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Abstract
Since 1978, China has been one of the fastest growing economies in the world. 
Notable features of its economic performance have been its industrial growth 
and the expansion of its manufactured exports. The focus of this research is 
China’s industrial performance during the years 1980 and 1992. Its principal 
objective is to analyze industrial growth from the twin perspectives of 
resource mobilisation and productivity change. It is argued that these two 
aspects, both of which reflect the impact of Dengist reforms, are inter­
related .
Our analysis of resource mobilisation suggests that a number of factors 
have contributed to China's rapid industrial growth. Two of these have been 
of particular importance. First, increased emphasis on the role of the market, 
in terms of facilitating more rapid growth of household demand and 
strengthening intersectoral linkages, enabled the industrial sector to improve 
its access to widening domestic and foreign markets. Second, the 
transformation of funding arrangements for industry had two beneficial 
results: it permitted non-state agents to play a greater role in financing 
industrial expansion; and it enabled the traditional state funding system to 
enhance its role as a means of improving intersectoral balance.
The analysis of productivity change in post-reform industry is 
deliberately set in the context of the changes in market structures which have 
faced China's industrial enterprises. Our findings indicate that enterprise 
reforms and structural adjustments have been a source of improvement in levels 
of Industrial productivity in China. But they also suggest that such 
improvements have been neither consistent, nor balanced over time and between 
different branches of industry.
In an attempt to identify the forces which have given rise to the 
distinctive patterns of resource mobilisation and productivity change in 
China's industrial sector under the impact of reform, we have deliberately 
focused on the interactions between government, enterprises and the market. 
It is noteworthy that the increased role played by regional and local 
governments has facilitated the more intensive use of local productive 
resources. But it is also clear that the same factor has been the source of 
regional market fragmentation. Both of these elements have impacted on China's 
industrial performance since the early 1980s.
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CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE (1980-1992): THE INTERACTION OF 
RESOURCE MOBILISATION AND PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
Chapter One
Introduction
The central theme of our study on the performance of China's industry 1980- 
1992 is to explain China's industrial growth in terms of resource mobilisation 
and productivity change. The two aspects are regarded as being interrelated. 
In this introduction, we will first outline the objective and structure of the 
study in Section I. A brief account of reforms and growth in China's industry 
since the later 1970s is given in Section II. Our analytical framework for the 
study is set forth in Section III by highlighting some theoretical 
generalisations concerning economic performance analysis.
I. The Structure of Study
As some theorists note, economic growth may be explained in many different 
ways for different purposes such as growth prediction or impact assessment of 
a development policy*. Our purpose set forth here in this research programme 
is to assess the economic performance of post-reform China's industry with 
reference to resource mobilisation and productivity change. It is concerned 
with the issue of policy implications as described below.
* See, for example, Richard R. Nelson: "Recent Exercises in Growth
Accounting: New Understanding or Dead End?", American Economic Review fAERl, 
Vol. 63, No. 3, June 1973.
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First, our central concern is the overall orientation of reform 
policies relating to China's industry. As summarised in the next section, 
China's reform policy has two characteristics: firstly, moving gradually
towards a market-type economy in virtually all areas but, secondly, the 
progress has been uneven in some areas. With this broad background, we intend 
to reveal how China's industrial growth has been influenced by the reforms in 
terms of both overall and sub-sectoral trends in output growth and 
productivity change.
Second, our standpoint in the study can be regarded as a combination 
of forward-looking perspective and retrospection. The forward-looking 
perspective tends to give more consideration to factors that are believed to 
obstruct further development and therefore illuminates in a broad sense the 
possible direction of future reforms. The retrospective view, on the other 
hand, emphasises more of the differences between the pre- and post-reform 
periods and therefore helps to reveal factors that are considered to be 
conducive to economic development. The two perspectives are in principle 
complementary.
Economic performance is defined in our analytical framework as the 
extent to which economic actors respond to changes in the market by mobilising 
productive resources and improving their productivity. This general definition 
of economic performance arises from a more general perception that economic 
growth may be regarded as a process when resource mobilisation and 
productivity change are interrelated. Empirically, performance assessment may 
be sought with comparison of output growth, input growth, and productivity 
change, at economy and sector levels. Our analysis will therefore aim to 
explore these measures in post-reform China's industry and their relative
3
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change by making full use of newly-enriched official Chinese statistics .
The structure of the research programme falls into three parts. The 
first part, consisting of Chapters Two and Three, deals with market expansion 
and investment expansion in post-reform China’s industry. Market expansion 
concerns issues such as the restoration of inter-sectoral linkages through the 
market, and the pursuit of market expansion both at home and abroad.
Investment expansion concerns the mobilisation of capital resources into
industry in the context of changed inter-sectoral relations. Transformation 
of inter-sectoral relations is our analytical focus. The second part,
consisting of Chapters Four, Five and Six, contains our comparative study of 
output growth and productivity change in post-reform China's industry. Our 
empirical investigation has been broken down into sub-sector level and also 
taken into account sectoral shifts and their impact. The third part,
consisting of Chapters Seven and Eight, presents our tentative interpretation 
of post-reform Chinese industrial growth in terms of interaction between 
enterprises, governments(including regional and local governments) and the 
market. The investigation is conducted at industrial branch and provincial 
region level, respectively. The purpose is to reveal how resource mobilisation 
has been linked, by economic actors in post-reform China's industry, with 
gains from greater market exposure.
The contents of individual chapters are as follows.
In Chapter Two, we examine the factors that fostered growing demand 
in post-reform China's industrial markets. The following positive impacts of 
reforms on China's industrial growth are exhibited, (i) The household sector 
grew faster in the post-reform period which boosted a growing demand for
2
The State Statistics Bureau of China [SSB] has published sectoral data 
for China's industry since 1985. But the scope and definitions of statistical 
data have been subject to some frequent alterations. Series on a more 
consistent basis began to appear in 1989 and continue to a recent date.
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industrial consumer goods; (ii) accelerated urbanisation is considered a 
significant factor that helped to enlarge domestic markets for industrial 
goods; (iii) linkages between heavy and light industry began to be restored 
through the market. Along with structural changes and technological progress, 
demand for capital goods was also growing; (iv) the open-door policy has given 
Chinese industrial enterprises more exposure to overseas markets and therefore 
enable them to take advantage of growing foreign demand. Altogether, changes 
in industrial markets have substantially helped to transform the inter­
sectoral constraints facing China's industry.
Chapter Three deals with investment expansion in post-reform China’s 
industry. The key questions faced include: (i) to what extent has post-reform 
China's industrial growth relied on investment expansion? (ii) along with 
changes in the state funding system and reforms in financial markets, how 
could China's industry maintain its high tendency towards investment 
expansion? (iii) what role is played by the continued state funding for 
industrial growth compared to that of market forces? Our investigations show 
that post-reform China's industrial growth has been to a large extent 
supported by fast investment expansion, and sources of industrial investment 
funds have became diversified and also conducive to industrial expansion. We 
also find that unbalanced sectoral movements existed in post-reform China's 
industrial investment expansion.
Chapter Four is an introduction to our productivity analysis, which 
makes use of the total factor productivity method. The purpose of total factor 
productivity analysis is to compare the relative contributions to output 
growth of input growth and productivity improvement. The main arguments we 
present there are: (i) total factor productivity can be taken as an indicator 
of productivity growth that may be conceptually different from technological 
progress; (ii) market conditions and their changes must be taken into account
5
when interpreting the results of total factor productivity analysis; (iii) 
sectoral shifts may be an important source of aggregate total factor 
productivity. In that chapter, we also clarify some issues concerning the use 
of official Chinese industrial statistics.
In Chapter Five, we elaborate existing statistical data to obtain a 
series of industrial output and input level in 1980-1992 with a consistent 
basis. Features of this work include: (i) the newly-available producer price 
index is used to deflate industrial output; (ii) price deflators for the 
industrial capital base for the whole period 1980-1992 are constructed in a 
manner consistent with their official counterpart which covers recent years 
only; (iii) as an experiment, we have also attempted to establish factor 
shares of industrial output for the whole period, which is considered 
particularly useful for revealing sharply-contrasting trends in returns to 
factors in post-reform China’s industry. Results of the work provide a 
consistent base for the total factor productivity estimates that are presented 
in Chapter Six.
For total factor productivity at industry level we have compared 
several measures of output and capital inputs, in Chapter Six, which have 
implications for current debate. To further the analysis, we explore at sector 
level in industry: sectors by form of ownership, by type of activity, and by 
size of enterprise. The purpose of this decomposition is, firstly, to 
ascertain particular sectoral sources of aggregate total factor productivity, 
and secondly, to establish the impact of sectoral shifts on aggregate total 
factor productivity. Through comparisons of output growth, input growth, and 
total factor productivity, across sectors and over periods, our empirical 
investigations reveal a number of important features of output growth and 
productivity change in post-reform China’s industry.
The finding in Chapter Six confirms that, overall, post-reform
6
China's industry has achieved positive productivity growth, though not to a 
great degree. The relatively slow growth in productivity does not, to our 
understanding, imply that technological progress in post-reform China's 
industry has been sluggish. What the result would suggest may be that the 
positive impact of technological progress on productivity growth may have been 
to a certain degree concealed by some other factors that have impeded the 
productivity growth in post-reform China's industry. To reveal these factors 
and their influences on industrial growth, we need to consider the impact of 
reforms on market structure and enterprise behaviour which were all under the 
influence of regional and local governments. Investigation of these issues is 
conducted in Chapters Seven and Eight.
The study in Chapter Seven examines the issue of profit-oriented 
behaviour of post-reform Chinese industrial enterprises. We hypothesise that 
stronger profit-seeking behaviour and greater mobility of capital across 
branches would lead to returns on capital converging between industrial 
branches. It is found that a popular result sought by post-reform China's 
industrial enterprises was a mixture of profits and tax returns. This finding 
suggests that the behaviour of China's industrial enterprises was under the 
great influence of governments, especially regional and local governments.
The impact of regional governments* direct intervention on industrial 
growth is examined in Chapter Eight. Though market forces have played a 
greater role in determining geographical shifts of industrial production in 
the post-reform period, we have found that regional governments exerted great 
influence on regional industrialisation by controlling regional markets and 
productive resources including raw material supply. We have also found a 
characteristic of factor markets in post-reform China's industry: capital 
movement across branches within a region developed faster than capital 
movement across regions. A degree of market fragmentation formed a feature of
7
decentralisation in post-reform China’s industry. Though the market
fragmentation had certain negative impacts on productivity growth, it was
nevertheless an outcome of the greater role played by regional governments in 
mobilising and allocating regional productive resources including market 
exploration and raw material supply.
Chapter Nine concludes our study of the performance of post-reform 
China’s industry. In summarising the results of analysis, it highlights two 
questions of particular importance: (i) how is resource mobilisation related 
to productivity improvement in post-reform China’s industry? (ii) what are the 
basic causes of unbalanced growth in post-reform China’s industry?
II. Reforms and Growth in China's Industry: A Brief Account
Following reforms in agriculture, reforms began in China's industry in the
later 1970s with the introduction of an increased autonomy for enterprise, in 
the form of the profit retention scheme(1979) and economic responsibility 
system(1980) . These measures aimed at improving the efficiency of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) by granting them more material incentives, and a degree of 
freedom to adjust production plans. However, under these measures the 
responsibilities of enterprises and their supervisory bureaux were often not 
clearly demarcated, and so because subject to endless negotiations. A new 
reform, the contract responsibility system that aimed to define more 
explicitly enterprise responsibility, was introduced in 1987, and has become 
central to the operation of SOEs since then .
Parallell with reforms in SOEs is the opening up of the non-state 
sector. In the pre-reform period after the mid-1950s, the only form of non-
i
For a comprehensive review of reforms in SOEs, see: Qimiao Fan and Mark 
E. Schaffer, Enterprise Reforms in Chinese and Polish State-Owned Industries, 
CP No. 13, STICERD, the London School of Economics, April 1991
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state enterprise in industry was collective enterprises (COEs), most of which 
operated on a small scale in urban areas. While this type of COE has continued 
to grow in the post-reform period, its counterpart in rural areas, the 
township and village enterprises (TVEs), registered faster growth. The rapid 
growth of TVEs constitutes a basic feature of post-reform China's industrial 
development. Meanwhile, other forms of ownership, joint-ownership enterprises 
(JOEs) and individual and private enterprises (IPEs), have also achieved 
impressive growth records(Figure 1-1).
Figure 1-1. Percentage Share in Industrial Production by Form of Ownership
d ]  1992% SOEs 
78.7
48.1
1980
TVEs
26.2
Urban COEs
15.1
11.8
5.6
JOEs
7.1
0.6
IPEs
6
0.02
Data source: The State Statistics Bureau [SSB], Zhonqquo tonqji aianjian (The Statistical Yearbook of 
China), thereafter TJNJ, (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanse, 1993), p.409; SSB, Zhonqquo gongye iingji tonqji 
zhiliao (The Statistical Data of China's Industrial Economy), thereafter ZGGYJJTJZL (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji 
chubanshe, 1986), p . 128.
Because enterprises with these various forms of ownership arose from different 
environments there are considerable structural and behavioural differences 
among them. We will examine the distinctive natures of the enterprises and 
their implications later in our study (particularly in Section III of Chapter 
Four and Section III of Chapter Seven). Here it is sufficient to note that 
SOEs are still the leading sector in urban areas in terms of its absorption 
of employment(Table 1-1). By 1992, though more than one half of all China's
9
industrial employment was absorbed by non-state enterprises, over two-thirds 
of industrial workers in urban areas remained in SOEs. This rate of urban 
industrial employment is virtually the same as that in 1985.
Table 1-1. SOEs in China’s industry(%)
1978 1985 1988 1992
In industrial production 77.6 64.9 56.8 48.1
In industrial employment 51.5 45.7 43.8 44.2
In urban industrial employment 72.1 68.7 68.7 68.3
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  TJNJ 1993, p.4l4(industrial production), p.98(total labour force engaged in industry); 
p . 104(total urban industrial employment).
Besides enterprise reforms, a cluster of de-regulations were 
gradually introduced into industrial markets. Price de-controls first appeared 
in some consumer goods markets where supply roughly balanced demand, spreading 
eventually over virtually all consumer goods. In capital goods markets, a two- 
track pricing system was introduced in the mid-1980s to allow for a greater 
role for market demand whilst planning authorities maintained a degree of 
control over the operations of SOEs. The overall trend in this respect is that 
price determination of an increasing number of products, both consumer goods 
and capital goods, become free of direct government control^.
Reforms in labour markets and capital markets have been rather slow 
and uneven, on the other hand. From their onset TVEs have had great 
flexibility in forming employment contracts. In contrast, SOEs faced strong 
resistance to their gaining any ability to decide employment levels. There
4
For a more accurate and detailed account of development in price 
reforms in China, see William A. Byrd, The Market Mechanism and Economic 
Reforms in China, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1991
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does not yet exist an effective social security system that would provide for
5
possible mass unemployment in urban areas . In financial markets, specialised
state banking institutions have undergone a degree of commercialization but
mostly in areas of short-term and small-scale operations. Notwithstanding
their de-linking with the state, those specialised state banking institutions
fi 7
have become subject to more interventions by regional governments ' .
Relations between central and regional governments over economic 
development have experienced a great deal of change. In 1980, a form of tax- 
return-sharing scheme was introduced between central and provincial 
authorities which gave regional governments strong incentives to seek 
production expansion. With the weakening of the centrally planned system,
regional governments gained more power to initiate their own development
0
policies . In this respect, decentralisation is key to the overall trend of 
reform in China.
Reforms have also evolved in external economic relations. Under the 
open-door policy, a number of special economic zones were set up in coastal 
areas to attract foreign capital inflow and promote export-oriented 
activities, as well as to establish examples of a market-type economy for 
China's industrial enterprises. Meanwhile, the Chinese government has
See, Athar Hussain, "Social Security in Present-Day China and Its 
Reform", AER, Vol. 84, No. 2, May 1994
® See, for details, Ryoshin Minami, The Economic Development of China: 
A Comparison with the Japanese Experience, London: Macmillan, 1994, Sec, 2.3
i
The imbalance and fragmented characteristics of China's factor 
markets(e.g . , labour, capital and land) have been well tackled in William A. 
Byrd and Gene Tidrick, "Factor Allocation and Enterprise Incentives", in 
China's Industrial Reform, ed. by Gene Tidrick and Chen Jiyuan, New York: 
Oxford University Press [OUP], 1987
0
For a review of fiscal reforms regarding to relations between the 
central and regional/local governments, see Christine P.W. Wong, "Central- 
Local Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: The Paradox of Fiscal
Decentralization in Post-Mao China", The China Quarterly [CQ], No. 128 
(December 1991)
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undertaken a number of protective policies to prevent domestic industry from 
foreign competition, and has used macroeconomic measures such as devaluations
Q
of RMB .to promote export expansion in overseas markets .
With reforms in all these spheres, China's industry has achieved a
high growth rate since the late 1970s. In official Chinese statistics, the
annual average growth rate of the gross value of industrial output(GVIO),
measured in constant 1980 prices, has reached as high as 13.2% in 1979-1992,
that is clearly higher than that of 9.5% in the 1970s^. Viewed from
estimates made by the World Bank, the rapid industrial growth in post-reform
China is also impressive. The Bank's estimates show that the average annual
growth rate of value added in China's industry was 11.0% in 1980-1991, again
a clear rise from that of 7.8% in 1970-1980^. It is evident that industrial
12growth in China in the post-reform period has accelerated .
Coupled with the overall growth in industrial production, China's 
manufacturing exports have registered an even faster growth record. From 1978 
to 1992, China's total commodity exports in dollar value increased nearly 
ninefold, equivalent to an annual average growth rate of 16.7%. Meanwhile, the
q
For an overall summary on China's foreign trade policy and its 
evolution, see: Erin McGuire Endean, "China's Foreign Commercial Relations", 
in the US Congress Joint Economic Committee [USCJEC], China's Economic 
Dilemmas in the 1990s: The Problems of Reforms. Modernization, and
Interdependence, Vol. II, Washington, D.C., 1991
^  Figures cited here and thereafter, unless otherwise stated, are from 
the TJNJ 1993.
^ See the World Bank [WB], World Development Report 1993, World 
Development Indicators. Figures about China's industrial growth reported there 
are estimated by the World Bank.
1? It may be noted that while industry continued to be the leading sector 
in China's economy in terms of GDP creation and relative speed of growth, its 
position in the economy has slightly changed as other sectors experienced more 
impressive growth in post-reform period. In 1980-1991, the annual growth rate 
of the agricultural and service sectors was 5.7% and 11.2% respectively, much 
higher than their growth rate in the 1970s (2.6% and 6.1% respectively). See 
W B , ibid.
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share of manufactured goods in the total of commodity exports rose from about 
45% to 80%. The average annual growth rate of China's manufacturing exports
n
was as high as over 18% in 1980-1992. In the United Nations' estimates , 
China's total exports expanded at 16% annually in 1980-1991, resulting in 
China's rating in the ranking of the world's exporters escalating to eleventh 
from twenty seventh. Their estimates also show that the share of manufactured 
goods in the total level of exports rose to 77% from 50% during the same 
period. This rapid export growth has also helped China to become one of the 
leading importers in the world(the eleventh largest importer in 1992) and 
therefore to begin to have a significant impact on the world economy. This is 
unprecedented in China's economic history.
From these statistical records of industrial output growth and 
manufacturing export expansion in post-reform China, it is not surprising when 
an observer concludes that "the reality of rapid and sustained growth [in 
China's industry] is beyond dispute"^. It looks certain that reforms have 
led China to achieve rapid and sustained industrial growth. On the other hand, 
however, it seems unclear exactly how the industrial growth was associated 
with resource mobilisation and productivity change. To this question our 
present study will respond.
III. Performance Analysis: An Analytical Framework
The central question we address in the present study is not whether China's 
industry has achieved a respectable growth record, but what economic 
implications the high growth record has for China's industrial development
^  The United Nations [UN], World Economic Survey 1993, Box III.2: China: 
Another Success in Asia of an Outward-Looking Development Strategy, pp.67-68.
^ Thomas G. Rawski, "China's Industrial Reform: Accomplishments,
Prospects, and Implications", AER, Vol. 84, No. 2 (May 1994), p. 271
13
under reforms. Currently, not only are there doubts over how China's ability
15to achieve the high industrial growth during a period longer than a decade , 
but also a controversy has arisen over whether the high growth has also meant 
improvement in efficiency in China's industry. An author has expressed his 
scepticism thus:
While the Chinese have achieved a high rate of growth, they have 
not yet been able to raise significantly the productivity of labour or 
the efficiency with which capital is used, particularly at state- 
operated enterprises.^
On the other side, some observers have strongly argued for an opposite 
judgement:
The increasing efficiency of China's industry is indicated by its 
success in selling in competitive world markets: exports grew in real 
terms at over 10% per year between 1978 and 1990; the ratio of exports 
to GNP had risen to 17%(compare this to Japan's 9%). While growth of 
national income should not be the only criterion for evaluating the 
success of economic policies, it is the first and most important 
indicator of success. An economic system ---  especially in a poor
For example, some economists have questioned: "Why China has grown so 
fast when conditions thought to be necessary for growth... . were absent?" 
(Oliver Blanchard and Stanley Fisher, eds. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1993. 
Boston: MIT Press, 1993, p.4; quoted in Rawski, ibid.)
^  Robert Michael Field, "China's Industrial Performance since 1978", CQ, 
No. 131(September 1992). Similar remarks can be also found elsewhere, for 
example, Jan S. Prybyla, Reforms in China and Other Socialist Economies. Ch. 
13, Why China's Economic Reforms Fail?, Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1990; 
and Wing Thye Woo, Wen Hai, Yibiao Jin, and Fang Fan, "How Successful Has 
Chinese Enterprise Reform Been? Pitfalls in Opposite Biases and Focus", 
Journal of Comparative EconomicsTJCE1, 18:410-437, 1994
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country --- must be judged by its performance in providing increased
levels of goods to its citizens, and this can be roughly measured by the
growth of GNP per capita. By the simple criterion of making ordinary
people better off(or, more accurately, less badly off), China has been
17spectacularly successful.
Involved in the debate are a number of theoretical issues concerning economic 
performance assessment, which include: (i) the critera of economic performance 
applicable to an economy or industry; (ii) the relationship between resource 
use and productivity change; and (iii) the implications of an imbalance in 
market conditions for long-term development. Below we will set forth our 
analytical framework for this study by attempting to define these issues.
1. Conceptual Note on Performance, Productivity, Technological Progress, and 
Production Efficiency
Terms of performance, productivity change, technological progress, and
production efficiency are sometimes used inter-changeably in the literature.
For example, to some economists, economic performance is regarded as a
18reflection of productivity change or technological progress only or mostly ,
17
John McMillan and Barry Naughton, "How to Reform a Planned Economy: 
Lessons from China", Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January 
1992), p.133. The authors have gone so far as to say that SOEs in China have 
"achieved respectable productivity gains"(p.135). A more recent expression of 
this assessment has been made by Thomas G. Rawski, saying, "[China's i]ndustry 
has broken a long-standing pattern of 'extensive' output growth arising from 
applying larger quantities of labour, capital and materials to the production 
process."(see his, o p .cit., p.271).
18 For example, Bruce Reynolds has judged China's industrial performance 
by referring to the total factor productivity that led him to arrive at 
"dismal failure" of reforms in China's industry up to mid-1980s. See his, 
"Introduction", in a special symposium on Chinese industrial reform, JCE, 
September 1987
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to some others, technological progress may be in general indicative of
1 Q
productivity change or efficiency improvement . For our purpose of analysis 
it seems imperative to give each of these terms a distinctive definition, in 
a manner which conforms to economists’ general perception of production.
By "the general perception of production" we imply those general and 
less-controversial points made about production. They may include: (i) the
purpose of production is to seek gains by using productive resources; (ii) 
production is a process caused by interaction between forces of demand and 
supply; (iii) all production faces certain resource constraints and 
technological constraints: the former is the degree of availability of or 
access to productive resources, and the latter is the possible level of 
maximum output obtained from a status quo use of resources. Given these 
premises it is possible to define the above terms as follows.
(1) production efficiency: it refers to a move in production towards
the possible maximum output under unchanged technological and resource
constraints as well as demand conditions. Referring to the terminology used
in production function theory, this implies a move from interior points
towards a production frontier when the frontier is held unchanged at a point
of time. Production efficiency is also called technical efficiency in the
literature. The concept reveals any problem of disuse of factor inputs, such
as labour(implicit under-utilisation of employment), capital(idle fixed
20
capital stock), and materials(excessive consumption of raw materials) .
19 For a summarised account of this concept, see C. Kennedy and A. P. 
Thirlwall, "Technical Progress", Economic Journal, May 1972
20
Notion of production efficiency of this kind is firstly introduced by 
M. J. Farrell, "The Measurement of Productive Efficiency", Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society, A series 120, pt. 111(1957), 253-81. A theoretical 
justification of the concept is the X-inefficiency in a competitive firm(see, 
for example, R. S. Frantz, X-Efficiency: Theory, Evidence and Applications, 
Boston: Kluwer Academics, 1988). Economists with neoclassical inclination
actually tend to deny this concept. See, for example, George J. Stigler, 
"Xistence of X-Efficiency", M E ,  66:213-16 (May 1976). ‘
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Improvement in technical efficiency if any is conducive to overall 
productivity growth.
(2) technological progress: it refers to a change of the possible 
maximum output level under unchanged resource constraints and demand 
conditions. From a neoclassical production function point of view, this 
indicates that a production frontier has moved outwards, i.e. , use of the same 
quantity of factor inputs has generated a higher level of output. Sources of 
technological progress may not necessarily lie only in technical inventions 
or equipment up-grading. Factors such as increasing returns to scale, learning 
by doing, and improved organisational competence may all help a shift in the 
production frontier. From a long-term development point of view, technological 
progress is a most important source of economic growth and productivity 
growth.
(3) productivity change: it refers to gain in production when 
resource constraints remain unchanged but demand conditions may or may not 
change. Conceptually, if demand conditions are unchanged, productivity change 
is virtually the same as technological progress. Important differences between 
the two concepts can arise however when demand conditions change over time. 
Changes in demand conditions will certainly affect productivity but have no 
impact, by definition, on technological progress. By "changes in demand 
conditions" we mainly mean changes in sectoral relative prices within an
economy and/or for an open economy changes in the terms of trade with foreign
21countries . An emphasised difference between productivity change and 
technological progress here is that demand conditions or changes in demand
71 In the field of international trade, economists have demonstrated that 
under certain conditions, changes in terms of trade can have an impact on a 
country's gains from its production expansion. Literature on the "immiserising 
growth" is a typical case. See, for example, Jagdish Bhagwati, "Immiserizing 
Growth: A Geometrical Note", Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3 (June 
1958)
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conditions can have an impact on gains from production in the case of 
productivity change, but when dealing with technological progress the impact 
has been assumed away. We will give a detailed illustration of the 
implications of changed demand conditions on aggregate productivity in terms 
of sectoral production shifts later in Section II of Chapter Four.
(4) economic performance: it refers to changes in production when 
various constraints, of technology or of resources, may have all changed over 
a period of time. Changes in resource use can be a simply quantitative 
increase or re-allocation of existing resources. As all of the constraints may 
be subject to change over time, economic performance is in essence a long-term 
issue and therefore usually related to overall achievement in an economy or 
industry. Because of this overall nature, the term economic performance can 
contain many measurable elements, as put by an author:
The most convenient way of assessing industrial success would thus 
be to examine the growth of manufacturing value-added over a long 
period, and such indicators of efficiency and dynamism as incremental 
capital-output ratios, growth of total factor productivity, export
growth and diversification, and levels of protection afforded to
11domestic industry.
An essential feature of the concept of economic performance is therefore that 
resource constraints facing an economy or industry can change or can be 
changed over a course of development. Factors that may be involved, for 
instance, may be a greater participation of the population in the labour 
force, a new discovery of mineral reserves, or more access to foreign markets
22 Sanjaya Lall, "Explaining Industrial Success in the Developing World", 
in Current Issues in Development Economics, ed. by V. N. Balasubramanyam, 
London: Macmillan, 1991, p.122
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or foreign financial assistance. For this reason, any assessment of economic 
performance should necessarily take into account issues of resource 
mobilisation as well as that of productivity change.
Based on this understanding of economic performance, our study will 
examine both of these issues, resource mobilisation and productivity change, 
in post-reform China's industry. In studying productivity change, issues of 
production efficiency and technological progress will also be taken into 
account.
2. Resource Mobilisation versus Productivity Change
Having said that the concept of economic performance entails resource 
mobilisation and productivity change, it is felt that the relationship between 
the two terms needs to be defined further, to clarify their relative 
implication for performance analysis. Main points that we wish to make here 
are: (i) decomposition of economic growth into resource inputs and
productivity change can be used to distinguish paths of economic development; 
(ii) the relative importance of resource mobilisation and productivity change 
is an important issue when considering production expansion; (iii) from a 
longer-term perspective of economic development, productivity increase is a 
more important element and therefore should be given more attention in overall 
performance assessment. Discussion below is brief and serves to justify our 
analytical framework of the performance of post-reform China's industry.
The theme that economic growth can be regarded as a process formed 
by the interaction of resource mobilisation and productivity has been 
expressed by development economists. For example, Moshe Syrquin has put it,
The process of economic growth can be formally described as the
19
result of the expansion of productive resources and the increase in the 
efficiency of their use.
A policy implication of this perception of economic growth is that emphasis 
may be given to either an increased use of resources or an improvement in 
productivity. This has also been articulated by development economists:
Development strategies try to accelerate growth either through 
increasing the supply of labour and capital or through more efficient
A
use of resources.
Accordingly, the biases in economic growth or development strategy may be 
described as either "extensive growth" or "intensive growth". "Extensive 
growth" means an increase in resource use overshadowing productivity 
improvement, and "intensive growth" refers to the contrary case. Although 
these terms are still subject to rigorous definition as economic growth would 
usually involve both increase in resource use and productivity change, 
economists have used them to analyse some of the developing economies, e.g., 
China^.
A more sensible question associated with the notions of "extensive" 
and "intensive" growth may be to ask what rationale would lie behind the 
policy inclinations classified by the "extensive" and "intensive" growth
Moshe Syrquin, "Patterns of Structural Change", in Handbook of 
Development Economics. Vol. I, ed. by Hollis Chenery and T. N. Srinivasan, 
Amsterdam: North Holland, 1988, p.224
1L
Hollis Chenery and Moshe Syrquin, Industrialization and Growth: A 
Comparative Study, New York: OUP, 1986, p.95
For example, Thomas G. Rawski concluded in mid-1980s that in China's 
industry, "the desired transition from ’extensive1 to 'intensive1 growth has 
hardly began"("Overview: Industry and Transport", in USCJEC, eds. Chinese
Economy to the Year of 2000, Washington, D.C., 1986, p.502).
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approaches. Exploration into this question would lead us far beyond the scope 
of the present study. We however wish to stress here that the biases in policy 
inclination would arise from differences in the perception of gains from 
production expansion and such differences could affect the critera appropriate
)C
for the evaluation of economic performance .
Let's take two simplistic and extreme cases to illustrate the point. 
One is that gains are perceived mostly as physical increases in production. 
For example, iron and steel was singled out on the top development agenda by 
the Chinese leadership during the "Great Leap Forward". Taking it for granted 
that the target was warranted for, say, national interest, the criterion of 
success would be an increase in the output of iron and steel with little 
regard to the costs incurred in achieving the output growth. Another and more 
general case is that gains are perceived as the income earned by productive 
factors including labour. Obviously real average income would not necessarily 
increase with output growth, since costs incurred are not taken into account. 
In general, seeking real income growth would require emphasising productivity 
improvement, whilst seeking production expansion itself would demand greater 
input growth especially in the short run.
Compared to the policy emphasising productivity improvement, 
development policy emphasising production expansion would have a stronger
? fi
Note a remark made on the issue in the 1970s: "Any attempt to evaluate 
the post-1945 development experience needs first to recognize the change in 
objectives over the period. In recent years, there has been a sharp shift in 
emphases. It is now considered that maximization of the gross national 
product(GNP) per capita is too narrow an objective; aims related to the 
reduction of poverty also need to be considered, such as improving income 
distribution, increasing employment, and fulfilling basic needs." David 
Morawets, "Twenty-Five Years of Economic Development", Finance and 
Development, September 1977; reprinted in Leading Issues in Economic 
Development, ed. by Gerald M. Meier, New York: OUP, 4th edition, 1984, p.45
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27Implication for employment creation . When the population grows fast and a 
huge amount of surplus labour in rural areas builds up, employment pressure 
will be high in the economy. Under such situations, the perception of economic 
gain would be linked to production expansion and less associated with 
productivity improvement. The link here between employment growth and 
production expansion means that those who are not in employment yet may get 
more more benefit; on the other hand, an emphasis on productivity improvement 
would tend to provide benefit mostly to those who are already in the process
TO
of production, at least in the short run .
In the long run, another situation can occur when population growth 
slows down and employment pressure becomes less fierce. With these changes, 
the perception of economic gain would shift towards productivity improvement 
as it is a source of real average income growth.
In short, the above discussion leads us to a more balanced view 
towards economic growth(economic performance) in terms of the relative 
importance of input growth(an increase in resource use) and productivity 
change(the efficiency of resource use). It appears that this stand-point has 
become a development economists' consensus, as it has been summarised below:
27 For a socialist-styled economy, this can be seen from a formal and 
simplified description. Suppose that the central planner is to decide division 
of output(Q) between labour(L) and social savings(assuming that labour is the 
only factor in the economy, and workers do not save from their wages), so that 
Q = wL + sQ, where w Is wage rate and s ratio of social savings to output. 
Writing the Q on the left-hand side as a product of labour(L) and labour 
productivity(1), we can obtain a new expression: L = {s/(1 - w)}Q. This may 
be seen as an employment function in a socialist-styled economy: it is
positively related with production(Q) but negatively with labour
productivity(1).
28 This distinction of economic gains has been used, at a micro level,
to explain SOEs' behaviour in China: the worker-dominated enterprises tended
to maximize total net product(in terms of income received by all family 
members, currently employed or would-be employed) rather than average net 
product (in terms of income received by currently-employed family members) . See 
William Byrd and Gene Tidrick, op.cit.. pp.62-63.
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At the first level, the growth of total output is explained by the
growth of various inputs, typically labour and capital. At a second
level, the growth of these inputs in turn needs to be explained, as well
29as changes in their efficiency in producing output.
We shall therefore consider both of these two aspects in explaining post- 
reform China's industrial growth: resource increase and productivity change. 
In investigating these factors we will further relate them and the 
relationship between them to the transitional nature of China's industry in 
the post-reform period.
3. Balanced and Unbalanced Growth
The terms balanced, unbalanced, and an imbalance in growth will be frequently 
used in our descriptions and analyses of post-reform China's industry. It is 
felt necessary to give them some clarification here to avoid ambiguities or 
mis-interpretations. In recognition of possibly plural usages of these terms, 
we shall define them in a framework concerning the transition from a planning 
system to a market economy.
A common feature of the terms balanced, unbalanced, and an imbalance 
in growth is the concern with inter-sector or inter-branch relationship in an 
economy. The relationships are measured in two ways: output growth rate and 
productivity. Needless to say that even in a market economy, the rate of 
growth in different sectors or branches would hardly be same since relative 
demand and supply forces differ. Yet differences in productivity would exist 
among sectors or branches at any point in time due to various factors or 
conditions, but in the long run such differences would diminish. The driving
^  Maurice Scott, "Explaining Economic Growth", AER, May 1993.
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forces in the convergence process are the price flexibility and factor 
mobility. If there are differences in sectoral productivity, factors would 
tend to flow into those with higher productivity away from those with lower 
productivity. With these sectoral supply changes, factor prices in sectors 
with increasing factors would go down relative to prices in sectors with 
decreasing factors. Productivity in terms of returns to factors will thus tend 
to converge among sectors over a certain period of time, in a market economy.
In a planning system, inter-sector relationships are however subject-
to planning authorities' intervention since they control sectoral prices and
factor flow across sectors. Under such an economic system, not only could
unbalanced or an imbalance on inter-sector relationships occur but also they
may be a persistent feature over time. Unbalanced growth occurs when planning
authorities shift factor inputs into a few selected sectors to seek higher
10growth in the targeted areas . That pre-reform China stronly invested in its 
heavy industry such as iron and steel production is a typical example. A 
characteristic of unbalanced growth is that inter-sector factor flow is not 
guided by the signals of market prices showing which sector offers greatest 
productivity, but by plans.
On the other hand, unbalance does not necessarily mean imbalance as 
long as the equality between supply and demand is maintained. An imbalance in 
relationships refers particularly to a situation where there is excessive 
demand relative to supply (shortages) or excessive supply relative to demand 
(surpluses). In the sense that if prices are flexible enough there will be no 
shortages or surpluses at all, imbalances are a problem with price system. The 
problem of imbalances can become particularly severe when factor mobility
10 This definition of unbalance is in essence compliant with the 
theoretical generalization concerning the debate between the balanced growth 
model and the unbalanced growth model in development economics. See Pan A. 
Yotopoulos and Jeffrey B. Nugent, Economics of Development: Empirical
Investigations, New York: Harper & Row, 1976, pp.293.
24
31increases but prices remain distorted and inflexible .
Transition from a planning system to a market-type economy therefore 
requires both greater factor mobility and the free price realignment available 
with market conditions. The success of the transition would be thus 
characterised by a diminution of unbalanced or any imbalance in sectoral 
relationships.
In the above discussion, we have related the issue of unbalance with
government intervention. This however should not always be the case. First,
we do not mean that all government interventions are undesirable. In some
areas, such as issues concerning regional development, intervention enforced
by a central government would be economically healthy and important so as to
prevent uneven trends from becoming hazardous. In fact, unbalanced
32relationships of certain types do also exist in market economies . Secondly, 
the term of "unbalance1' can also in some cases refer to gaps between an actual 
situation and a desirable state in terms of what transition and long-term 
economic development would require. This is a meaning of the term "unbalance" 
in a broad sense. With this perception, we may be able to tackle issues 
concerning the interaction of market forces and government intervention. For 
instance, when discussing sectoral differences between state investment and 
enterprise investment later, in Chapter Three, we will show that state 
investment in industry actually acts as a force to respond to some problems 
of unbalanced growth incurred within an imperfect transition environment where
3] Firstly, distorted prices will send a wrong signal to enterprises over 
productivity or profitability; secondly, shortages or surpluses so incurred 
may not be able to be rectified by adjusting prices. See William Byrd and Gene 
Tidrick, o p .cit., pp.91-92.
3? For example, it has been observed that agricultural productivity in 
developed countries tends to be inflated by protection policy. See Alfred 
Maizels, Industrial Growth and World Trade, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press [CUP], 1963, pp.27-28.
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33market forces cannot yet play a sufficient self-correcting role .
In the present study, we will mainly confine our attention to 
relative production expansion and productivity change between sectors or 
branches in post-reform China's industry(Chapter Six). Furthermore, we wish 
to show how successful reforms have helped to transform inter-branch or inter­
region relationships, generating a shift towards a state where market forces 
play a more important and more self-sufficient role in determining these 
relationships(Chapters Seven and Eight). Our analysis will be focused upon how 
resource mobilisation and productivity improvement have interacted in the 
process of transition and growth in post-reform China's industry.
33 Overall, state interventions seem to have been in some cases a cause 
of unbalance problems and in other cases a counter-measure against unbalance 
problems. This is not just a phenomenon in industry. For Instance, in China's 
agricultural sector, it has been noted that in the mid-1980s, with state 
funding partially withdrawing, investment in agricultural Infrastructures saw 
a sign of decline, opposite to the requirements of long-term growth in 
agriculture. See Y.Y. Kueh and Robert F. Ash, eds., Economic Trends in Chinese 
Agriculture: The Impacts of Post-Mao Reforms, Oxford: OUP, 1993, Introduction; 
also, Robert F. Ash, "The agricultural Sector in China: Performance and Policy 
Dilemmas during the 1990s", CQ, No. 131 (September 1992)
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PART ONE
M O B I L I S I N G  R E S O U R C E S
Chapter Two
Market Expansion and Growth of Demand
The principal reasons for increasing the level of demand are to provide an 
enlarged market for the results of production and to guide structural shifts 
in production. In the sense that changes in demand are not a self-driving 
process especially from a long-term point of view an increase in demand can 
be regarded as an aspect of resource mobilisation. Firstly, an increase in 
demand raises the issue of which part of the total domestic market is to be 
increased. Secondly, it implies the use of foreign markets as an additional 
source of demand. In the process of economic transition, increases in demand 
and its impact on the level of economic growth are closely associated with a 
shift towards a system where increasingly important role is played by the 
market compared to the state command.
Market expansion and the growth of demand therefore stand out as an 
important issue in any appraisal of post-reform China’s industrial growth. The 
purpose of our study in this chapter is to trace basic trends in the post­
reform demand growth for industry and to exhibit some important implications 
of the changes in demand on industrial growth. The results which we have 
arrived at suggest that reforms have helped to significantly change the demand 
conditions facing China's industry and that industrial production is now 
affected by market forces.
28
In what follows we will first show the growth of the household sector 
and its impact on the increase in demand for industrial goods; this discussion 
is followed by a consideration of the growing demand for capital goods that 
has also become a feature of post-reform China’s industrial growth. Thirdly, 
we will turn to an appraisal of the use of foreign markets as an additional 
source of demand, which was made possible in China only after the 
implementation of the open-door policy. Last but not least, we will present 
an overview of the changed relationships between industry and other sectors, 
highlighted by the constraints on industrial growth caused by the lagged 
agricultural development. This section also serves to summarise the overall 
changes in demand facing industry, and changes in the way that industry is 
affected by market forces.
I. Growth of the Household Sector
In a summarised review of China’s economic growth up to the late 1970s, it is 
noted that,
A . . . distinguishing characteristic of Chinese development has been 
the ability of the nation to mobilize fully its resources for growth. 
The rising share of the producer goods sector is one aspect of this 
phenomenon. As national product has increased, China has succeeded in 
holding the rise in personal consumption to modest levels. Government 
consumption, mainly in the form of military expenditures necessitated 
by the 1960 break with the Soviet Union, rose sharply in the 1960s; 
despite this rise there is little doubt that China's investment rate 
(gross domestic capital formation as a percentage of GDP) has increased
29
to a very high level.^
That pre-reform China has been able to mobilise fully its resources for growth 
should be, to our understanding, interpreted to mean that the centralised 
economy has been able to raise the investment rate to a very high level and 
sustain this over a long period of time. It should be also pointed out that 
this was achieved primarily through depressing the growth of the household 
sector. The growth of the household sector was restrained in pre-reform China
9
mainly through the low wage policy in the urban-industry sector and the 
policy of exploitation in the rural-agriculture sector . Clearly, this type 
of resource mobilisation had its prices to pay: the slow growth of real 
consumption per capita and the slow development of agriculture^.
Dwight H. Perkins, "The Central Features of China's Economic 
Development", in China's Development Experience in Comparative Perspective, 
ed. by Robert F. Dernberger, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980, 
p.139
2
A summary of long-term trend in real wages in urban-industry China 
during the pre-reform period can be found in Christopher Howe, Wage Pattern 
and Wage Policy in Modern China 1919-1972, Cambridge: CUP, 1973, pp.28-54. 
Estimates there show that most of the post-1949 wage increase occurred in mid- 
1950s, and afterwards a tendency between decline and stagnation was seen.
3
Studies have shown that the rural-agricultural sector in China began 
to be subject to some systematic exploitation in the mid-1950s. Estimates made 
by Dwight Perkins and S. Yusuf(Rural Development in China, Washington, D.C.: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984, pp.17-21) show that the amount of 
agricultural net product that was siphoned off through agricultural tax and 
taxation on industrial goods sold in rural areas in the mid-1950s was about 
eight billion yuan in value, contributing to about 16% of the state's total 
investment. In addition, there was an implicit transfer through the low 
agricultural prices that was calculated as about two or three billion yuan in 
the 1950s.
 ^ In fact, some industrialisation policies implemented in pre-reform 
China had more damaging impacts on the economy than on the general growth rate 
of consumption or agriculture. For instance, the famine in the early 1960s may 
have occurred as China pursued resource mobilisation for its industrialisation 
too far. See Peter Nolan, "Why Do Famines Occur and How Can They Be Avoided? 
A Critique of A.K. Sen on Famine with Special Reference to China", in State 
and Market in the Chinese Economy: Essays on Controversial Issues, London:
Macmillan, 1993.
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Against this background, it is interesting to know the impact of
reform on the level of resource mobilisation when China has apparently changed
5
its policy towards the wage growth in the urban-industry sector and its 
policy towards rural-agricultural development^ in the post-reform period. The 
question may be addressed in another way: as the high investment rate was 
achieved under the centralised planning system through depressing the growth 
of the household sector and shifting resources away from the rural- 
agricultural sector, would it be expected to fall in the post-reform period 
when the household sector begins to grow fast, and the relationship of the 
rural-agriculture sector with the rest of the economy moves towards a more 
balanced state? We will show, in the next chapter, that post-reform China has 
been actually able to maintain a high investment rate and this has been to an 
increasingly large degree contributed to by household savings and rural 
investment. It is evident that forms of resource mobilisation have undergone 
significant changes and the recent growth of the household sector has exerted 
a positive impact on post-reform China's economic development.
5
As a reflection, official Chinese statistics record that the real 
average wage level in industry began to rise in 1978, after twelve years of 
stagnation since 1966; yet there are several years in the 1980s when real 
average wage outgrew real labour productivity in China's industry; overall, 
in 1978-1992, the annual growth rate of real average wages in urban-industry 
was 4.1%, and that of real labour productivity in industry (measured in gross 
output) was 4.9%(TJNJ 1993. pp.66, 132 and 431). Our study later in Section 
III of Chapter Five also shows that labour income as a percentage of net 
output in China's industry has risen considerably in 1980-1992. For a 
summarised account of post-reform wage issues, see: S. Jackson and C.R.
Little, "Wage Trends and Policies in China: Dynamics and Contradictions", 
Industrial Relations Journal, No. 22 (1991).
® For a comprehensive review of changes in China's policy towards the
rural-agricultural sector and the impact on accelerated agricultural growth 
in post-reform period, see Y.Y. Kueh and Robert F. Ash, eds. Economic Trends 
in Chinese Agriculture: The Impacts of Post-Mao Reforms. Oxford: OUP, 1993. 
A specific study on the topic of financial resource transfer concerning 
agriculture has been conducted in Yuling Sheng, Intersectoral Resource Flows 
and China's Economic Development, London: Macmillan, 1993. It concludes that 
net financial resource transfer from agriculture to urban-industry in China
ceased to be effective in 1979-1983.
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In this section, we will mainly consider basic trends in the post­
reform growth of the household sector and its implications for demand for 
China's industry. The propensity to consume industrial goods will be examined 
in both the urban and rural aspects, where previously existing differences 
provided a significant opportunity for the population shift from rural areas 
into urban areas to generate an immense impact on the demand for industrial 
goods.
1. The Household Sector
In current official Chinese statistics there is no decomposition of national 
income into personal or household income. What is recorded on the expenditure 
side of national income is household consumption, social consumption(that of 
government and non-enterprise institutions), and accumulation (fixed capital 
formation and net increase in circulating capital including reserves etc). 
Based on the decomposed data and estimates of household savings made by 
research staff of the IMF and the World Bank, it is possible to work out the 
size of the household sector comprising household consumption and saving. The 
results are listed in Table 2-1 (they are up to 1988 only, since data of 
household savings for more recent years are not yet available).
It can be seen from Table 2-1 that household consumption as a 
percentage of national income began to rise in 1978, but encountered a U-turn 
however after 1982 which was to a large degree due to a sharp rise in 
household saving. The combined consumption and saving in the household sector 
clearly saw a rapidly and steadily rising trend in 1978-1984. In 1984-1988, 
the overall share of the household sector in national income has slightly 
fallen, but the level at the end of period was much higher than that in 1978. 
This suggests unequivocally that national income tended to shift towards the
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household sector In the post-reform period, a trend much in contrast to that 
of the pre-reform period.
Table 2-1. Household sector as a % of national income, 1978-1988
National Household Accumulation Total
Income consumption household
Total Household
sector
1978 100.0 56.2 36.5 3.4 57.4
1980 100.0 60.1 31.5 13.5 64.4
1982 100.0 62.7 28.8 23.8 69.6
1984 100.0 59.6 31.5 44.0 73.5
1986 100.0 56.2 34.7 39.9 70.1
1988 100.0 57.0 34.5 44.7 72.4
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  Column Two: TJHJ 199 3 , p.43 and p.45; Column Three: TJNJ 1993, p.43; (difference 
between Column Qne(national income) and the sum of Columns Two and Three is social consumption, which is not 
listed in the table but its share can be seen to have declined slightly over the period); Column Four is 
household savings as a I of domestic savings (see the World Bank, China: Hacroeconomic Stability and Industrial 
Growth under Decentralized Socialism, 1990, Washington, D.C., p . 103). Column Five is household consumption and 
savings as a I of national income.
Given the fact that the growth of national income has accelerated in 
the post-reform period(see below), the shift towards the household sector also 
implies that income per capita in household sector has experienced a more 
rapid growth in the post-reform period. In this respect, a decline in the 
population growth rate has also helped to accelerate the growth of national 
income per capita. National income in comparable prices grew at an annual
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average rate of 6.0% in 1952-1978 when the population growing at 2.0% per 
annum, resulting in national income per capita grew by 3.9% annually. In 1978- 
1992, the annual average growth rate of national income rose to 8.8%, and the 
population growth rate decreased to 1.4%, causing an annual growth rate of 
national income per capita of 7.3%. Both the income shift towards the 
household sector and the slowing-down of population growth have contributed
7
to the accelerated growth of income per capita in the post-reform period .
Comparing the differences in the growth rate of national income per 
capita and household consumption per capita in pre- and post-reform periods 
would also show changing patterns with regard to household income and 
consumption. In 1952-1978, household consumption per capita in real terms grew 
by 2.2% annually, a level much lower than the 3.9% growth rate of real 
national income per capita. In 1978-1992, however, the annual growth rate of 
real household consumption per capita rose to 6.8%, a level close to the 7.3% 
per capita income growth rate in the same period. This changed relationship 
implies that a larger part of national income has been turned into household 
consumption in the post-reform period compared to that in the pre-reform 
period.
Because household income and consumption are a main source of 
domestic demand for industrial consumer goods, the fast growth can be thought 
to have supported the rapid growth in China's consumer goods industry (mainly 
light industry) in the post-reform period. In 1952-1978, the annual average 
growth rate of GVIO in light industry and heavy industry was 9.3% and 13.8% 
respectively, and in 1978-1992 the same indicator became 14.8% and 11.9% 
respectively. Clearly, from the pre-reform period to the post-reform period,
1
See also, Joseph C. H. Chai, "Consumption and Living Standards in 
China", CQ, No. 131 (September 1992); and Azizur Rahman, Keith Griffin, Carl 
Riskin, and Zhao Renwei, "Household Income and Its Distribution in China", C Q , 
No. 132 (December 1992)
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the growth rate of light industry has scaled up relative to that of heavy
industry. Structural changes in this respect have been apparently associated
8 8with the growth of household income and consumption ' .
2. Propensity to Consume Industrial Goods: Urban and Rural Areas
Below is our brief consideration of propensities to consume industrial goods 
in urban and rural areas based on data of household living expenditures. These 
data demonstrate that positive marginal propensities to consume industrial 
goods existed in both urban and rural areas. The existence of such positive 
marginal propensities implies that domestic markets in terms of the final 
demand for China's industry, were expanding in line with the growth of 
household income and consumption.
Table 2-2 summarises changes in the composition of urban household 
living expenditures from 1964 to 1990. Among all the components of living 
expenditures, it is the non-food category that is most close to industrial 
goods, i.e., non-agricultural goods(presumably there was an increased 
proportion of food products supplied by industry other than by agriculture, 
but it is not known from the existing statistics). As we can see from the
0
There are notably some other factors that have affected the relative 
growth rate of light industry to heavy industry in post-reform period, such 
as the policy shift that gives less emphasis to defence-related heavy industry 
after Mao's leadership (see, for example, Tien-tung Huseh and Tun-oy Woo, "The 
Political Economy of the Heavy Industry Sector in the People's Republic of 
China", The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 15 (January 1986). We 
may also note that heavy industry still maintains a high growth rate in the 
post-reform period, that has been, among other things, associated with the 
growing demand for capital goods and improved market linkage (see Sec, II later 
this chapter).
o
Some observers have emphasised the role of "explosive expansion" of 
durable consumer goods in post-reform Chinese industrial growth(see, for 
example, Die Lo, Market and Institutional Regulation in Chinese 
Industrialisation. PhD thesis, the University of Leeds, 1994). From this point 
of view, growth of household income and consumption plays a more fundamental 
role in post-reform Chinese industrial growth.
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Table 2-2. % of urban family living expenditures, yearly average, per capita
All living All commodities Service
expenditures „
G r a m Non-grain Non-food
1964 100.0 22.4 63.0 34.8 14.6
1981 100.0 12.9 79.1 48.4 8.0
1985 100.0 8.5 83.7 52.8 7.8
1988 100.0 6.8 85.0 53.6 8.2
1990 100.0 6.6 83.4 50.5 10.0
Source and note: TJNJ 1986, p .668; TJNJ 1991. p. 280.
Table 2 - 3 .  Commodities as a % of urban family living expenditures , by category
of income level, yearly average, per capita
Income groups 1985 1990
Non-grain Non-food Non-grain Non-food
lowest 79.9 43.9 80.4 42.2
lower 81.6 47.5 81.7 45.6
lower-middle 82.4 49.9 82.6 47.7
middle 83.7 52.2 83.6 50.6
upper-middle 84.5 54.5 84.1 52.4
higher 85.5 57.0 84.6 53.7
highest 86.2 58.7 84.7 55.2
Source and note:■mrim.'p.b?!: TJNJ mi, p.281. Definitions of non-grain and non-food commodities
are the same as in Table 2-2. For 1985, per capita income level ranged from less than 500 Yuan for the lowest 
group to about 1,400 yuan for the highest group. For 1990, the bottom and top levels were 860 Yuan and 2,700 
Yuan respectively.
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table, share of non-food goods in urban household living expenditures steadily 
rose up to 1988, and this rise seemed to have been greatly contributed to by 
the fall of the share of grain in consumption. It is striking that share of 
grain in urban household consumption has steadily declined over a long period 
(even dating back to the pre-reform period, 1964). On the other hand, 
consumption of services also played an important role in affecting the share 
of non-food consumption. A notable difference is that the share of services 
in urban household consumption fell until 1985, and has risen since then. The 
latter rise has apparently reduced the previously rising share of non-food 
consumption. The trend of a rising share of services in household consumption 
seems to conform more to a normal pattern of consumption growth.
From the time-series data in Table 2-2, it is actually impossible to 
know whether and to what degree changes in the composition of living 
expenditures have been associated with income growth. In fact, real income per 
capita in urban households began to a fall in 1988-1989(see TJNJ 1993, p.282). 
We have however found a close positive association between the share of non­
food consumption and per capita income level in urban households in cross- 
section data(Table 2-3). The table lists shares of non-grain and non-food 
products in urban household living expenditures by income groups in 1985 and 
1990. In both years, the data clearly show that the share of expenditure on 
these two categories rose with the per capita income level.
Table 2-4 shows a similar trend of changes in the composition of 
living expenditure for rural households. In 1978-1988, when the share of self- 
supporting consumption fell by 28 percentage points, the share of all 
commodities rose by 25 points and that of service by 3.0 points. Much of the 
expenditure saved by the reduction in the level of self-supporting consumption 
went to commodity consumption. This implies that, to an increasingly large 
degree, rural households turned to the consumer goods markets. Compared to
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urban households, however, rural households spent relatively more ori food 
commodities, and the share of expenditure on food commodities even increased 
in the 1980s. This partly reflects the low level of per capita income in rural 
households. Again, in the period after 1988, non-food commodity consumption 
in rural households actually declined, quite sharply in 1988-1990(6 percentage 
points). A primary and directly responsible factor was the renewed rise of 
self-supporting consumption in the period(5 percentage points). The economic 
contraction in the two years seems to blame.
Table 2-4. % of rural family living expenditures, yearly average, per capita
All living Commodities Self-supporting Service
expenditures
Food Non-food
consumption
1978 100.0 16.3 22.3 58.6 2.7
1980 100.0 19.2 29.9 48.3 2.6
1985 100.0 24.1 34,4 38.7 2.9
1988 100.0 26.6 37.2 30.6 5.7
1990 100.0 25.9 31.3 35.9 6.9
1992 100.0 25.9 30.9 34.5 8.7
Source and note: TJNJ 1993, p.315.
For the propensity to consume non-food industrial goods in rural 
households, similar cross-section data like that of urban households are not 
available. It seems, as a speculation, that, in allocating their living 
expenditures between food commodities and non-food commodities, both of which 
were realised through markets, a rural household had to consider their 
corresponding(and/or substitution) relationship with self-supporting
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consumption(self-supporting food and self-supporting non-food), in addition 
to the factor of service. A trend in rural household commodity consumption 
that conforms to Engel's Law would become more apparent only after the self- 
supporting consumption has been substantially reduced or replaced by commodity 
consumption.
In disentangling urban and rural households' propensities to consume 
and their impact on the domestic market for post-reform China's industry, we 
should stress an implicit element: housing. In the decomposition of living 
expenditure, housing is an item under the category of services. Its impact on 
the domestic market is, nonetheless, considered great. Growing demand for 
housing would cause housing investment to rise, which in turn would drive up 
demand for related industrial materials. As will be shown in the next chapter, 
housing investment constitutes an important part of post-reform fixed capital 
investment, and its share in total fixed capital investment has risen 
considerably in the first half of the 1980s, and maintained a level afterwards 
higher than that of the pre-reform period. The role of growing demand for 
housing in post-reform industrial growth was indeed great.
In principle, increasing demand for housing is part of the growth 
process in both urban and rural household sectors. Because there were 
different price structures in the two areas, and government policies were 
biased towards the urban-industry sector, urban and rural households saw sharp 
differences between housing as a component of living expenditure{Table 2-5). 
In urban areas, households paid proportionately much less for their housing 
needs out of their total living expenditure than rural households, and the 
share of expenditure on housing was actually falling in the 1980s. In 
conjuntion with the fact that a huge and increasing amount of housing 
investment had been undertaken in urban areas, this asymmetrical relationship 
implies that a degree of price distortion within housing markets existed or
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continued to exist in post-reform urban China. The distortion was mainly 
caused by low rental prices paid by urban households(especially workers in 
state sector), as the state hugely subsidised this sector^.
Table 2-5. Housing as a % of living expenditure
Urban households 
(rent for housing)
Rural households
commodity housing non-commodity housing
1978 2.6(1964) 3.0 0.2
1980 1.4(1981) 7.0 0.9
1985 1 .1 12.1 0.3
1988 0.7 14.7 0.2
1990 0.7 11.8 0.1
1992 0.9 10.1 0.2
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  For urban households up to 19(15, TJNJ 1986, p. 668; tor urban households in the rest 
of the years and rural households in all the years, TJNJ 1993, pp.286 and 315.
In rural areas, on the other hand, households spend much more out of 
their living expenditures on housing, and the proportion is rising up to 1988. 
More importantly, much of the spending on housing was through the market 
(commodity housing). Housing prices in rural areas seem to have been linked 
more with the market and less with state intervention. This difference in the 
price of housing between rural and urban areas, together with price
^  China's peculiar features in this area has been compared with 
international experience in the World Bank, China: Long-Term Development and 
Options, Appendix V. China's Economic System in International Perspective, 
Washington, D.C., 1985. It concludes that both demand tendencies 'and policy- 
driven price structures have affected structural compositions of demand and 
production in China's economy, which were considerably different from typical 
international experience(pp.33-36).
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differences in some other service areas, may partly explain the higher 
tendency to consume non-food goods in urban areas.
3. Impact of Urbanisation
The preceding discussion points out that though there was a rising level of 
non-food goods consumption in both urban and rural areas in most years of the 
1980s, a considerable gap between the tendencies of urban and rural areas 
existed(typically 18 percentage points throughout the 1980s, as summarised in 
Table 2-6 based on Tables 2-2 and 2-4). Given such a difference, the impact 
of urbanisation on an overall increase in non-food goods consumption would 
presumably be large.
Table 2-6 reveals a simplified examination of the impact of 
urbanisation, using 1980-1990 data. To avoid the influence on the measurements 
of uneven levels between urban and rural areas, we regard the total non-food 
goods consumption (the share of non-food goods in total living expenditure for 
both urban and rural areas) as a sum of the individual tendencies in urban and 
rural areas weighted by their shares in the total population. With this 
summation, it is possible to decompose the total increase into a part that was 
due to increases in individual non-food goods consumption levels in urban and 
rural areas, and another part that was due to changes in population ratios 
between urban and rural areas^. As revealed in the table, the effect of 
urbanisation on the increase in total non-food goods consumption has been 
positive throughout the 1980s, with a relative contribution of about 15% in
11 It can be expressed as: (Putcot ♦ Prtcrt) - <PuocuO + prOcrO) = {(p»tciiO +
p r t c rO> _  ( p u 0 c »0 +  p r O c r O )( +  ( ( p u O c ut +  p r O c rt> ‘  < p a O c uO +  p r O c r O ) } > w h e r e  p  i s
population ratio, c non-food good consumption ratio; subscript u for urban,
r rural, and t for current period, 0 previous period. The first {...} 
indicates the effect of the shifting population ratio, and the second {...} 
indicates the effect of the changing non-food goods consumption ratio.
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1980-1988. In 1988-1990, the contribution from urbanisation was rather small 
compared to the previous period, but nevertheless it helped to prevent the 
total non-food goods consumption ratio from falling more quickly.
Table 2-6. Impact of urbanisation on the increase in non-food goods 
consumption, %, 1980-1990
1980 1985 1988 1990
Share in total population
Urban 19.4 23.7 25.8 26.4
Rural 80.6 76.3 74.2 73.6
Share of non-food goods in living expenditures at per capita level
Urban 48.4 52.8 53.6 50. 2
Rural 29.9 34.4 37.2 31.3
The difference 18.5 18.4 16.4 18.9
Total share of non-food goods in living expenditures
I{weighted by current expenditure ratios) 33.5 38.8 41.4 36.3
1 1 (wei ghted by previous expenditure ratio) 34.3 39.2 41.5
1 1 1 ( w e i g h t e d  by previous population ratio) 38.0 41.1 36.2
Contribution to increase in I '80-85 '85-88 '88-90
increase in I 15.7 6.9 -12.4
b y  ii(urbanisation) 2.4 1.0 0 . 2
b y  l l l ( c h a n g e  in consumption tendency) 13.4 6.0 -12.7
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  Population: TJNJ 1888, p . 81; share ot non-food goods in living expenditures: Tables 
2-2 and 2-4. For derivation of increase in total non-food goods consumption ratio using different weights, see 
the text.
Urbanisation in China did not accelerate until the reforms of the 
1980s. In the period from the early 1950s to the mid-1960s, the proportion of 
the urban population in China's total population increased from 12% to 18%. 
But in the period from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s, the process of 
urbanisation was actually stationary in China, varing around a level below
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18%. This was very different from international experience in the same period.
In 1950-1980, the urbanisation ratio in the whole world rose from 28% to 41%,
with industrial countries' ratio rising from 52% to 71%, and developing
countries' ratio rising from 16% to 31%. The difference in levels of
urbanisation between China and the rest of world became narrower only after 
12recent years . The tendency towards accelerating urbanisation is closely
associated with both agricultural development and the diversification of urban
n
economic development in the post-reform period .
II. Growing Demand for Capital Goods
The preceding discussion in the above section primarily concerns issues of 
demand for consumer goods. Corresponding to the demand for consumer goods is 
demand for capital goods. The production of consumer goods needs inputs of 
capital goods including materials and equipment etc. Moreover, capital goods 
produced in industry are also used in other sectors, e.g., agriculture, 
construction, transport, and services. Any growth of demand for industrial 
consumer goods and production expansion in other sectors can induce an 
increase in demand for capital goods and that of the capital goods industry.
Generally speaking, demand for capital goods is directly dependent 
on the investment ratio(a percentage expression of the proportion of capital 
formation to national product) and the capital consumption ratio(a percentage
1? In the World Bank's statistics, by 1992, China's urban population 
ratio is 27%, whereas the world's ratio is 42%, and the high income countries’ 
ratio 78%. See WB, The World Development Report 1994, World Development 
Indicators
11 For an overview of the issue, see: Harry Xiaoying Wu, "Rural to Urban 
Migration in the People's Republic of China", CQ, No. 139(September 1994); and 
Kyung-sup Chang, "Chinese Urbanization and Development before and after 
Economic Reform: A Comparative Reappraisal", World Development, Vol. 22, No. 
4, 1994
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expression of the proportion of consumption of capital goods in total 
production). By these two criteria, post-reform China has maintained its high 
and fast-growing demand for capital goods. We will discuss the investment 
ratio in the next chapter and here look at the capital consumption ratio.
Table 2-7. Capital consumption as a % of gross value of production
1978 1980 1985 1988 1992
All sectors 56.0 56.8 57.7 60.6 64.5
Industry 64.9 65.0 67.4 70.3 73.5
Agriculture 29.4 31.0 31.1 34.9 36.2
Construction 78.0 75.9 75.3 73.6 71.6
Transportation 42.4 49.6 46.9 45.0 47.0
Commerce 32.9 43.9 36.8 34.1 32.6
Source and note: TJNJ 1993, p.65. 
Table 2-8. Consumption of capital
All are 
goods as
in current prices 
i a % of GVIO
1980 1985 1988 1992
Light industry 70.2 72.2 73.5 74.9
using agricultural materials 72.8 74.0 74.0 75.5
using non-agricultural materials 62.0 68.0 72.5 73.7
Heavy industry 62.5 63.7 67.8 71.8
mining 49.3 50.1 53.7 59.3
material processing 62.8 64.5 68.4 74.0
finished-goods producing 66.2 66.6 70.6 72.5
_i_i. iSource a n d  note: SSB, Zhonqquo qonqhe iinqji tonqji nianjian 1993 (Statistical Yearbook of China's 
Industrial Economy), hereafter ZGGYJJTJNJ fBeijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1993, p p . 143-144). Consumption 
of capital goods is GVIO deducted by NVI0(net value of industrial output). Both are in current prices.
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Table 2-7 lists the capital consumption ratio for major sectors in 
China from 1978 to 1992. The overall trend was clearly rising over the period.
■s
Showing, a constant rise were industry, agriculture and transportation. There 
might have been a number of factors that compelled the rise in the ratio, such 
as technological progress, structural shifts, relative prices of inputs to 
output, as well as efficiency in the use of capital g o o d s ^ . Overall, the 
rising ratio indicates that demand for capital goods has risen in general.
A more important and specific issue concerning the growth of demand
for capital goods in the context of China’s economy seems to be the
transformation of inter-sectoral and inter-enterprise relationships in
industry, along with the greater role of the market. Looking at Table 2-8, we
may note that since 1980 the ratio of capital consumption to production has
risen in all sub-sectors. This overwhelming rise may be particularly
associated with specialisation at product level(other factors may include the
relative rise in price of capital goods). It has been noted that,
traditionally, many state enterprises had a strong tendency towards self-
sufficiency, i.e., tended to supply themselves with parts and inputs as much
as possible. Consequently, this tendency tended to reduce the level of capital
goods purchases through the market. With the development in capital goods
markets, specialisation at product level and the purchase of capital goods
through the market became widespread. As reflected in these statistics, the
15ratio of capital goods consumption to production tended to rise .
For a general discussion, see: Hollis Chenery and Moshe Syrquin,
Industrialization and Growth: A Comparative Study. New York: OUP, 1986, Ch. 
3; and for a discussion relating to Chinese economy, see: WB, China: Long-Term 
Development Issues and Options. Appendix V, Washington, D.C., 1985, Ch. 3
^  See, Robert Michael Field, "China's Industrial Performance since 
1978", CQ, No. 131 (September 1992), p.583.
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Table 2-9. Index of fixed capital per worker
1980 1985 1988 1992
State-owned enterprises 100.0(12.0) 132.9 177.2 292.9
Collective enterprises 100.0 (2.1) 161.9 256.1 469.4
Joint-ownership enterprises 100.0 (4.3) 198.0 348.1 851.4
Light industry 100.0 (4.2) 151.1 223.9 409.8
Heavy industry 100.0(11.0) 125.4 165.2 281.8
Large-sized enterprises 100.0(19.0) 135.8 176.4 278.0
Medium-sized enterprises 100.0(11.8) 131.0 160.9 226.4
Small enterprises 100.0 (4.1) 137 .0 188.7 310.6
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  ZGGYJJTJNJ 1993, pp. 168-171. Figures in parenthesis are fixed capital per worker in 
thousand yuans in 1980.
One feature of post-reform China's industrial growth is that fixed 
capital grew faster in those traditionally labour-intensive sectors or 
branches(table 2-9). For example, in 1980, the capital-labour ratio(fixed 
capital per worker) in state enterprises was about sixfold that in collective 
enterprises, but the speed of increase in the ratio in collective enterprises 
during 1980-1992 was almost twice as high as that in state enterprises. A 
similar relationship existed between light and heavy industry, and to a lesser 
degree, between large-sized enterprises and small enterprises. These sectors, 
such as collective enterprises, light industry and small enterprises, were 
those undergoing faster growth throughout the post-reform period. Their 
pursuit of a more rapid increase in fixed capital means that, in total, the 
growth of demand for fixed capital was accelerated.
Perhaps a most important aspect of the issue of demand for capital 
goods is to consider the market linkage between the capital goods industry and 
consumer goods industry. We approximate here heavy industry as the capital 
goods industry and light industry as the consumer goods industry. The fact
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that heavy industry grew faster than light industry in the pre-reform period 
does not necessarily mean that heavy industry provided light industry with 
greater capital support or that such support has grown in line with the 
overall growth in heavy industry. Because much of pre-reform development of 
heavy industry was undertaken for defence purposes^, the linkage between 
heavy industry and light industry was weak under the traditional centralised 
planning system^. This is partly evidenced by the fact that in 1980-1982, 
when light industry underwent fast growth, the growth of heavy industry 
actually collapsed. These two years are the period in which China began to 
transform its heavy industry in order to make it more conducive to civilian 
purposes and therefore of more service to light industry. Since then, the 
growth rates of light and heavy industry have converged.
Making the assumption that light industry obtains supply of its 
capital goods from heavy industry, one way to measure the linkage between 
heavy and light industry is to look at the proportion of light industry 
product that is produced by using non-agricultural materials, and the ratio 
of capital goods consumption in light industry to gross product in heavy 
industry. We list the these two indicators for 1980-1992 below:
For example, in 1953-1957, defence industry accounted for 46.7% of 
total investment in heavy industry. This is derived from the figures that 
aircraft industry occupied 2.18% of national investment and 26.69% of total 
investment in the defence industry in the first-five-year plan period, 1953- 
57. See Wang Huijun et a l , eds. Zhongguo pumen chanye chenze yan.jiu( Studies 
in Industrial Policy for Various Sectors in China), Beijing: Zhongguo caizhen 
jingji chubanshe, 1989, Ch. 20: Aircraft Industry. Figures of investment in 
heavy industry in the same period are from TJNJ.
17 Some Chinese scholars have called this type of relations as the "self- 
serving structure of heavy industry" mainly prevailed in pre-reform China. 
See: Yang Jianbai and Li Xuezheng, "Len long qin zhong jigou kuanxi" (On 
Structural Relations between Agriculture, Light Industry and Heavy Industry) , 
in Ma Hong and Sun Shangqin (eds), Zhongguo jingji jiegou wenti yanjiu 
(Research on Problems relating to China’s Economic Structure), Beijing: Renmin 
chubanshe, 1981, Vol. I, pp.119-22.
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1980
1985
1988
1992
% of light industry 
using non-agricultural 
materials in light 
industry's GVIO
24.5
29.2
31.5
32.2
% of capital goods consumption 
in light industry using non- 
agricultural materials in 
heavy industry's GVIO 
12.8
16.4
20.4 
18.7
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  ZGGYJJTJNJ 1992, pp.104 and 143.
The two ratios both see a clearly rising trend in the 1980s. The implications 
are: first, that light industry that relied on the support of heavy industry 
grew faster than that which relied on the agricultural supply of materials; 
and second, that more of the products of heavy industry was sold to light 
industry. This is clearly a piece of evidence suggesting that the market 
linkage between heavy industry and light industry in post-reform China has 
improved. (The slight fall of the ratio in recent years may be due to a growth 
of heavy industry exports. Since 1988, machinery goods have been a sector with 
the fastest export growth in China).
III. Domestic Markets versus Foreign Markets
Foreign trade played an important role in China's industrialisation even in
the pre-reform period for it provided China with advanced technology and
equipment. Many observers have noted that after the break with the Soviet
Union in early 1960s, China turned to western countries for technology
18imports, and such imports were scaled up considerably in the 1970s .
However, a characteristic of the development strategy adopted by pre-
1 fi See: Hans Heymann, Jr. "Acquisition and Diffusion of Technology", in 
USCJEC, ed. China: A Reassessment of the Economy, Washington, D.C., 1975
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reform China was that it emphasised import substitution rather than export-
oriented growth. Any encouragement to increase export levels was in general
limited to correspond with China's import needs, and export growth was mostly
implemented in some non-manufacturing areas such as agriculture and mining,
19together with traditional Chinese handcraft products .
When the open-door policy was introduced, China's attitude towards
the outside world changed and she began to regard foreign markets as a
?0potentially important source of effective demand . Manufactured exports were 
subsequently encouraged through measures such as the establishment of special 
economic zones over coastal regions, allowances granted to enterprises
Table 2-10. Share of manufactured exports in total commodity exports and 
domestic production, %
In total commodity In domestic manufacturing
exports production
1980 49.7 3.1
1984 54.3 5,0
1986 64.2 7.8
1988 69.7 9.4
1990 74.4 12.7
1992 79.5 14.3
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  TJNJ 1993, pp.b(J4, bll, b33 and 635. For the second column, manufactured exports id 
RMB value are obtained using actual exchange rates in commodity export; domestic manufactured production is 
measured in GVIO which is for all independent-accounting industrial enterprises excluding extracting industry, 
see ZGGYJJTJNJ 1991, p p . 133-34, and TJNJ 1993, p.417.
19 Agricultural goods were China's major exports until the early 1960s, 
and subsequently in the 1970s mining products were an important export item. 
See: Alexander Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade. 
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966; and Chu-Yuan Cheng, China's Economic Development: 
Growth and Structural Change. Colorado: Westview Press, 1982, Ch. 14
See: Wendy Friemand and Thomas W. Robinson, "Costs and Benefits of 
Interdependence: A Net Assessment", in USCJEC, ed. China's Economic Dilemmas 
in the 1990s: The Problems of Reforms, Modernization and Interdependence, Vol. 
2, Washington, D.C., 1991
(domestic and foreign-related) that achieve good export records, and the
devaluation of the yuan, etc. Table 2-10 summarises the achievement of China’s
manufactured exports in terms of their proportion of total commodity exports
and in domestic manufacturing production. The two ratios have steadily risen
throughout the period 1980-1992. Of the overall growth of manufactured
exports, two features are worth noting. First, non-textile and non-handcraft
manufactured exports have achieved rapid growth records especially since the
later 1980s. For example, the share of machinery and transport equipment in
? 1industrial exports rose from 6 .6% in 1987 to 19.5% in 1992 . Second, the
destination of a large proportion of China's rapidly expanding manufactured 
exports has been industrialised markets. As a whole, the share of industrial 
economies as a destination of China's exports rose from 71.4% in 1986 to 79.0% 
in 199222.
One way to appreciate the role of export expansion in post-reform 
China’s industrial growth is to compare the effects of domestic household 
consumption growth and foreign trade growth, as detailed in Table 2-11. Before 
interpreting the analysis, we should make it clear that our focus on final 
demand here is for the purpose of comparison only, i.e. comparing the relative 
effects of domestic market and foreign market. By no means does it imply that 
growth was solely reliant on the level of final demand.
Our comparative study has four steps. (1) Firstly, we obtain rural
The role of foreign-related enterprises especially in special economic 
zones is considered great in promoting China’s non-textile and non-handcraft 
manufactured exports. Overall, the contribution from foreign-owned firms to 
China's exports has increased from 1.1% in 1985 to 20.0% in 1992. See, UN, 
World Economic Survey 1993. p.197
Figures from the International Monetary Fund [IMF], Direction of Trade 
Statistics Yearbook 1993. In the calculation Hong Kong has been included, 
because the majority of China's exports to Hong Kong were then channelled into 
industrialised markets such as the USA and UK etc. See Robert Ash and Y.Y. 
Yueh, "Economic Integration within Greater China: Trade and Investment Flows 
between China, Hong Kong and Taiwan", CQ, No. 136 (December 1993)
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Table 2-11. Summary of growth rates In demand and production
1980 1984 1988 1990
Consumption of industrial goods(100 mil . yuan in 1980 prices)
Rural 213.9 436.0 719.5 611.8
Urban 405.7 512.8 881.6 920.7
Share in total consumption of industrial goods(%)
Rural 34.5 46.0 44.9 39.9
Urban 65.5 54.1 55.1 61.1
1980-1984 1984-1988 1988-1990
Growth rate of GVIO(%) 9.8 17 .8 8.2
Growth rate of household income(%)
Rural 13.6a 3.5^ 1.9
Urban 4.9° 5 . 2 0 2.6
Weighted growth of consumption of industrial goods(%)
Rural 6.7 6.1 -3.5
due to changes in propensity 2.0 4.5 -4.4
Urban 4.0 7.8 1.2
due to changes in propensity 0.7 5.1 0.2
Sum of rural and urban 10.7 14.0 -2.3
Growth rate of trade in industrial goods(%)
imports 14.2 -19.5 1.9
exports 12.1 23.6 18.1
sum -2.1 4.1 20.1
Source and note: (i) rural and urban household consumptiori in current prices and their growth index
based on comparable prices are from TJNJ 1993, pp.45-46; rural and urban consumption of industrial goods is 
calculated using data of the rural and urban propensity to consume industrial goods, as defined and quoted in 
table 2-2 and 2-4; for rural households, self-supporting consumption is excluded from total rural consumption 
before applying the percentage share of non-food commodity consumption in total non-self-supporting living 
expenditure, (ii) growth rate of GVIO from TJNJ 1993, p.58; all growth rates in the table are an annual average 
growth rate based on comparable prices except that for the import and export of industrial goods, (iii) the 
growth rate of rural and urban household income is from TJNJ 1993, p.282; for rural, it is net family income 
per capita, and for urban it is actual family income per capita minus income from borrowing and lending; 
figures with a are for 1980-1985, and those with p for 1985-1988. (i v } the weighted growth rates of rural and 
urban consumption of industrial goods are the growth rates of rural and urban consumption of industrial goods 
multiplied by their individual shares in the total consumption of industrial goods; the growth rate due to 
changes in propensity is the weighted growth rate minus the growth rate of income for rural and urban 
households which is also weighted by their share in the total consumption of industrial goods, (v) the growth 
rate of import and export of industrial goods is based on figures in dollars, see TJNJ 1993, pp.634-35; the 
growth of imports has a minus sign if it increases, and a plus sign if it decreases.
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and urban consumption of industrial goods in constant prices, from which 
individual growth rates for rural and urban areas and their weights can be 
derived(see the first panel in Table 2-11). It can be noted that rural 
consumption of industrial goods grew faster than urban consumption until the 
mid-1980s.
(2) The second stage is to derive the relative contribution to a 
growth in demand for industrial goods from rural and urban consumption of 
industrial goods. To do this the growth rates of rural and urban consumption 
of industrial goods are weighted by their shares in the total consumption of 
industrial goods respectively. As shown in the table, in 1980-1984 much of the 
contribution to the growth in demand for industrial goods was from rural 
areas, but this relative relationship between rural and urban areas was 
overturned in 1984-1988. Furthermore, the contribution from rural areas became 
negative in 1988-1990.
(3) Thirdly, by deducting the growth rate of rural and urban 
household income from the growth rate of rural and urban industrial 
consumption respectively, we obtain a component of the growth in rural and 
urban industrial consumption that could be attributed to changes in the rural 
and urban propensity to consume industrial goods. An assumption made here is 
that if the propensity to consume industrial goods remains unchanged over 
time, the growth in consumption of industrial goods would be proportionate to 
the growth of income; any difference between the two can be regarded as 
resulting from changes in the propensity. In 1980-1984, when the contribution 
to rural growth of consumption of industrial goods from changes in the 
propensity to consume was modest, that for urban areas was also small. In 
1984-1988, the effects of changes in the propensity to consume industrial 
goods were considerable for both rural and urban areas. In 1988-^1990, when 
income growth slowed down in both rural and urban areas, the effects
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diminished in urban areas and became negative in rural areas.
(4) Lastly, we wish to make a comparison between the growth of GVIO 
and the growth of domestic consumption of industrial goods. The assumption 
that is made here is that the two growth rates would be proportionate to each 
other if effect of trade on industrial growth was neutral, i.e., if the import 
and export of industrial goods grew at same rate or were balanced in quantity. 
By comparing the growth rates of GVIO, the sum of weighted rural and urban 
consumption of industrial goods, and the sum of imports and exports of 
industrial goods, we note that relationship between these elements changed 
during the period: in 1980-1984, the growth rate in domestic final demand for 
industrial goods in terms of total rural and urban household consumption of 
industrial goods exceeded the growth rate of GVIO,.implying that part of the 
growing domestic demand went to imported industrial goods in nett, which is 
also confirmed by the fact that imports of industrial goods grew faster than 
exports of industrial goods in the period; in 1984-1988, however, the relative 
relationship reversed as the growth rate of GVIO was higher than that of 
domestic household demand for industrial goods, and the exports of industrial 
goods grew faster than imports; lastly, in 1988-1990, when domestic demand for 
industrial goods actually started to decrease, the growth of GVIO was entirely 
supported by faster growth of exports of industrial goods compared with the 
growth of imports.
Post-reform China's greater use of overseas markets has had profound 
implications for its long-term development perspective in two important 
dimensions: firstly, it helped to transform inter-sectoral relationships, and, 
secondly, it changed inter-regional relations in China’s domestic economy. We 
will demonstrate the first dimension in the next section, and the second 
dimension in Chapter Eight (Section I).
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IV. Transforming Inter-Sectoral Relations
Having reviewed some basic trends in China's industrial markets during the 
post-reform period, we are now able to give an overview of the two central 
issues: how China has successfully transformed its inter-sectoral
relationships compared with the situation under the centralised planning 
system, and what implications this transformation has for post-reform 
industrial growth.
Characteristics of pre-reform China's centralised planning system and 
development strategy include: (i) the state endeavoured to mobilise resources 
(mostly capital resources) fully in order to promote industrialisation, 
especially rapid growth in heavy industry; (ii) the depression of any growth 
of the household sector and a simultaneous exploitation of agriculture; (iii) 
the restriction of the role of foreign trade, that was limited to the degree 
of imports of advanced equipment and technology.
Under this economic system and development strategy, China's industry 
was in a pivotal position for the national economy. However, it faced several 
important constraints. First, funding for industry crucially relied on central 
government's ability to raise capital resources through various means, 
including agricultural contributions and implicitly forced household savings. 
Second, the inward development policy discouraged exports of industrial 
products, especially manufactured goods, rendering domestic markets the 
virtually sole source of demand for industrial products. Third, within 
domestic markets, demand for consumer goods was dismal because of the 
depressed household income growth, and, therefore, the role of the consumer 
goods industry in inducing any growth of demand for the capital goods industry 
was weak. The market for the capital goods industry, i.e., heavy industry, was 
largely dependent on central government's spending plans, which in turn were
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crucially reliant on the government's ability to collect funds.
In these chains of inter-sectoral relationships, agriculture occupied 
an important position. As over four-fifths of China's population lived in 
rural areas before the 1980s, more than half of the domestic markets for 
industrial consumer goods were in rural areas, and therefore dependent on 
agricultural growth. Slow growth in agriculture meant that the state could 
expect to take less from agriculture, and in some cases could have to "give 
it back" to agriculture, therefore affecting the government's ability to 
finance any accelerating industrial growth. Insufficient grain supply for the 
urban population, as occurred in the early 1960s and intermittently returned 
since then, forced the government to abandon financial reliance on grain 
exports and turn to importing grain instead. This necessity was a drain on the 
foreign exchanges which pre-reform China regarded as a precious resource for 
its industrialisation.
In theory it would be possible for the state to increase investment 
in agriculture and thereby raise its productivity. Such attempts were indeed 
made in the pre-reform period. However, two problems might have occurred: 
firstly, that Increasing investment in agriculture could lead to a rise in 
surplus labour in rural areas, and secondly, that any resultant increase in 
agricultural labour productivity might not be necessarily followed by an 
increase in land productivity or would even reduce land productivity, in the 
worst case. In either case, a vast quantity of surplus labour in agriculture 
would necessarily require sufficient absorption in non-agricultural sectors, 
particularly in industry. A contradiction in terms therefore arises: 
industrial growth is restricted as investment shifts towards agriculture and 
the industrial sector is nevertheless unable to absorb surplus labour. 
Finally, the lower obtainable rate of return in agriculture than in, say, 
industry, because of lower agricultural labour productivity, made the option
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of increasing investment in agriculture particularly unappealing to the state.
To escape from the dilemma made the transformation of economic system 
and development strategy inevitable . Reforms since the later 1970s have 
been directed towards these issues. And amongst all the areas of reform 
progress has been made particularly strongly here. (1) Firstly, agriculture 
was given a greater stimulus towards development through the "household 
responsibility system" and agricultural price reforms. Agricultural production 
expanded and peasants' income increased. The market for industrial goods, both 
consumer and capital goods, enlarged in rural areas. Meanwhile, some of 
surplus labour force existing in rural areas began to find an alternative 
employment outlet: township and village enterprises (TVEs). (2) Secondly, in 
urban-industry areas, reforms in wage policy also helped the household sector 
to grow fast, which in turn stimulated the dynamic growth of consumer goods 
markets. (3) Thirdly, the opening-up policy encouraged the outward development 
of China's industry by promoting manufactured exports. Foreign markets became 
an increasingly important source of demand for China's industry. Constraints 
from the need for foreign exchange on domestic growth also became less fierce.
(4) Fourthly, linkages between the consumer goods industry and the capital 
goods industry have been substantially improved by allowing market forces to 
play a more important and direct role, and by weakening the reliance of heavy 
industry on government spending plans. (5) Fifthly, post-reform funding for 
industrial growth was to a increasingly large degree supported by a rapid 
growth of savings in the household sector: both from peasants' enthusiasm for 
investing in TVEs and urban households' savings(see the next chapter).
ii
Some economists have stressed the importance of the policy shift 
towards an outward-looking development strategy by regarding the open-door 
policy as "a major attempt to break through the impasse". See, Yak Yeow Kueh 
and Zhao Renwei, "Market-Oriented Transformation of China's Economic System: 
Accelerator or Handicap of the Socio-Economic Development Process?" in China1 s 
Contemporary Economic Reforms as a Development Strategy, ed. by Dieter Cassel 
and Gunter Heiduk, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellscheft, 1990, p.33
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One implication of these developments is that, as China's industry 
has found new markets and new sources of funding, its reliance on state 
support and therefore on agricultural growth has become less great. Though 
agricultural growth continued to play an important role in supplying grain and 
raw materials for the urban-industry sector, in providing a large market for 
industrial goods, and in contributing financial support for industrial 
investment, the role has nevertheless become less important compared to that 
which existed in the pre-reform period. The main reasons for this effect were 
the accelerating population shift towards urban areas and the outward-looking 
growth in industry.
This change seems to have been confirmed by a study presented in 
Table 2-12. It examines the hypothesis that industrial growth was affected by 
agricultural growth and that such linkage might have changed between the pre-
Table 2-12. 
1953-1992
Regression of Industrial Production on Agricultural Production,
Agr Agr(-l) R2 RSS F‘ statistic
1954-66 -2.162 3.137 .586 2195.9 9.494
(-3.061) (4.356) (2 , 10)
1967-77 1.405 -2.537 .503 1054.9 4.045
(1.229) (-2.526) (2 , 8 )
1978-92 -.174 .330 .042 537.2 .265
(-.301) (.650) (2 , 12)
Source and note: The regressand is annual growth rate of current year gross value of industrial 
production in comparable prices, and the regressors are annual growth rate of gross value of agricultural 
production in comparable prices at a current year(Agr) and at a lagged year(Agr(-l)); the data from TJNJ 1993, 
p.52. A constant term is included in regression for all periods. RSS is for residual sum of squares. Figures
in parenthesis under the estimate are t-value, and that under the F statistic are degree of freedom. The Chow
test is run as follows: (1) given the RSS of 7276.5 for 1954-1977, the computed F(3,18) is 7.43, exceeding the
table F of 3.13 at critical level of 51, and indicating that the two regressions for 1954-66 and 1967-77 are
not same; (2) given the RSS of 2423.6 for 1967-1992, the computed F{3,20} is 3.48, exceeding the table F of 
3.10 at critical level of 5%, and indicating that the two regressions for 1967-77 and 1978-92 are not same.
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reform and the post-reform period. The central results of our examination of 
the hypothesis are: (i) that the impact of agricultural growth on industrial 
growth was significant in both 1954-1966 and 1967-1977; (ii) that the direct
1A
relationship appeared to have broken down in 1978-1992 ; (iii) that in both
1954-1966 or 1967-1977 agricultural growth seems to have had a negative impact 
on industrial growth(in the first period the data measures agricultural growth 
in the current year, and in the second period it shows the agricultural growth 
in the previous year). This seems a clear indication of the conflicting nature 
of the relationship between industry and agriculture in the pre-reform period, 
as we have described above.
We should also present another interpretation of this results of 
regression study. On the one hand, reforms and development policy shifts 
have successfully transformed inter-sectoral relationships in the Chinese 
economy, particularly the constraints from the agricultural sector on 
industrial growth. This transformation was achieved basically through 
restoring market linkages between the capital and consumer goods industry, and 
searching for new sources of demand and funding, which are hardly imaginable 
under the centralised planning system of the pre-reform period. Though the 
centralised planning system had been able to raise funding for industry to a 
high level, it nevertheless depressed market linkages and limited any further 
enlargement of demand, or funding sources.
On the other hand, the changing inter-sectoral relationships in the 
post-reform Chinese economy should not be construed as concluding that there 
are no longer and impact of agricultural growth on industrial growth. In fact,
? A
In Chu-yuan Cheng, o p .cit. , the issue is perceived as the diminishing 
influence of food production on China's general economic development since the 
mid-1960s; a regression analysis using 1980s provincial data of industrial and 
agricultural growth has also arrived at a similar conclusion, see WB, China: 
Macroeconomic Stability and Industrial Growth under Decentralized Socialism,
Washington, D.C., 1991.
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as the total population in China continues to grow and more people move into 
urban areas, the demand for grain and other agricultural products will remain 
high and increasing. Given this population shift and the related changes in 
the economy, the requirement of increases in agricultural productivity will 
be stronger than before. From a long-term point of view, the possibility of 
increases in agricultural productivity is a crucial factor in determining the 
pace of growth of domestic markets. Though industrial exports have expanded 
rapidly, they cannot replace the role of agricultural productivity growth 
because of the immense size of the economy. Moreover, the considerable gap 
that exists in China between agricultural productivity and industrial 
productivity implies that potential gains to further economic growth from 
increased agricultural productivity are great.
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Chapter Three
Investment Expansion in China's Industry
For many years since the early 1950s, the growth of China’s economy has to a 
large extent relied on investment expansion, i.e., the high investment rate*. 
As we have indicated in the previous chapter, this reliance was closely 
associated with the way in which the centralised planning system mobilised 
capital resources, i.e., through constraining the growth of the household 
sector and exploiting the agricultural sector. Though the centralised planning 
system was able to raise the investment rate to a high level, and provided 
industry, especially heavy industry, with huge funding support, economic 
growth in the pre-reform period was achieved at the price of slow development 
in the rural-agricultural sector and overall slow growth of domestic markets. 
This was in addition to the problem of low efficiency in the use of capital.
In the sense that fast economic growth needs to be financed to an 
adequate degree, mobilisation of capital resources in the post-reform period 
continues to be an important issue for China’s economic growth, along with the
* See, Dwight H. Perkins, "The Central Features of China's Economic
Development", in Robert F. Dernberger, ed. China's Development Experience in 
Comparative Perspective, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980. For 
a description up to 1980, see Chu-yuan Cheng, China's Economic Development: 
Growth and Structural Change, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982, Ch. 10; for 
description of the post-reform period, see: Ryoshin Minami, The Economic
Development of China: A Comparison with the Japanese Experience, London:
Macmillan, 1994, Ch. 7
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issue of improving the efficiency with which capital resources are used. As 
China's economic system has begun to move towards a market-type economy since 
the late 1970s, market forces have became an increasingly important factor to 
in determining the pace and pattern of investment expansion. The question of 
resource mobilisation under the transitional system turns out to be, in this 
respect, a question how the state and market forces interact in the process 
of financing economic growth.
One particular issue concerning post-reform China's economic and 
financial development is whether, and how, China could maintain a high 
investment rate when financial resources begin to shift into the non-state 
sector. The question may be addressed in this manner: unlike the centralised 
planning system that was able to force the social saving rate to increase 
through various means such as planned prices(including wage rates in urban- 
industry sector) and fiscal measures, the new regime which emerged in the 
post-reform period could no longer, or at least no longer to the same 
magnitude, rely on traditional schemes to achieve the same objective; if there 
were no sufficient forces, market or non-market, to ensure the maintainance 
of a high level of social savings, a fall in the social saving rate might be 
expected. And if this was the case, it would pose a potential threat to the 
funding abase of post-reform China's economic growth .
In this chapter, we attempt to explain investment expansion in post-
2
It has been pointed out that in the agricultural sector, there is no 
guarantee that de-control and subsequent output growth will be followed by an 
increase in capital formation. See Yak Yeow Kueh and Zhao Renwei, "Market- 
Oriented Transformation of China's Economic System: Accelerator or Handicap 
of the Socio-Economic Development Process", in China's Contemporary Economic 
Reforms as a Development Strategy, ed. by Dieter Cassel and Gunter Heiduk, 
Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990. Similar questions can also be 
addressed to the urban-industry sector. However, once a high rate of capital 
formation or a high investment rate is observed, the question seems to be more 
appropriately addressed by asking "who paid for it". See: John Knight, "Price 
Scissors and Intersectoral Resource Transfer: Who Paid for Industrialisation 
in China?" Oxford Economic Papers, No. 47 (1995).
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reform China's industry with regard to the changing relationship between the 
state and the market. In Section I, we will give an overall description of the 
investment rate in post-reform China in comparison with the pre-reform period. 
The issue of industrial Investment expansion relative to GDP is considered as 
a combination of two ratios: gross investment in proportion to GDP and
allocation of gross investment into industry. Focusing on the first aspect, 
Section II will in particular discuss the growth of household income and 
savings and the transformation of the state funding system. In Section III, 
we will come to the issue of the allocation of funds to industry. We will also 
consider behaviourial differences between state and non-state industrial 
investment.
I. The Role of Investment Expansion in China's Industrial Growth
When looking at immediate effects, the role of investment expansion in 
economic growth shows a combination of two inter-related effects. First, it 
enlarges productive capability by increasing fixed capital stock. Second, it 
induces a growth in aggregate demand by raising demand for capital goods. From 
a broad, longer-term, point of view, the role of investment expansion may also 
entail facilitation of technological progress, for it involves financing 
equipment renovation and research and development projects . For all these 
reasons, investment expansion has an enormous influence on economic growth. 
If an economy wishes to achieve a higher growth rate, it is therefore in 
general desirable to achieve an accordingly high investment rate without
In Moshe Syrquin's phrase, it is "the role of capital accumulation as 
a carrier of technological change"("Patterns of Structural Change", in 
Handbook of Development Economics. Vol. I, ed. by Hollis Chenery and T.N. 
Srinivasan, Amsterdam: North Holland, 1988, p.225). This perception has been 
earlier expressed in A.K. Cairncross, "The Place of Capital in Economic 
Progress", in Economic Progress, ed. by L.H. Dupriez, Louvain: The
International Economic Association, 1955
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jeopardising the efficiency with which increased capital is used.
One way to appreciate the dynamic relationship between investment 
expansion and output growth is to observe the incremental capital-output ratio 
(ICOR) and its change. Though there are a number of theoretical and practical 
problems with this measure^, it may be seen an indicator describing the 
reliance of output growth on capital growth, under a mutatis mutandis 
assumption that investment expansion is associated with changes in other 
productive factors. In other words, it may help to see to what extent economic 
growth has relied on investment expansion compared to experience in either a 
different period or a different country.
Here we are mainly interested in the question of whether the ICOR in 
China's economy as a whole and in its industry in particular has undergone any 
alteration in the post-reform period compared to the pre-reform period. Table 
3-1 presents the ICOR for 1980-1992 based on national income. It seems that 
for both the economy as a whole and industry in particular, there was no 
uniform trend during the period: it fell in the first half of the 1980s, began 
to rise around the end of the decade, and began to fall again in 1990-1992.
5
Whether the latest change represents a general trend remains to be seen .
For a theoretical discussion, see Gerald M. Meier, "Criticisms of the 
Capital-Output Ratio", in Leading Issues in Economic Development, New York: 
OUP, 4th edition, 1984. The main argument presented there is to deny ICOR's 
value as a policy instrument in development project appraisal. A more recent 
(re)appraisal on the issue has appeared in Dennis Anderson, "Investment and 
Economic Growth", World Development. Vol. 18, No. 8 (1990). Use of the ICOR 
analysis in China's economy or industry has been cautioned with regard to its 
relevance to judge economic efficiency. See, for example, Peter Nolan, State 
and Market in the Chinese Economy, London: Macmillan, 1993, p. 291; Adrian 
Wood: China's Economic System: A Brief Description with Some Suggestions for 
Further Reform. CP No 12, STICERD, London School of Economics, 1991. Bearing 
in mind these criticisms, we do not intend to use this criterion to judge 
China's economic performance, but rather to examine the degree of reliance of 
its economic growth on investment expansion.
£
Compared to other countries' experience in the 1980s, China's position 
in this respect seems modestly good(see Ryoshin Minami, o p .cit., pp.156-59). 
But as Adrian Wood(op.cit., p.18) has warned, the international comparison 
should be treated with more caution because of differences in scope of
63
Table 3-1. The IGOR in the China's Economy and Industry, 1980-1992
Growth of NI (%) Investment rate(%) ICOR
Economy Industry Economy Industry Economy Industry
1980 6.4 10.9 31.5 22.7 4.92 2.08
1981 4.9 1.7 28.3 23.4 5.78 13.76
1982 8.2 6.0 28.8 27.7 3.51 4.62
1983 10.0 9.8 29.7 29.3 2.97 2.99
1984 13.6 14.9 31.5 31.1 2.32 2.09
1985 13.5 19.6 35.0 34.8 2.59 1.78
1986 7.7 9.6 34.7 38.8 4.51 4.04
1987 10.2 13.0 34.1 41.5 3.34 3.19
1988 11.3 17.4 34.5 41.2 3.05 2 .37
1989 3.7 6.0 33.8 31.6 9.14 5. 27
1990 5.1 5.5 32.8 32.4 6.43 5.89
1991 7 . 7 12.8 32.8 33.3 4.26 2.60
1992 14.4 21.4 34.3 38.1 2.38 1.78
rate for whole economy is the accumulation ratio{% of gross formation of fixed capital and net increase of 
circulating capital in national income). For industry it is fixed capital investment(see Table 3-2 for details 
of data sources and scope) as a % of the net value of industrial output. The ICOR is the investment rate 
divided by the growth rate. The ICOR for the economy is not fully compatible with the ICOR for industry.
Figure 3-1. IGOR in China's economy 1952-1990
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S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  Data source is same as to Table 3-1. There is no positive ICOR in 1958-1962 because 
real national income decreased during the period.
measurement and price structures, etc,
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Figure 3-2. ICOR in China's industry 1952-1990 
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S o u r c e  a n d  N o t e :  Data source is same as to Table 3-1. In the period up to 1980, industrial investment 
consisted of state investment in basic construction only.
Compared to the pre-reform period, it seems that the ICOR has fallen 
since the 1970s at the economy level (Figure 3-1). But we need to note that the 
level of the 1970s was the highest in the pre-reform period. Also, the latest 
level, 3.0 in 1991-1992, was still higher than the 2.7 of 1953-1957 and 1.5 
of 1963-1965. For industry, similar patterns existed. The ICOR steadily rose 
from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s, reaching a high level in the first half 
of the 1980s; however, from 1980 to 1992, the long-period averages seem to 
have exhibited a falling trend, i.e., one that is more conspicuous than that 
exhibited in the annual series in Table 3-1. Overall, it may be fair to say 
that the ICOR in the post-reform period was an average between the high and 
the low levels in the pre-reform period, for both China's economy as a whole 
and industry in particular.
Perhaps it may be interesting to note differences in the output 
growth rate and the investment rate between the pre- and post-reform periods, 
as the ICOR is determined by these two factors. On the one hand, the overall 
output(national income) growth rate was higher in 1980-1992 (9.1%) than in 
1952-1980(6.0%), but the growth rate remained the same for industry In the two
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periods(11.3% in 1952-1980 and 1980-1992). On the other hand, the investment 
rate for the whole economy rose from an average level of 27.4% in 1952-1980 
to one of 32.8% in 1980-1992^, and that for industry rose from about 26.0% 
in 1952-1980 to about 29.2% in 1980-1992. Overall, the ICOR for the whole 
economy has fallen between the pre- and post-reform periods, but that for 
industry has risen instead.
The fact that the ICOR in industry has risen between the pre- and 
post periods implies that post-reform China's industrial growth has to a 
larger extent relied on a rise in investment rate, i.e., investment expansion. 
This in turn raises a question about how post-reform China's industry could
7
continue to absorb capital resources for its growth . Quantitatively, the 
question may be addressed as a combination of the two moving factors: for what 
reasons the overall investment rate continued to be high in post-reform 
China's economy, and how could industry absorb an increased proportion of 
total investment funds. In Table 3-2, we list the two series for 1980-1992. 
It clearly shows that the rise of industrial investment in proportion to GDP 
is a result of the rise in the share of gross investment in GDP and the rise 
in the share of industry in gross investment. To be more precise, in the first 
half of the 1980s, the upward trend was mainly a result of the rising share 
of gross investment in GDP when the share of industry in gross investment was 
slightly decreasing. Since the mid-1980s, both proportions were increasing.
® The investment rate in China in the 1980s has been calculated as 
amongst the highest in the world. See, Ryoshin Minami, o p .cit.. pp.156-159
*7
To some authors, this question has been addressed as "who paid for 
China's industrialisation". See, for example, John Knight, op.cit., ft. 2. To 
our understanding, with the transition of the centralised planning system to 
a market-type economy, most of the issue has turned out to be how post-reform 
China's industry could maintain its pivotal position in absorbing or 
mobilising social capital resources.
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Table 3-2. Trend of industrial fixed capital investment, 1980-1992
Total investment 
as a % of GDP
Industry as a % of 
total investment
Industrial investment 
as a % of GDP
1980 20.4 44.9 9.2
1981 20.1 44.8 9.0
1982 23.7 43.9 10.4
1983 24.7 43.8 10.8
1984 26.5 42.7 11.3
1985 29.8 43.3 12.9
1986 31.2 46.0 14.3
1987 32.2 48.6 15.7
1988 32.0 49.7 15.9
1989 25.9 47.7 12.4
1990 25.2 48.1 12.1
1991 27.3 46.5 12.7
1992 32.7 47.6 15.6
Source and note: Figures of total investment and industrial investment for the years until 1986 are from 
the SSB, Zhongguo gudin zichan touzi tongji ziliao 1950-1985 (Statistical Data of C h i n a ’s Fixed Asset 
investment [ZGGDZCTZTJZL]; for subsequent years, see T J N J , various issues. Rural collective industrial 
investment is incorporated in the statistics from 1981, and individual industrial investment from 
1987(ZGGYJJTJNJ various issues since 1988). All are in current prices. Industrial investment as a % of GDP is 
the product of total investment as a % of GDP and industry as a % of total investment.
The share of gross investment in GDP is related to changes in the 
sources of funding. We will discuss this issue in the next section. The share 
of industry in gross investment concerns the allocation of investment funds 
to industry by both the state sector and the non-state sector. We shall in the 
last section of this chapter investigate how market forces and state 
intervention interacted in this process of investment allocation to industry.
II. Changes in Funding Sources of Investment
The question of how much can be saved or invested out of GDP under the 
centralised planning system seems in principle a matter of how much the state
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can raise investment funds through its control on inter-sectoral resource flow 
and its collection from the state enterprises. By pricing industrial goods 
relatively high in the economy, financial resources tended to centre on 
industry. With the dominance of state enterprises in industry, the state was 
able to extract a large portion of the income generated by industry through 
profit remittance and taxes. This centralised planning system of capital 
mobilisation has understandably received a huge blow in the post-reform 
period: first, with price reforms, especially agricultural price reforms, the 
inter-sectoral price relations tend to move towards a market equilibrium 
level. Consequently, the state is less able to draw financial resources into 
industry by fixing a price policy. Second, the non-state enterprises (that are 
usually entitled to a larger degree of financial independence) achieve faster 
growth than state enterprises in industry, so attacting financial resources; 
and for state enterprises an increasingly large proportion of income remains 
with enterprises and their employees. As a result, the state is less able to 
collect funds from industry.
With these .changes, the state's funding capacity has inevitably 
fallen in the post-reform period. As shown in Table 3-3, the share of the 
state budget as a source of fixed capital investment decreases from 62.2% in 
1978 to 4.3% in 1992(in fact, the absolute amount is virtually stationary over 
the period). It is not an overstatement to say that all of the investment 
expansion in the post-reform period has been financed by non-state-budget 
sources: enterprise self-raising funds, domestic banking loans, foreign
capital inflow, and others. Of these sources, the use of foreign capital is 
new to the socialist Chinese economy except for the 1950s when China had close
g
economic relations with the Soviet Union .
0
See: Robert F. Dernberger and Richard S. Eckaus, Financing Asian 
Development 2: China and India. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 
1988, pp.15-18
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Table 3-3. Funding Sources for fixed capital investment
1978 1980 1985 1988 1992
All sources 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
state budget 62.2 44. 7 16.0 9.1 4.3
domestic banking loans 1. 7 11.7 20.1 20.6 27.1
foreign funds 4.2 7.2 3.6 5.6 5.5
enterprise self-raising 
other 31.9 36.5 60.3 64.5
51.2
12.0
Source and note: TJNJ 1991 and 1993.
Using the categories of official Chinese statistics, we cannot
directly see the role of household savings in financing investment expansion.
An estimate made by the World Bank and IMF staff shows that from 1978 to 1988,
the share of the household sector in China's total savings rose from 3.4% to 
q
44.7% . It is evident that household and enterprise sectors become a major 
funding source of post-reform China's investment expansion. It also becomes 
apparent that the banking sector(or financial markets) has played an 
increasingly important role in channelling various sources of funding for 
investment expansion. In what follows, we will discuss the growth of household 
savings and enterprise self-raising funding and the role of the banking sector 
briefly.
1. Growth of Household Savings and Enterprise Self-Funding
The growth of household savings is dependent on the growth of household income 
and households' propensity to save. We have indicated in the previous chapter
q
The World Bank, China: Macroeconomic Stability and Industrial Growth 
under Decentralized Socialism, Washington, D.C., 1990, p.103. Corresponding 
shares taken by the state and enterprises changed from 45.4% to 8.3% and from 
51.2% to 47.0% respectively.
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(Section II), that household income at per capita level experienced a faster 
rising trend in the post-reform period than that of the pre-reform period. 
Also important is the increasing household saving rate in urban and rural 
areas shown in Table 3-4. Taking account of the fact that income per capita 
has risen in general in the period, the rising saving rate can be regarded as 
an approximate indication of a positive marginal propensity to save in urban 
and rural households (the fall of the rate in some of the years may be 
associated with slower growth of per capita income in the same years, for 
example, in 1988 and 1989). From cross-section data for the urban household 
sector shown in Table 3-5, it becomes more apparent that the rising household 
saving rate was indeed closely associated with an increase in per capita 
income.
Table 3-4. Savings as a % of income, yearly average, per capita
Urban areas Rural areas
1978 9.4(1964) 13.1
1980 8.7(1981) 15.2
1983 11.7 20.0
1984 15.3 22.9
1985 10.9(10.1) 20.2
1986 12.2 15.8
1987 12.6 13.9
1988 7.4 12.5
1989 12.7 11.0
1990 16.0 14.8
1991 15.1 12.5
1992 17.7 15.9
Source a n d  note: T J N J , various issues. Savings are household income minus living expenditures; for rural 
households, net incone is used. The scope of urban areas changed in 1985 slightly thereafter both municipal 
cities and townships were covered in surveys. The figure in parenthesis for 1985 urban areas is compatible with 
those of subsequent years in scope.
Another result we can deduce from Table 3-4 is that in the early
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years of the post-reform period, the household saving rate was higher in rural 
areas than in urban areas, but the urban rate then rose fast, reaching a level 
close to that of rural areas. Reasons for this change as well as the reasons 
behind households propensity to save, in both rural and urban areas, may be 
several, and need further investigation^. The change in fact helped to raise 
the overall households saving rate as urbanisation accelerated in the period, 
which we have shown in Section II of Chapter Two.
Table 3-5. Savings as a % of income by income level, urban areas
Income groups 1985 1992
lowest income 5.6 6.7
lower income 8.0 11.2
lower-middle income 9.4 13.9
middle income 10.1 15.6
upper-middle income 11.3 18.9
higher income 12.3 22.4
highest income 16.0 26.8
Source and note: For 1985, TJNJ 19867 P.670: for 1992, TJNJ 1993, p. 287. The definition of savings is
same as that in Table 3-4.
The growth of enterprise self-funding investment seems a more
complicated issue. By definition, self-funding investment is different from 
self-raising investment for the latter includes funds from external sources 
such as net borrowing from financial markets. Enterprise self-funding 
investmentis restricted to the internal financial sources of an enterprise^. 
Major internal sources are depreciation charges drawn on fixed assets, and 
retained profits. China has raised the depreciation rate for all state
^  See WB, op.cit.. pp.110-113, for a review of the issue.
^  For a detailed description of the issue, See: D. Hay et al. Economic 
Reform and State-Owned Enterprises in China 1978-1987. Oxford: O U P , 1993, Ch. 
10
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enterprises several times since 1978(TJNJ 1993, p.28). In state industry 
alone, the ratio of the depreciation fund to total fixed capital investment 
rose from 26.7% in 1985 to 27.3% in 1991(ZGGYJJTJNJ 1992. pp.90 and 103). As 
the total fixed capital investment in state industry understandably includes 
a large proportion of funds from external sources, such as state budgetary 
support and net lending from banks, any slight rise of the ratio in the 
statistics may actually reflect a greater contribution to investment expansion 
in state industry during the period.
Table 3-6. Retained profits in in-budget state industrial enterprises
Nominal retained 
profits as a % 
of total profits 
and product tax
Actual retained 
profits as a % of 
total profits and 
product tax
Productive development 
as a % of actual 
retained profits
1978 1.1 1 .1
1980 8.1 8.1 17.9
1984 18.4 15.6 23.4
1985 20.3 17.3 38.6
1986 21.2 18.0 30.9
1987 21.4 18.2 44.1
1988 22.2 18.8 31.7
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  The State Economic System Reform Commission: Zhonquo qiye qaiqe shiliapq(The Fifsf 
Decade of Enterprise Reform in China), Beijing: Gaige chubanshe, 1990, p.646. Actual retained profits is 
retained profits minus the deduction of the energy and transportation fund at a rate of 15% since 1984.
Retained profits is a more dynamic source of enterprise self-funding 
investment. As shown in Table 3-6, at the beginning of reform in 1978, in­
budget state enterprises(major SOEs in China's industry) were allowed to 
retain only a tiny portion of the total profits generated(including product 
tax remitted). The profit retention rate was quickly raised in the first half 
of the 1980s and became fairly stable in the second half of the 1980s. For all
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China's industrial enterprises, the rate saw a decrease in 1988-1992, from
18.8% to 15.4%(ZGGYJJTJNJ 1993, p.142).
How much of the retained profits was used for investment by
enterprises may be seen approximately by looking at the ratio of productive
development to retained profits. The productive development fund had been
designated for non-consumption purposes. As shown in Table 3-6, in the early
years of reform, the ratio was rather low, implying that SOEs were reluctant
to use their own funds to invest or reinvest, especially for productive
n
development purposes . To cope with the situation, the state has taken a 
number of measures since the mid-1980s to encourage (force) the rate to rise, 
these included the imposition of a quasi-tax, the energy and transportation 
fund, and an "adjustment tax" on enterprises that increased a welfare fund out 
of their retained profits, in 1985.
2. Transforming the Banking Sector and Role of Financial Markets
With financial resources shifting into non-state sectors, i.e., the growth of 
personal income in urban and rural areas, the growth of non-state enterprises, 
as well as the growth of retained profits in SOEs, reforming the state banking 
sector became a necessity. The objectives of the reforms of the state banking 
sector for the purpose of resource mobilisation included: to absorb savings 
from households and enterprises, in urban and rural areas; to channel funds 
into sectors or branches or enterprises according to a market-based valuation; 
to commercialise to a degree state banking institutions to improve their
12 It has been observed, "many [Chinese] enterprises prefer to spend 
their retained profits on collective welfare and workers' bonuses rather than 
on investment, and they do so to the extent that they can get away with it." 
William Byrd and Gene Tidrick, "Factor Allocation and Enterprise Incentives", 
In Gene Tidrick and Chen Jiyuan, eds. China's Industrial Reform. New York: 
OUP, 1987, p .88
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operational efficiency; to allow to a modest degree development of non-'state
1 0
financial institutions ; and to increase access to foreign financial 
markets^. These objectives have been pursued with different degrees of 
success.
Table 3-7. Sources of bank deposits
1983 1985 1988 1992
All sources 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
fiscal deposit 18.0 8.6 3.6 1.2
enterprise deposit 33.4 48.5 39.5 36.1
household deposit 34.9 35.3 44.8 53.4
other 13.7 7.6 12.1 9.3
Source and note: TJNJ 1991, p.642; TJNJ 1993. p.664
The most notable is the growth of household deposits as a source of
bank deposits (Table 3-7). The level rose from 34.9% in 1983 to 53.4% in 1992,
outstripping all other sources of bank deposits. Even when observers have
cautioned, in 1990-1992, that creeping inflation in China has threaten the
ISgrowth of personal savings , urban and rural households' savings with the 
banking institutions have increased rapidly. Though the underlying causes need 
to be examined further, it seems likely that the state banking institutions
13
See for example, On Kit Tam, "A Private Bank in China: Hui Tong Urban 
Co-Operative Bank” , CQ, No. 131 (September 1992)
^  For an overall account, see: Mei Xia and Phillip D. Grub, The Re- 
Emerging Securities Market in China, Boston: Quorum Books, 1992, Ch. 3. The 
authors conclude: "The growth and diversification of financial institutions 
now taking place in China has been a positive development, enhancing the 
financial sector's ability to mobilize savings and to direct them efficiently 
to high-value investment."(p.47). Also pointed out by Peter Nolan: "As a
result of the growth of alternative sources of investment fiance... the old 
Stalinist system of finance was transformed.” (Peter Nolan, State and Market 
in the Chinese Economy, o p .cit., p.274)
^  See WB, op.cit.. p.103.
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have been able to adjust interest rates to attract personal savers.
Reforms and developments in the financial sector were, however, 
unbalanced in some aspects. Notably, there are three major problems still 
existing in post-reform China’s funding system, or financial markets. First, 
the growth of banking sector is still behind what might have been made 
possible by the growth of enterprise financial resources. We may note from 
Table 3-3 that, in 1978-1992, the banking sector as a source of investment has 
risen from 1.7% to 27.1%. Though this is a remarkable increase, the size of 
banking sector, in terms of its channelling of total investment, is still much 
smaller than the enterprise self-raising sector, which accounts for 51.2% of 
total investment in 1992. The size of the enterprise self-raising sector 
implies that over a half of investment projects were neither in the arms’- 
length control of the central government nor in the nexus of the banking 
sector^. The activities of enterprise self-raising investment were 
apparently more locally oriented or less integrated with financial markets. 
Therefore, the gains from the integration of self-raising enterprise funding 
into financial markets are considered to be great.
Second, the commercialisation of state banking institutions has taken 
the form of decentralisation, i.e. , specialised state banking institutions are 
being de-linked with their central headquarters. In the process of 
decentralisation, those banking institutions have found themselves, however, 
under the increasingly large influence of regional and local governments. 
Nonetheless, a degree of segmentation in the banking sector has occurred.
Third, in order to achieve macroeconomic stability, the central 
government has concentrated on controlling fixed capital Investment through 
the regulation of state banking institutions. With this goal, more progress
^  For a detailed description of enterprise self-raising investment, see: 
Robert F. Dernberger and Richard S. Eckaus, op.cit., pp.51-52
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has been made in deregulating circulating capital operation in state banking 
institutions. For Chinese enterprises, the difference in this relative degree 
of state control has actually been perceived as a reflection of differentials 
in borrowing costs. This has led Chinese enterprises to use more circulating 
capital relative to their use of fixed capital. This fast-increasing use of 
circulating capital has brought about some profound implications for China's 
industrial growth. We will come to this issue in more detail particularly in 
Chapter Seven(Section II).
III. State Investment versus Enterprise Investment
The above discussion deals with one aspect of the transformation of 
traditional centralised funding system: financial resources have been allowed 
to grow faster in the non-state sector and more use has been made of financial 
markets in mobilising and channelling financial resources. The transformation 
of the funding system also involved development in another important aspect: 
allowing non-state enterprises and state enterprises to initiate investment 
activities, thereby allowing market forces to play an increasingly important 
role in investment decision-making. Meanwhile, within the state sector, 
regional/local governments were encouraged to seek their own development 
initiatives through regional- and local-oriented investment activities.
In this section, we will focus on the issue of how state and non­
state investment goals are influenced by market forces, and so determine the 
allocation of Investment funds concerning industry. We will compare the 
investment behaviour of enterprises of different ownership status later on. 
Here we firstly give a brief description of changes which have happened to the 
ownership composition of gross investment in post-reform China.
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Table 3-8. Share In gross investment by form of ownership, %
State Collective (TVEs) Individuals
1980 81.9 5.0 ( 2.5) 13.1
1985 66.1 12.9 ( 7.8) 21.0
1988 61.4 15.8 (10.2) 22.7
1990 65.6 11.9 ( 8 .2 ) 22.5
1992 67.1 17.3 (12.7) 15.6
Source and note: TJNJ 1991. pp.18 and 26; TJNJ 1993, p.26.
As summarised in Table 3-8, the ownership composition of China’s
gross investment has undergone a great deal of changes over 1980-1992. First, 
the share of state enterprises has declined considerably, from over four- 
fifths at the beginning of the period to about two-thirds at the end of the 
period. Second, the collective enterprises especially rural collective 
enterprise (TVEs) have become an increasingly important actor in investment 
activities. Third, investment by individuals achieved a larger share in gross 
investment than collective investment during the 1980s, but this trend has 
reversed since 1990. In 1990, when the economy was under retrenchment,the 
relative relationship between state and non-state in investment became subject 
to some strong "adjustments", i.e., the state re-emphasised its bias towards 
state enterprises through various forced means including re-orientating the 
state bank lending behaviour. Overall, however, the basic underlying trend has 
been the relative decline of state investment, though it still occupies a 
dominating position in 1992.
Two things may be noted with regard to the situation described in 
Table 3-8. First, within the state (or non-private) sector, changes have 
occurred to the balance between central and regional/local investment 
projects. As shown in Table 3-9, the share of regional/local projects in total 
state investment increased from 54.6% in 1980 to 56.3% in 1988. The steadily
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rising trend was interrupted again in the 1989-1990 retrenchment. The change 
of two percentage points seems relatively insignificant, but if we include 
collective investment, the relative change in the position of regional/local 
investment becomes more conspicuous(rising from 57.4% in 1980 to 69.3% in 
1992).
Table 3-9. Central and regional/local investment, 100 mil yuan
1980 1985 1988 1990 1992
Basic construction: central 292.6 575.2 873.7 919.2 1341.7
regional 266.3 499.1 700.6 784.7 1671.0
Technical innovation: central 23.8 104.8 211.9 228.5
regional 113.6 344.3 768.9 601.7
Other investment: central 98.1 132.6
regional 57 .3 66.5
Collective investment 46.0 327.5 711.7 529.5 1359.4
Share in investment(%): central 45.4 44.6 43.7 46.8 44.5
regional 54.6 55.4 56.3 53.2 55.5
regional(incl. collective) 57.4 63.3 65.4 60.8 69.3
Source and note: Central investment includes ministerially-administrated and ministerially-supplied 
investment. See: ZGGDZCTZTJZL. various issues, and TJNJ 1993. For 1980, 1985 and 1992, estimates of the 
composition make-up are incomplete because of data unavailability.
Second, in investment undertaken by individuals (including private 
enterprises), the funding directed towards industry was very small(Table 3-10 
compared to Table 3-11). In urban areas, all Investment by individuals(in 
fixed assets) went on housing investment(TJNJ 1993, p.208). Investment by 
individuals in industry reported in the ZGGYJJTJNJ is therefore presumably all 
undertaken in rural areas. For rural areas, housing has also been a top 
priority in the allocation of investment by individuals, accounting for over 
four-fifths in 1982 and over two-thirds in 1992(TJNJ 1993, p.206). The main
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implications of this housing-focused tendency in investment by individuals 
are: firstly, it relieves to a degree the burden on urban and rural collective 
enterprises in housing investment(see below), and secondly, that it implies 
that industrial markets are yet not open to Individual or private enterprises 
as much as to collective enterprises.
Table 3-10. Investment by individuals, 100 mil yuan
All investment Investment in % of industry in all
industry investment
1987 795.9 14.7 1.9
1988 1022.1 24.3 2.4
1989 1032.3 27.0 2.6
1990 1001.2 18.6 1.9
1991 1182.9 18.3 1.6
1992 1222.0
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  All investment u n d e rtaken by individuals from TJNJ 1991 and 1993; the investment by 
individuals in i n d ustry from Z G G Y J J T J W J . various issues since 1989.
In what follows we will focus on investment undertaken by state 
enterprises, and urban and rural collective enterprises. Investment by state 
enterprises is further broken down into basic construction, renovation 
investment, and other. It is believed that considerable differences existed 
between basic construction and renovation investment, albeit the fact that 
they both operated in the state sector. Institutionally, renovation investment 
was a device which enabled existing state enterprises to initiate their own
79
Table 3-11. Share in industrial investment, %
1980 1982 1985 1988 1990 1992
Industrial Investment 408.8 540.4 1101.1 2209.3 2123.6 3716.0
(100 Mil. Yuan)
State investment
basic construction 67.4 48.2 40.5 36.8 44.9 39.2
other - 6.7 10.5 6.3 9.9 6.0
Enterprise investment
renovation 27.9 31.6 31.9 35.0 30.5 30.0
urban collective 4.7 6.1 7.8 8.8 5.8 7.1
rural collective - 7.4 9.2 13.0 9.0 18.6
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  For 1980 to 1905, Z G G D ZCTZTJZL 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 8 5 ; tor M b  to 199Z, TJNJ various issues and 
ZGGYJJTJNJ 199 2 . For 1980, investment in s tate industry contains the basic c o n s t r u c t i o n  and renovation 
investment only, and data for rural collective industrial investment were not available. For the remaining 
years, investment in state industry was larger than the sum of basic constr u c t i o n  and renovation investment, 
and the d i f f e rences are listed here as 'other', that contains mai n l y  the special i n v e stment fund for oil field 
mai n t e n a n c e  and d e velopment etc. For state industrial investment, the figures for 1988 and 1990 provided in 
TJNJ and ZGGYJJTJNJ were different. Figures in TJNJ are used. The investment by indivi d u a l s  in industry listed 
in Table 3-10 seems incom p a t i b l e  with the figures listed here and is therefore excluded.
17investment activities , whilst basic construction remained a form of 
investment that state planning authorities and state enterprises both could 
make use of. Generally speaking, state planning authorities had more power or 
influence on basic construction investment than on renovation investment. To 
be more sensible, we will from now on refer to basic construction investment 
as state investment, and renovation investment, together with collective 
investment, as enterprise investment.
As shown in Table 3-11, in 1980-1988, the share of basic construction
17 In official Chinese statistics, industrial renovation investment 
starts in 198Q(ZGGTJJTJNJ 1993, p.27) but renovation investment for all 
sectors dates back to the early 1950s(TJNJ 1993. p.149).
80
in total investment became smaller and that of renovation investment became 
larger. Overall, enterprise investment consisting of renovation investment, 
urban and rural collective investment, has increased its share in total 
industrial investment, from 32.6% in 1980 to 55,7% in 1992. The share taken 
by basic construction investment rose in 1990 compared to 1988, and reverted 
back to a declining trend in 1990-1992. This fact reflects the view that basic 
construction investment has a closer relationship with the state, and the 
state policy inclination for basic construction investment became more evident 
in the period of retrenchment.
Table 3-12. Industry as a % of investment outlets
State basic State Urban Rural
construction enterprise collective collective
renovation enterprises enterprises
1980 49.3 82.9 84.1
1982 46.9 68.2 77.0 30.4
1985 41.6 78.2 67.2 50.9
1988 51.8 79.0 76.3 63.1
1990 55.9 78.0 75.1 52.2
1992 48.4 73.7 72.3 69.6
Source and note: For 1980-1985, see ZGGDZCTZTJZL 1950-1985: for other years, see TJNJ various issues.
Now we consider to what extent Investment by these different sources 
has been allocated to industry in the post-reform period(Table 3-12). There 
are several points to note. First, compared to the state basic construction 
investment, investment undertaken by enterprises, SOEs, urban COEs and TVEs 
has had a higher tendency towards being allocated to industry since the mid-
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1980s. By 1992, the difference in the proportion of total investment being 
allocated to industry by state basic construction and enterprise investment 
was about one-fifth(lower end) and one-quarter(high end). Second, for SOEs* 
renovation investment and urban GOEs1 investment, there was a declining 
tendency towards investment in industry in 1980-1985 and 1988-1992, Third, 
unlike the other three sources, TVEs investment has steadily shifted towards 
industry throughout the period, except for an interruption in 1990. To explain 
differences and similarities implied by these trends in the investment 
patterns of these in different sources, we consider it necessary to refer to 
some underlying factors. These are the comparative positions of non-industry 
sectors, and the different constraints facing each source of investment. Of 
them, we will particularly look at the issue of housing investment.
The proportion of total investment devoted to housing by the 
different sources are shown in Table 3-13. The first striking feature 
displayed is that housing accounts for a larger share in state basic 
construction investment than in all other investment throughout the period, 
and in TVEs' investment housing took only a small proportion. The chief reason 
for state basic construction investment shifting towards housing, especially 
in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, was to meet the huge and previously 
pent-up need for housing in the urban-industry sector. In a period of spanning 
almost a generation, from the late 1950s to the late 1970s, housing investment 
was only about 5% of total state basic construction investment, which itself 
was the only major form of investment during that period. The sharp rise of 
the share of housing in state basic construction investment was in one sense 
a compensation to the employees in the state sector. In contrast In rural 
areas, employees of TVEs would usually own their houses in the villages, TVEs 
therefore faced lighter burdens in housing investment, and were thus able to 
increase their non-housing investment. The main constraints facing TVEs in
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Table 3-13. Housing as a % of Investment
Basic
construction
Renovation Urban collective Rural collective
1980 20.0 6.1 14.3 6.9*
1982 25.4 11.5 21.5 7.1
1985 20.0 5.6 13.2 6.9
1988 13.0 8.0 10.3 6.0
1990 10.0 7.1 10.9 4.5
1992 10.9 5.7 8.3 2.5
Source and note: ZGGDZCTZTJZL, 1950-1985 anS 1988-1989; TJNJ, 1991 and 1993. Figure with * is tor 1981.
allocating Investment towards industry would not be the need for housing, but 
would more of a problem of access to industrial markets and technology.
The reason why renovation investment undertaken by SOEs has had a 
much lower proportion devoted to housing investment than the state basic 
construction investment, is mainly that renovation investment was designated 
by regulation to be used for technical updating for productive purposes, 
rather than for non-productive purposes that would include housing. However, 
the fact that SOEs did increase the housing investment ratio several times in 
the period(e.g., 1982 and 1988 in Table 3-13) seems to imply that SOEs have 
an inbuilt bias towards increasing housing investment, to meet the 
requirements of their employees. Their inability to increase the housing 
investment ratio more than they did appears due to the state restrictions 
imposed on their investment projects.
Urban COEs industrial investment seems to have had some peculiar 
underlying factors. In the first half of the 1980s, the industrial investment 
ratio declined(Table 3-12), and so did the housing investment ratio(Table 3- 
13). What did increase was urban GOEs investment in the commerce and service
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sector, which may have been associated with deregulation and development in 
this sector. Whether it is a relative improvement in industrial profitability 
that has led to the bounce-back of the industrial investment ratio by urban 
GOEs since 1985 is a question to be studied(the actual profit rate in industry 
has declined in the period but profit rates or their changes in non-industry 
sectors are yet unknown from existing statistics).
The main conclusion that we may draw from the above discussion is 
that even facing different constraints, exemplified by a discussion of the 
housing investment ratio, enterprises, including SOEs, urban COEs and TVEs, 
have been able to maintain a high tendency towards industrial investment; 
among them, TVEs in particular demonstrated a spectacular trend of shifting 
investment towards industry. Our discussion here is incomplete in the sense 
that there may be other relevant and important factors concerning the 
industrial investment ratio and its change. For instance, the relative 
position of the service sector in the economy. However, instead going into 
these questions for which we may encounter data problems and go beyond the 
scope of the present study, we would like to discuss further the issue of 
behaviourial differences between state investment and enterprise investment 
in industry.
We take the energy industry as an example here. As shown in Table 3- 
14, there were substantial differences in the energy industry investment 
ratio(the share of the energy industry in industrial investment) between 
funding from state basic construction investment, state enterprise renovation 
investment, and urban COEs investment, over the period 1980-1992. State basic 
construction investment had the highest ratio, the next highest was the state 
enterprise renovation investment, and the lowest was the urban GOEs 
investment. We have no similar data for TVEs but from their production data, 
it seems that their situation is close to that of urban GOEs(the energy
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industry accounted for less than 5% of TVEs gross industrial product in 1985, 
1989 and 1992, see ZGGYJJTJZL 1986, TJNJ 1991 and 1993). Interestingly, both 
in the state sector, basic construction investment and renovation investment 
show a different trend: in the former, the main trend has been a rise, but in 
the latter, the main trend has been a decrease except for an interruption in 
1990(again associated with the economic retrenchment in 1989-1990). Here 
again, renovation investment displayed features close to those of non-state 
enterprises.
Table 3-14. Energy industry as a % of industrial investment
Basic construction Renovation Urban collective
1980 42.0 32.9 3.1*
1982 39.2 24.7 2.2*
1985 46.0 15.3 2.1*
1988 50.6 14.7 4.6
1990 58.6 19.3 9.9
1992 55.1 13.8 5.8(1991)
Source ana note ;"T O T O T J Z l , 19i)0-198b, 1988-1989, and 1990-1991; TJNJ, 1990 and 1993. The energy'
industry consists of five branches out of the forty in a new industrial classification, i.e., coal mining, 
petroleum mining, power generation, petro l e u m  refinement, and coking. Figures w i t h  * are those for w h ich the 
ener g y  industry consisted of three branches out of the fifteen in the older industrial classification, i.e., 
power generation, coal, and petroleum. Similar b r eakdown data for rural c o l l ective industrial investment are 
not available.
The main differences between the energy Industry and non-energy 
Industry in China are that energy Industry products are usually priced low 
compared to non-energy industry products, especially some of the light 
manufacturing goods; also, in general, the energy industry requires a longer
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gestation period for any large lump sum funding before yielding returns to 
Ifl
investment . It seems that these two important differences have affected the 
state and enterprises' inclination towards investment in the energy industry.
As SOEs renovation investment, urban GOEs investment, and TVEs 
investment all tended to become more market-oriented in the period 1980-1992, 
they have been less willing to invest in energy industry. In addition, as they 
expanded more rapidly than basic construction investment in industry(Table 3- 
11), this inevitably resulted in the fall of the energy industry investment 
ratio(the share of energy industry in total industrial investment, Table 3- 
15). As can be seen from the table, in 1980-1985, the ratio given by state 
basic construction investment did not reduce significantly, but it declined 
sharply in total industrial investment. In 1985-1988, the state reaffirmed its 
commitment to the energy industry by increasing the investment ratio 
substantially(from 19.1% to 26.1%), although this increase had little 
influence on the overall ratio in industry (an one percentage-point increase) 
because of the shift away by enterprise renovation investment from the energy 
industry(Table 3-14). The rise in the energy industry's investment ratio in 
1990 is mainly due to the fact that the other forms of investment all 
increased their funding towards the energy industry, perhaps resulting from 
heavy pressure by the state. In 1992, when state basic construction investment 
accounted for just 38.4% of total national investment and 39.2% of total 
industrial investment, it nevertheless contributed over 80% of energy industry 
investment. We can therefore say that investment in the energy industry was 
mainly supported by state basic construction investment.
Overall, the fall in the energy industry's investment ratio, 
especially in 1980-1988, has been a fundamental factor causing the recurrent
10
A detailed survey of China's energy industry can be found in Tatsu 
Kambara, "The Energy Situation in China", CQ, No. 131 (September 1992)
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Table 3-15. Energy industry investment ratios
Energy industry as a Energy industry as a
% of total industrial % of basic construction
investment investment
1 9 8 0 3 7 . 6 2 0 . 7
1 9 8 2 2 7 . 0 1 8 . 4
1 9 8 5 2 3 . 9 1 9 . 1
1 9 8 8 2 4 . 8 2 6 . 1
1 9 9 0 3 3 . 6 3 2 . 8
1 9 9 2 2 7 . 1 2 6 . 7
Source and note: First column from Table 3-11 and 3-14 [TVEs' energy industry investment ratio is
assumed the same as urban COEs); second column from TJNJ 1993, p . 158.
shortages of energy industry products(coal, petroleum and electricity power,
i g
etc) in post-reform China (other important factors include the similar bias 
within the transport sector in that energy industry products could not be 
effectively and promptly delivered from production locations to consumption 
locations). We have shown that these problems are mainly caused by the bias 
against the energy industry existing within enterprise investment sources. It 
is clear that the problems of imbalance in China's industry are closely 
associated with enterprises' investment behaviour.
Overall, the actual significance of the behaviourial differences 
between state basic construction investment and enterprises' investment is a 
question that may be answered by reference to differences in their response 
to some common factors such as profit rate and capital intensity. In order to 
consider this question of significance, we propose to look at a regression
19 See Tatsum Kambara, ibid.
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analysis of industrial branch data(the results are reported in Table 3-16). 
It is hypothesised that if state basic construction investment and enterprise 
investment were the same in principle, the effects of common factors on their 
allocation of investment would be similar. For instance, we may expect, under 
this indifference hypothesis, that both state basic construction investment 
and enterprise investment would be positively related to profit rate.
Included in the regressions are the profit rate, the level of
retained profits and fixed capital per worker. The dependent variable is the
share of branches in total investment divided by the share of branches in
fixed capital stock. The use of the relative term is to eliminate the size
effect of existing capital stock. For example, enterprises would be less
willing to invest in the coal industry because of its low profit rate, but
actual investment in the coal industry would be a large amount because the
20coal industry is among the largest industrial branches in China . The year 
1988 is chosen because this is the year enterprise investment reached its peak 
level in the post-reform period that we are studying(Table 3-11).
The results reported in Table 3-16 may be explained as follows. (1) 
Renovation investment tended to respond positively to the profit rate of 
return and the level of retained profits, and negatively to the level of 
capital intensity: the higher the profit rate or level of retained profits 
in a branch, the greater would the shift of renovation investment into the 
branch be, compared to its position in the existing total capital stock; on 
the other hand, when the capital-labour ratio was high in a branch, renovation 
investment would be smaller, compared to the branch's position in the existing
20 By using this measure, differences between state basic construction 
investment and enterprise investment can be revealed immediately in some 
cases. For example, in 1988, when the coal industry and the textile industry 
accounted for 7.2% and 7.4% of total industrial fixed capital stock 
respectively, their shares in basic construction investment were 7.8% and 2.9% 
respectively, and their shares in renovation investment 4.5% and 11.0% 
respectively(from the same source to Table 3-16).
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Table 3-16. Regressions of industrial Investment
Enterprise investment Basic
construction
investment
Renovation Urban collective
Profit Rate 435 005 - 001
(7 902) ( 323)* (-1 676)*
Capital-labour ratio 107 - 007 002
(-1 952) (-2 738) (2 .939)
Retained profit 292 - 004 002
(3 040) (-1 .360)* (1 .216)*
Constant term 39 902 2 .396 .491
(2 860) (6 .266) (2 .791)
R2 .725 .270 .308
F statistic 30 713 4 .309 5 .182
D-W statistic 2 .254 1 .481 1 .457
Source and note: The d e pendent variables are the shares of i y branches in total industrial
investment(i.e., either in industrial renovation investment, urban collective industrial investment, or 
industrial basic construction investment) divided by the share of the 39 branches in total fixed assets, using 
1988 data; the profit rate is the sum of profit and taxation as a % of total c a pital(fixed assets and 
circulating capital); the capital-labour ratio is fixed assets per worker; retained profit is also at per 
worker level. All variables are in percentage form. Figures in parenthesis are t-values and figures with * are 
not statistically significant at a critical level of 51. The F statistic for renovation and basic construction 
are significant at a 1% critical level, but that for urban collective is significant at 5% only. Investment 
data at branch level are from ZGGDZCTZTJZL 1988-1989, and all other data from ZGGYJJTJNJ 1992.
total capital stock, ceteris paribus. (2) The statistical results for urban 
collective industrial investment are not as robust as those for renovation 
investment. It seems however that collective investment shares common features
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21with renovation investment . (3) For basic construction investment, the
results seem quite different. Statistically, the profit rate and retained 
profits had no significant effect on the allocation of state basic 
construction investment, and its response to the capital-labour ratio was 
positive, i.e., the more capital intensive a branch was, the greater would be 
the amount of state basic construction investment flowing into the branch. A 
basic conclusion we may draw is that there seem to be some systematic 
differences existing between state basic construction investment and 
enterprise investment, concerning the allocation of investment among 
industrial branches. In general, enterprise investment has been greatly 
influenced by factors such as the profit rate, the level of retained profits 
and the capital-labour ratio, in a manner which conforms to market forces; on 
the other hand, state basic construction investment has been less 
significantly affected by these factors.
There seems to be an important implication of the above conclusion 
which concerns overall investment expansion in post-reform China's industry. 
Insomuch as enterprise investment tended to flow into industrial branches with 
a higher profit rate, or those which were more accessible, the growth of 
investment became uneven among industrial branches: the bottleneck appeared 
in some areas such as the energy industry. When a positive response from state
21 We have conducted a revised regression for a similar category: using 
fixed capital stock of non-state enterprises (including urban COEs and TVEs) 
as the dependent variable, whilst dependent variables are defined the same as 
in Table 3-16 but three-year average values of 1988-1990 are used. The results 
are remarkably improved and quite close to those of renovation Investment in 
Table 3-16:
Profit rate Retained profits Capital-labour ratio 
% of capital stock = 0.07 + 1.77 - 2.65
(.185) (3.513) (-6.914)
: 0.691; F(2, 25): 18.648; D-W: 1.817. Log form is used for all variables. 
Data of 30 industrial branches are used. Data sources: TJNJ 1991, p.401 and 
407 and those for Table 3-16.
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basic construction investment has helped to relieve the pressure in the areas 
neglected by enterprise investment, the continuing bias against these areas 
in enterprise investment tended to make the imbalances recur again. As long 
as state basic construction investment continued to support the industrial 
branches which were suffering investment supply shortages, such as the energy 
industry, the growth of total industrial investment was pushed up a step
further. The overall growth of industrial investment in post-reform China was
22thus exaggerated .
To summarise our discussions about post-reform growth of industrial 
investment, we may note several key points again. (1) With state funding 
capacity declining in the post-reform period, the growth of household savings 
provided a space for accelerated gross investment. (2) In parallel, enterprise 
investment expanded rapidly as enterprises, both state enterprises and 
collective enterprises, had more accessible financial resources. (3) Facing 
different constraints, enterprises, especially rural collective enterprises, 
invested less in housing than state investment, which made it possible for 
them to invest more in other areas including industry. (4) Industrial 
Investment initiated by enterprises was significantly guided by market forces, 
i.e., they were likely to invest more in industrial branches with high profit 
rates and invest less in branches with more intensive capital requirements. 
Such an investment tendency however engendered a problem of shortages under 
the partially reformed planned pricing system. The commitment to the balanced 
growth made It imperative for the state to increase investment in the 
neglected branches, such as the energy industry, which would usually be those 
with a lower profit rate and more intensive capital requirements. Overall, 
industrial investment was therefore exaggerated.
22 A similar conclusion has also been arrived at by Oktay Yenal, "Chinese 
Reforms, Inflation and the Allocation of Investment In a Socialist Economy", 
World Development, Vol. 18, No. 5 (1990)
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PART TWO 
P R O D U C T I V I T Y  C H A N G E
Chapter Four
Productivity Analysis For China's Industry: Methodology and Data Scope
In Part One, Mobilising Resources, we have demonstrated that reforms have 
helped China's industry to pursue market expansion and investment expansion 
since the late 1970s. China's linkages of industrial production with markets 
have been restored and strengthened by the transformation of the old 
centralised planning system. By actively responding to the growing market 
demand, post-reform China's industry has been able not only to achieve a high 
output growth rate, but also to transform its institutional and production 
structure, e.g, the faster growth of non-state enterprises and the faster 
growth of manufactured exports. Over this periof of rapid economic growth, 
China's industrial enterprises including SOEs, urban COEs, and TVEs, have also 
been able to gain greater access to the financial resources that were made 
available by the fast growth of the household sector and the enterprise 
sector, as well as foreign capital inflow. Though it has partially withdrawn 
from industrial funding, the state maintained its commitment to the balanced 
growth by supporting the basic industrial branches, including the energy 
industry. Such state support has played an important role in sustaining the 
overall industrial growth.
From the resource mobilisation point of view, post-reform China's 
industry has therefore performed successfully, although not without certain
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setbacks characterised by some unbalanced reforms or unbalanced impacts of 
reforms. Having arrived at this stage of economic performance analysis, we 
come to the question of productivity change. The question can be addressed as: 
whether and if so to what degree the faster industrial growth has been 
accompanied by productivity improvement in general, and exactly how the 
industrial growth has been interrelated with productivity change in 
particular. In Part Two, we will concentrate on the first aspect. The 
interrelation of industrial growth and productivity change will be dealt with 
in Part Three.
Productivity change in post-reform China's industry has become an
area that has attracted great attention from analysts and observers. In many
aspects our empirical investigation of the issue has benefited from the 
previous studies. However, it is felt that a few issues concerning 
productivity analysis for post-reform China's industry need mroe analysis, (i) 
Theoretically, it seems that the relevance and limitations of the use of total 
factor productivity analysis may need to be clarified, with regard to its 
application in post-reform China's industry, (ii) Empirically, productivity 
analysis here involves quite a few data-related problems, some arising from 
the original data sources and some others from analysts' data processing. 
Based on progress made in official Chinese statistical publications and in 
academic discussions, we are now able to pursue the empirical investigation 
into sectoral levels on a more consistent base, (iii) The interpretation of
the results of total factor productivity analysis seems to be not so
straightforward as how it looks at first sight. We believe that the 
interpretation should be at least related to the structural transformation 
that has occurred in post-reform China's industry.
The organisation of Part Two is as follows. Chapter Four discusses 
the theoretical aspect of the use of total factor productivity analysis with
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regard to its application in China's industry. The issue of data scope will 
also be highlighted in the chapter. Chapter Five presents the results of our 
effort to estimate output and input growth in China's industry at sector level 
during 1980-1992. Chapter Six tries to interpret these results in the light 
of the structural transformation in post-reform China's industry.
The main theoretical points that we will make in the present chapter 
are: (i) As the conventional total factor productivity analysis is derived 
from the production function under competitive conditions, it appears 
necessary to reconsider its implication when the market conditions are 
different or when they have changed over a course of economic development, 
(ii) Aggregate total factor productivity is an outcome of productivity change 
at sectoral levels. Existing sectoral relations and their change over the 
period under study should be therefore taken into account when interpreting 
the results of total factor productivity estimates, (iii) Strictly speaking, 
total factor productivity may not necessarily reflect technological progress. 
To accommodate this conceptual difference, we will seek to establish 
appropriate principles for the empirical treatment of output and input series.
I. Total Factor Productivity Analysis and Market Conditions
Broadly speaking, the purpose of total factor productivity [TFPJ analysis is 
to identify the physical contributions of productive factor inputs to output 
growth and treat the residual of output growth (subtracting from the 
contributions of input growth) as an indication of productivity growth. In 
formulating the analysis, economists usually make an assumption about the 
market conditions under which the analysis applies: perfect competition. Under 
perfect competition, factor prices are equal to their marginal products, and 
therefore factor shares in output reflect the relative importance of factor
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inputs to output growth.
The TFP approach to economic growth accounting has received a good
deal of criticism and revision^. For our analytical task that deals with a
transitional economy in post-reform China, a most crucial issue is this
reliance of TFP analysis on the assumption about underlying market conditions:
would non-competitive conditions or a change in market conditions over time
affect the applicability of the method or require a distinctive interpretation
2
of the analysis? The question has been raised by some economists . Most
importantly, this question seems unlikely to disappear even if the validity
3
of applying the analysis into a non-competitive environment were justified .
Criticisms and/or revisions have often been made in these areas: factor 
substitutability(between labour and capital), returns to scale, and 
homogeneity of factors(particularly capital) and aggregate output. See for 
example, Richard Nelson, "Recent Exercises in Growth Accounting: New
Understanding or Dead End?", AER, Vol. 63 No. 3 (June 1973); C. Kennedy, and 
A.P. Thirlwall, "Technical Progress", Economic Journal, March 1972; Richard 
Nelson, "Research on Productivity Growth and Productivity Differences: Dead 
Ends and New Departures", Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 19 (1981)
2
In one case, it has been pointed out that, if TFP analysis is used in 
an economy where monopolistic conditions prevail, it would measure, among 
other things, effects associated with the monopolistic conditions. See Ben 
Fine, "Total Factor Productivity versus Realism: the Case of the South African 
Coal Mining Industry", in South African Journal of Economics, Vol. 60, No. 3 
(September 1992). Similar criticism has also been made in more general terms: 
"The justification of the weighting schemes in growth accounting have never 
been convincing nor have they been well defended. For example, in short-run 
and long-run equilibrium under competitive conditions, factor shares do 
measure the contributions of each input, but the real world hardly conforms 
to the model of perfect competition, whether in or out of equilibrium. What 
kind of bias this weighting procedure might introduce has never been made 
clear." John Cornwall on TFP, in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 
Vol. IV
3
Some economists have argued that perfect competition is not necessary, 
though is convenient, for TFP analysis in the Cobb-Douglas form of the 
production function. See: Pan A. Yotopoulos and Jeffrey B. Nugent, Economics 
of Development: Empirical Investigations, New York: Harper & Row, 1976, p.52. 
Their main argument is that, by treating factor inputs as an endogenous 
variable and factor prices as an exogenous variable, one would expect that 
factor shares in output would remain same even if factor prices were 
distorted. For example, supposing that wages were fixed at a level lower than 
the marginal products of labour, the share of labour in income would not 
necessarily change because more labour would have been put in use. 
Empirically, it has been suggested that when dealing with a monopolistic
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To illustrate this point, let us see what bias would be entailed in 
conventional TFP estimates under monopolistic conditions.
The following illustration is a quick look at the outcome of 
introducing factor price inequality with marginal products under monopoly, and 
has necessarily overlooked some detailed descriptions of the usual TFP 
formulation(e.g ., assumptions about factor substitutability and returns to 
scale etc). Starting with a production function in a general form,
Q = A(t)f(L, K) (1)
where Q is output, and L and K are labour and capital, respectively; A(t) is 
a term indicative of TFP, separable from the f(L, K) . Taking the total 
differentiation with reference to time, t, (1) becomes
dQ/dt = (dA/dt)f + (dQ/dL)(dL/dt) + OQ/0K)(dK/dt) (2)
Note that dQ/dL = AOf/3L), and 5Q/3K = A(3f/dK) . They are the marginal 
products of labour and capital, respectively. Under competitive conditions, 
the marginal products of labour and capital are equal to their prices, w(wage 
rate) and r(profit or interest rate in broad sense), respectively^.
economy, the contributions of factor inputs to output growth may be estimated 
by referring to the output elasticity of factor inputs, instead of using 
factor shares. See, M. Nishimizu and J. M. Page, Jr. "Total Factor 
Productivity Growth, Technological Progress, and Technical Efficiency Change: 
Dimensions of Productivity Change in Yugoslavia, 1965-1978", Economic Journal, 
Vol. 92 (1982).
 ^ It can be derived from a simplistic profit function under competitive 
conditions in a two-factor case:
71 = 0 - (wL + rK)
where ti stands for profit. The first-order conditions leading to profit 
maximisation yield:
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Introducing these two equalities into (2), dividing both sides by Q, we can 
obtain:
0/Q = A/A + (SjL/L + skK/K) (3)
where 0/Q, ft/K and L/L are the growth rates of output, capital and labour, 
respectively; and s^^rK/Q) and Sj(swL/Q) are the share of labour and capital 
in output, respectively. The part (sjL/L + s^/K) may be interpreted as the 
contribution of factor inputs to output growth. The part A/A is indicative of 
productivity growth, i.e., TFP. It is not directly observable but can be 
expressed as a residual term:
TFP(competitioa) = A/ A = 0/Q - (s^/L ♦ s f^t/K) (4 )
It is apparent that, under monopoly, the equality relations(dQ/dL=w, and
dQ/dK=r) can no longer hold. It can be shown that factor prices under monopoly
would be equal to .the marginal products multiplicative to some price 
elasticities, which may be expressed as ,
I dn/dL = dQ/dL - w = 0 f dQ/dL » w
I dn/dK = dQ/dK - r - 0 [ dQ/dK = r
5
Take the same case in the ft. 4 but add a term of output price (because 
price is a function of output under monopoly)
7i = pQ - (wL + rK)
The first-order conditions leading to a profit maximisation yield:
( dn/dL = (Q(dp/dQ)(dQ/dL) + p(dQ/dL)} - w = 0
t dn/dK = {Q(dp/dQ)(dQ/dK) + p(dQ/dK)} - r = 0
Rewriting them as
( w/p = (dQ/dL) (epq + 1)
1 r/p = (dQ/dK)(epg + 1)
where ep^  = (Q/p)(dp/dQ), the price elasticities.
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I dQ /dL  » <w/p)(epq + l)'1 
I 3Q/3K - (r/p)(epq + l)"1
The new equalities mean that under monopoly payments to factors are made not 
only according to their marginal products, but are also subject to price 
elasticities. As ep^  is usually in the range of 0 and -1, factors are 
underpaid to the degree to which the monopoly profits are generated. Existence 
of the monopoly profit does have implications for a conventional calculation 
of TFP. Substituting the above expressions for dQ/dL and dQ/dK into (2), we 
end up with a distinctive expression of TFP under monopoly:
TFP(monopoly) = ^  + sk^K> = A/ A - epq<0/Q " A/ A> <5>
It thus becomes clear that TFP under monopoly contains an additional term 
embodying price elasticities. Moreover, comparing (5) with (4), it is evident 
that
T f , p (ffionopoly) > T F P (competition)
Because it is usually the case that ep^ is in the range of 0 and -1, and 0/Q 
is larger than A/A^.
The reason for the TFP estimate under monopolistic conditions being 
larger than the TFP estimate under competitive conditions is that, under 
monopoly, output growth has embraced an additional source: the gain of
monopoly profits. The existence of monopoly profit indicates that part of the 
consumer surplus is being taken by monopolistic producers. Capture of the
 ^The comparison is made in a static sense as it assumes that A/A is same 
in quantity under monopoly and competition. Under which of the market 
conditions A/A would be larger is a separate question.
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consumer surplus means that gains to monopolistic producers have increased but 
they do not incur additional factor inputs. In statistics, this would be 
reflected as an increase in productivity. However, when competition prevails 
in the market, monopolistic prices tend to give way to equilibrium prices, the 
consumer surplus will be accordingly returned to consumers, and as a result, 
monopoly profits will gradually die down. In this process, the productivity 
of monopolistic producers would tend to become lower because of the loss of 
the additional source of gain. Statistically, this implies that in the period 
of transition, TFP estimates tend to converge towards A/A, an indicator of the 
true total factor productivity.
The change in market conditions may be termed de-monopolisation. It 
is clear that in a process of de-monopolisation, TFP estimates would not be 
necessarily positive or positively larger even if A/A is positive or 
positively large. The difference we can identify between the TFP (ffiOI10poly) anc* 
the TFP(competition) very helpful for us to give an appropriate interpretation 
of TFP estimates of post-reform China's industry. De-monopolisation has became 
a everpresent feature of post-reform China’s industrial development, which has 
been characterised by a diffusion of new technology and production expansion 
over regions, as well as increased competition between state and non-state 
enterprises(we will come to these issue later in Part Three). With this 
theoretical background, we should interpret TFP estimates with due regard to 
the changes in market conditions(Section II in Chapter Six).
II. TFP Analysis and Sectoral Relations
As revealed in equations (3) and (4), the TFP estimate of A/A measures the 
rate of productivity change in output growth over a certain period of time. 
If we are dealing with an economy comprising several sectors, disparities in
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sectoral TFP estimates would imply unevenly occurring productivity change
among the sectors, but they do not necessarily indicate which of the sectors
has a higher or lower productivity or whether production has tended to shift
into a sector with higher productivity.
The question of whether production tends to shift into sectors with
higher productivity is particularly interesting for the analysis of a
transitional economy. If we admit that a centrally planned system is
characterised by the state control of inter-sectoral flows of productive
resources and that such flows have weak linkages with the market, a transition
towards a market-type economy would therefore be represented by an
increasingly large proportion of the inter-sectoral flow of productive
resources coming out of state control, and linkage between the flow and the
market becoming stronger. In other words, production or productive resources
under the transitional economy tends to shift towards sectors with a higher
productivity. If this is the case, the sectoral shift may contribute to the
7
overall growth of productivity significantly .
How a TFP analysis could be incorporated with the sectoral 
perspective is an issue still awaiting development, theoretically and 
empirically. Here we intend to show that an aggregate TFP estimate is a 
combination of sectoral TFPs weighted by sectoral shares in aggregate output. 
This result may help us to clarify the relationship between aggregate TFP and 
sectoral TFPs and furthermore, to give a more appropriate interpretation of 
aggregate TFP estimates.
What follows is a formal demonstration of the relationship between 
aggregate TFP and sectoral TFPs using a simplified case: a two sector(good)
7
This is similar to saying that the positive effect of a reallocation 
of productive resources among sectors would be substantial in a transitional 
period, a suggestion made in Moshe Syrquin, "Productivity Growth and Factor 
Reallocation", in Hollis Chenery, ed. Industrialization and Growth: A
Comparative Study. New York: OUP, 1986
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economy. We assume that each sector has its own production function and 
sectoral TFPs are in the same form as expressed in equations (3) and (4) such 
that,
Oi/Qi = Aj/Aj + (siiL/Li + Sjjjfc/Kj) and
TFPj = ki/Ai = Oi/Qi “ (siiL/Li + skiK/Ki) (i = l t 2) (6 )
where subscript i indicates an individual sector, and sk and Sj here stand for 
the shares of capital and labour in sectoral output, respectively. All other 
symbols remain the same as in the previous definition. Here we ignore the 
issue of market condition by simply assuming that competitive conditions 
prevail in each of the two sectors. One way to establish the relationship 
between the sectoral TFPs and aggregate TFP is to start with decomposing the 
aggregate output a s :
This expression implies that aggregate output is a sum over sectoral output 
through a price mix, pj and P2. Without a price mix, sectoral output cannot 
be aggregated.
Now we consider the change of aggregate output over time by taking 
total differentials of (7) with respect to time, t,
dQ/dt = pjdQj/dt + P2dQ2/dt (8 )
Implied in the differentiation is also that the price mix, pj and P2, does not 
change over time, either individually or relatively. In empirical studies of 
TFP, the use of constant prices of output has actually excluded (though may not
(7)
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accurately) any change in the price mix. Dividing both sides of (8 ) by the 
aggregate output, Q, and denoting hj = Pj:Q^/Qt (sectoral share in aggregate 
output), we can have an expression for aggregate output growth in terms of 
sectoral output growth:
0/Q = v V Q p  + h2((V Q 2 )  (9)
This reveals that aggregate output growth is a sum of sectoral output growth 
weighted by sectoral shares in aggregate output which contain a price mix over 
sectors. We can now substitute the expressions in (3) for aggregate output 
growth and that in (6 ) for sectoral output growth into equation (9),
A/a + (S|L/l + sk£/K)
= hj (A1/A1 + + Sj^/Kj) + h2(A2/A2 + s12£2/L2 + sk2K2/K2) (10)
0
It can be shown that in (10) ,
Sjf/L = hj (Sj jLj/Lj ) + h2 ( Sj2L2/L2 ) ; and 
SjjK/K = h 1(skll(1/ K 1) + h 2 (sk2^ / K 2 )
0
Note that, in the case of capital, on the left-hand side of equation
(10) ,
sk£/K = (rK/Q)(fc/K) = ( rK/Q) (k ^ / K j ) + ( rK/Q) (k2^ 2/K2)
= (rKj/QMfy/Kj) + (rK2/Q)(R2/K2)
because R/K = k^Rj/Kj) + ^2(R2/K2), where k- = K-/K; and also on the right-hand 
side,
^1 ( sk 1 ^ 1 / K ] ) + h 2  ^sk2I^2//K2  ^
= (P1Q1/Q)(rK1/p1Q1)(R1/K1) + (p2Q2/Q) (rK2/p2Q2) (R2/K2) 
= (rKj/QXfcj/Ki) + (rK2/Q)(^2/K2)
A similar equality exists for terms concerning labour.
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Removing the corresponding terms from both sides in (10), we come to a result,
T F P (aggregate) =  ~  ^ i ^ j / A j )  +  ( H )
It becomes clear that aggregate TFP depends not only on sectoral TFPs
individually, but also on sectoral shares in aggregate output measured in a
price mix at an initial period(holding the price mix unchanged over a period
of time is nothing more than anchoring the price base to the initial period) .
An implication of this relationship is that when we are interpreting aggregate
TFP estimates in terms of sectoral TFP estimates, we should also take into
account the underlying sectoral weights or price mix. In a transitional
period, it is possible that a reforming sector achieves a relatively high TFP
but because of its relatively small share in aggregate output it has a
relatively small impact on aggregate TFP. On the other hand, it is also
possible that the price mix, if used differently, would affect estimates of
aggregate TFP. For example, in China's industry, the shares of light and heavy
industry in total GVI.0 in 1980 were 47% and 53%, respectively, when measured
in current prices, but were 43% and 57% in the same year, respectively, when
measured in comparable prices. Given the fact that TFPs in light and heavy
industry were different in the 1980s(Section Two in Chapter Six), the results
of an aggregate TFP estimate would be apparently affected by the choice of 
o
price mix .
We should however note that there is a deficiency in the aggregate 
total factor productivity formulation as revealed in equation (11). From this 
expression, we would hardly know exactly how much sectoral shifts have
q
Because we will mainly use the data provided in ZGGYJJTJNJ which give 
no sectoral data prior to 1980(see the next section) for our TFP analysis, we 
have to use the 1980 price base. As shown in the text, this base exaggerated 
the share of light industry(4 percentage points more in the TJNJ data-set and 
about 2% percentage points more in the ZGGYJJTJNJ data-set).
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affected aggregate productivity growth because it gives no account of the 
effect of sectoral shifts on total factor productivity(i.e., hj and h2 are 
held unchanged and only A j/Aj and A2/A2 are allowed to change over a period of 
time)^. Foa study of the reallocation effect, it would be much more easy to 
focus on, say, labour productivity. Similarly, aggregate labour productivity 
in a two-sector case can be expressed as:
Q/L = (Lj/ L M Q j/Lj ) + (L2/L)(Q2/L2) (12)
If we use s^  to indicate the sectoral share in total labour, and 1^  sectoral 
labour productivity(i = 1, 2, here), the change of aggregate labour
productivity over time would be a sum over change in the sectoral weights and 
change in the sectoral labour productivity^:
d(Q/L)/dt = E(si*dli/dt) + E(li*dsi/dt) (13)
And
d(Q/L)/dt)/(Q/L) = £(qi*(li/li) ) + E (qj * ( S^/Sj)) (14)
This means that the sum of h^Aj/Aj) and h2(A2/A2) has exhausted the 
aggregate total factor productivity, A/A. To some authors, this relationship 
has been expressed differently. For example, Moshe Syrquin envisages a 
residual existing between A/A and the sum of hj(A^/Aj) and h2(A2/A2), and it 
being named the factor reallocation effect("Productivity Growth and Factor 
Reallocation", in Hollis Chenery, S. Robinson, and M. Syrquin, op.cit., Ch. 
8 . To our understanding, the residual would possibly exist or the reallocation 
effect may be studied in two ways: One: artificially alter the sectoral
weights, hj and h2, based on some assumptions outside the model; Two: instead 
of focusing on the total factor productivity, one may examine labour 
productivity for which the formulation proposed by Syrquin is formally 
applicable.
^ The discussion follows Syrquin, o p .cit.
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The dot " ‘" indicates a time derivative, and sectoral share in total 
output. The second part in the right-hand side, E(qj*(£j/Sj)), measures the 
effect of sectoral shifts on aggregate labour productivity growth, i.e., the 
reallocation effect. Viewed from this expression, it is possibly the case that 
even if labour productivity did not grow in individual sectors(i.e, 
E(qj*(ij/lj)) was zero or negative), aggregate labour productivity could 
increase as long as the labour force moved into sectors with a higher labour 
productivity and such shifts were sufficiently large(i.e, E (q^  * (S^/sj)) was 
positive and sufficiently large). More generally, the two sources of aggregate 
productivity growth may not necessarily move in same direction in the same 
period of time. As we will show later in Chapter Six(Section Three), this has 
sometimes been the case in post-reform China’s industry. We need to examine 
underlying factors in such a pattern of productivity growth.
III. TFP Estimates as an Indicator of Productivity Change
Our discussions in the previous two sections have revealed that aggregate TFP
estimates would be possibly affected by a change in market conditions and by
sectoral relationship in an economy. These findings strongly suggest that we
should be more careful in interpreting TFP estimates especially when dealing
with a transitional economy. The usual interpretation of TFP as technological
progress should therefore be subject to scepticism. However, in the sense that
TFP does measure the part of output growth that is not due to an increase in
factor inputs, the TFP estimate can still be taken as an indicator of
12productivity change . Of sources of productivity change, technological 
12 Mathematically, we may rewrite TFP in equation (4) after retrieving 
the definitions of Sj(=wL/Q) and sk(=rK/Q) into it,
TFP = 0 / Q  -  (s,{L/L + sktf/K) = { 0  - (wf + rt)}/Q
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progress may be a most important one but by no means the only one. This broad 
view towards TFP analysis has been taken by several authors, as they put it:
Our empirical results on TFP change thus should not be interpreted 
as measuring technical change only in the sense of a shift in the 
frontier of production possibilities because of the implementation of a 
new generation of technical knowledge. Instead, the measures must be 
interpreted quite broadly to include such factors as industrial and plant 
organization, engineering know-how, or changes in response to disruptions
in the production process that affect capacity utilization in the short
n
run. The measures really treat production units as a black box.
What would be in the "black box" is exactly those factors which would affect 
productivity or its change in the course of economic growth. Besides 
technological progress, market conditions and sectoral relations which we have 
mentioned above, there is notably another important source of TFP: technical 
efficiency. This refers to the question of whether enterprises have operated 
on their production frontiers. Studies on this issue tend to confirm that 
technical efficiency would be in general positively associated with a change 
in market conditions from monopoly to competition but may not necessarily be 
associated with technological progress^.
The part {0 - (wR + rR)} determines the sign of the TFP estimate. The 
component (wR + rR) may be regarded as returns to increased factor inputs(the 
return rates, w and r, are fixed because of the use of constant prices). 
Therefore, TFP is positive only if an increase in output is sufficiently 
larger than an increase in total returns to factor inputs measured in constant 
return rates. TFP is thus related to the change in total returns to factors.
n
Mieko Nishimizu and Sherman Robinson, "Productivity Growth in 
Manufacturing", in Hollis Ghenery, Sherman Robinson and Moshe Syrquin, 
op.cit. , p.288
^ See R.S. Frantz, X-Efficiency: Theory. Evidence and Application,
Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1988
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In the present study of productivity change in post-reform China's 
industry, we will focus on the TFP defined in the broad sense rather than the 
TFP defined as technological progress. This is not only because the use of the 
TFP method for studying technological progress may encounter a number of 
theoretical and empirical problems that may affect the accuracy of the 
estimates, but also because, as we have shown above, TFP defined in the narrow 
sense may not be sufficient to embrace other factors that may also affect 
productivity. Generally speaking, the two approaches have their own merits, 
though at this stage of study an integration of the two approaches still 
awaits development.
It may be noted that there are some measurement issues associated 
with the two concepts of TFP, i.e., TFP being taken as an indicator of 
productivity change in the general sense or as an Indicator of technological 
progress in the strict sense. The focus of analysis may be either TFP as an 
indicator of productivity change or TFP as an indicator of technological 
progress, but for each different focus the choice or treatment of output and 
input variables would be accordingly different.
In statistics, output can be a gross term or a net term. A difference
that arises here is whether we should include intermediate inputs when
estimating TFP . If choosing gross output, it seems that intermediate inputs
should be taken into account (using gross output without including intermediate
inputs would generate a bias in the estimate). Intermediate inputs are a
component of gross output and may be also a carrier of technological 
1 fi
progress . In the sense that TFP is an indicator of productivity change, the 
IS The question has been raised in Julia Hebden, Application of 
Econometrics. London: Philip Allen, 1983, p.99, who however gives no clear-cut 
answer to it.
^  See Hollis Ghenery and M. Syrquin, "Typical Patterns of 
Transformation", in Hollis Chenery et al, op.cit, p.57
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use of net output seems more appropriate for the analysis. Firstly, it is the 
net output that concerns total returns to factors and therefore is closer to 
the concept of productivity defined in productive gains. Secondly, the use of 
net output actually "neutralises" the role of intermediate inputs and 
therefore enables analysts to focus on the role of labour and capital. We will 
compare the results of the estimates using both gross output and net output 
in our empirical study in Chapter Six.
A question over the treatment of input variables is whether we should 
exclude those elements that have not been in effective use? In any economy 
there may exist some under-utilised capital stock and labour supply due to 
business fluctuations, monopolistic positions or technical inefficiency 
problems. Should the excessive factor inputs be removed from the input series 
when estimating TFP? The answer seems to be dependent on the purpose of 
analysis. If it is to determine technological progress, the series of factor 
inputs should not include any element that has no de facto contribution to 
production, for otherwise estimates of technological progress would be biased. 
On the other hand, if the purpose of analysis is TFP as defined in a broad 
sense, or to ascertain technical efficiency, it seems unnecessary to exclude 
the excess part of the factor inputs. The main reason is that any part of the 
factor inputs, being in service although effectively unused, have equally de 
.jure entitlement to claim compensation from the net output, and therefore will 
affect productivity or any change in productivity. Disregarding the excess 
part of the factor inputs would be helpful to estimate a true shift of the 
production function, but may also lead to an exaggeration of improvement in 
production or technical efficiency. In short, any treatment of factor inputs 
should be justified by the relevant purpose of analysis.
For China's industry, a question that has been raised in empirical 
studies is whether non-productive fixed assets should be excluded from capital
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series. On the one hand, the non-productive fixed assets are not actually part 
of productive capital inputs; on the other hand, however, this part of factor 
use does claim a portion of net output(depreciation charges). For these 
reasons, we will treat the non-productive fixed assets differently: removing 
them from the existing capital series but including depreciation charges drawn 
on them in labour income accordingly(Chapter Five).
IV. Data Sources and the Scope of the Subject Matter
Statistical data sources that we will use extensively are mainly some official 
Chinese publication series, i.e, Zhongguo gongye ,1ing.1i tongji nianiian 
(Statistical Yearbook of China's Industrial Economy) [ZGGYJJTJNJ], and 
Zhongguo tongji nianiian (Statistical Yearbook of China) [TJNJ]. The 
forerunner of ZGGYJJTJNJ is Zhongguo gongye jingji tongji ziliao (Statistical 
Data of China's Industrial Economy) [ZGGYJJTJZL], which appeared in 1985 and 
has been subsequently replaced by ZGGYJJTJNJ since 1988. These publications 
provide a detailed statistical description of China's industry for the period 
1980-1992 and are therefore a main data base for our empirical study.
Because statistical practice in China has been experiencing some 
changes in line with the economic transformation from the planning system to 
a market-oriented economy, there are a number of issues of statistical data 
that should be noted. Some of them restrict the scope of our empirical study 
on China's industry. Data coverage and statistical classification are worthy 
of particular attention.
Under the current legislation, all China's industrial enterprises, 
regardless of their forms of ownership, are divided by a particular status 
criterion, independent accounting or non-independent accounting. By 
definition, independent accounting units are those that have a separate
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administrative body and independent banking status, and are financially self-
accounting. In practice, independent accounting units excluded all individual
17and private industrial entities . On the other hand, all collective
enterprises below township level were regarded as non-independent accounting
units. Moreover, there are some other problems in the overlapping relations
between forms of ownership and divisions of independent-accounting status. For
example, as can be seen in Table 4-1, for the category of "the other" (official
1 0
Chinese title mainly for the joint-ownership enterprises ) , the figures for 
output by independent-accounting enterprises are larger than the figure for 
all enterprises, including non-independent-accounting enterprises, for some 
years. This may imply that consistent grouping standards might have not be 
complied with all the time.
In the statistical series publications mentioned above, many more 
data, especially those of output and financial indicators, are available for 
independent-accounting enterprises than for non-independent-accounting 
enterprises. For this reason, we will have to restrict the scope of our 
empirical study to independent-accounting industrial enterprises only. They 
account for over 90% of total GVIO in China's industry in 1980, and about 75% 
in 1992 (Table 4-1). The coverage of our subsequent empirical study(in Part 
II and Part III) is fairly large. However, we should bear in mind that non­
independent-accounting industrial enterprises grew far faster than
17 Individual household industrial enterprises began to grow in China in 
1980. The status of private industrial enterprises was legalised in 1988. The 
difference between the two is that an individual household enterprise may be 
classified as a private enterprise when it has over eight employees. In 1990, 
the average number of employees in individual household Industrial enterprises 
was two, and that In private industrial enterprises was about nineteen. See: 
SSB, TJNJ 1991. pp.134-137.
18 They include joint state-collective, joint state-individual, joint 
collective-individual, joint Chinese-foreign, and foreign-owned enterprises, 
etc. See, Robert M. Field, "China's Industrial Performance since 1978", C Q , 
No. 131 (September 1992)
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independent-accounting industrial enterprises over 1980-1992, as revealed by
their rising share in the total GVIO in China’s industry(Table 4-1). Of those
non-independent-accounting enterprises, most are rural collective enterprises
10
below the village level .
Table 4-1. Percentage share of independent accounting enterprises in GVIO
All industry State Collective The other
1980
1985
1988
1992
91.2
86.8
80.0
74.8
97.0
97.8
96.1
95.9
71.8
6 9 . 0
64.1 
57.5
135.0
100.8
84.8
95.9
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  TJNJ 1 9 9 3 , p . 412; ZGGYJJfJMJ 1 9 9 2 , p. 142. All in current prices. For 'the other*, a 
p r o b l e m  with group i n g  standards may have existed in original compilation.
For the statistical classification of industry by branch, there are 
two systems that are currently being used individually in Chinese
publications. One is the old system that comprises fifteen industrial
branches(left column in Table 4-2). Data of GVIO in 1980 constant prices with 
some financial indicators are published in ZGGYJJTJNJ up to 1990(ZGGYJJTJNJ
1991, pp.71-77). At present, price indexes that are published at branch level
20are still of the fifteen branches . In 1985, a new system that comprises 
forty industrial branches(right column in Table 4-2) was introduced. As Robert 
M. Field notes, the new classification system is a step in Chinese statistics 
towards international compatibility since it provides a more detailed
19 A comprehensive study focusing on rural collective industrial
enterprises(TVEs) including those below the township level has been conducted 
in William Byrd and Q. Lin, eds. China’s Rural Industry. Oxford: OUP, 1990.
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See: TJNJ 1993, p. 268; and Zhongguo wu.jia niangjian (Price Yearbook 
of China) fWJNJ], various recent issues.
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Table 4-2. Fixed assets under old and new systems, year-end original value, 
100 mil. yuan, 1986
Branches in Fixed Corresponding branches Fixed
old system assets in new system assets
Metallurgical industry 998.6 rerrous and non-ferrous metal mining(3,4)t ferrous and non- 
ferrous metal processing(32,33)
998.5
Power 985.7 3owe r (23) 985.7
Coal and coke 674 .5 Coal raining(l), coal processing and coking(25) 676 .9
Petroleum 558.6 3etroleum extracting(2), petroleum processing(24) 558.6
Chemicals 759 .5 ;hemicals(26), pharmaceutical(27), rubber(29), plast i c s {30) 790.5
Machinery 1728.4 (etal products(34}, machinery(35), transport equipment(36}, 
electric m a chinery(37), electronics(38), instruments(39)
1727.1
Building materials 453 .4 3uiIding materials mining(5), building materials 
oanufactures(31)
520.8
Forestry industry 171.7 rimber 6 bamboo(8), timber manufactures(17), furniture(18} 175.2
Finished food 448 .6 Finished food(10), beverage(ll), tobaccof12), forage(13) 438.5
Textile 606.3 Fextile(14), chemical fibres(28) 606.3
Clothing 52.1 Clothingf15) 52.1
Fur and leather 35.8 Fur and leather(16) 35.8
Paper-making 106.6 ?aper-making(19) 120.7
Cultural goods etc 105.4 ?rinting(20), cultural goods etc(21), arts & crafts(22) 105.4
Other 236 .2 Salt mining(6), other minerals!7), running water(8), 
)ther{40)
129.3
Total 7921.4 Fotal 7921.4
Sources and note : ZGGOTJNi 1991, p p . 74-/7 and 108-114. Fixed assets in the fourth column are a sum
over new branches in the same set. Numbers in parenthesis indicate the sequence in the new system.
decomposition roughly corresponding to the International Standard Industrial 
71Code . The earliest date when data on the forty branches are available is 
1980. Data of many financial indicators are readily available at this forty
^  Robert M. Field, op.cit., p.580
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branch level* but all value indicators for the forty branches are in current 
prices. To take advantage of the price indexes published for the old system 
of fifteen branches, we need to establish links between the branches of the 
old system and those of the new system. Any correspondence between the old and 
new systems has not been made clear, however, in official Chinese statistics. 
It seems plausible to establish the relationship by looking for actual
equality in some indicators commonly shared by the old and new system. We
22looket at fixed assets of 1986 , and the results are presented in Table 4-2.
Exact or almost exact correspondence is found for eleven out of the fifteen 
old branches: metallurgical industry, power, coal, petroleum, machinery,
forestry industry, foodstuff, textiles, clothing, furs and leather, and 
cultural etc articles; approximate equality seems to exist for three branches: 
chemicals, building materials, and paper-making; and for only one 
branch("other") does the equality relation break down, but this is a rather 
small branch(less than 3% in total fixed assets). With these equality 
relations, the conversion that we will use in the next chapter seems fairly 
sound.
Relations between branch classification and classification by major 
commodity group are a bit more complicated. Division by major commodity group 
at the primary level means into light and heavy industry, approximately 
equivalent to that of consumer goods and capital goods. Under the old system, 
there are four out of the fifteen branches that produce both consumer goods 
and capital goods, with the other nine exclusively belonging to either light 
or heavy industry. Under the new system of forty branches, sixteen exclusively 
belong to light industry, and twelve to heavy industry, with the other twelve
22 The year 1986 is chosen because it is the first year when the annual 
Chinese statistical reports took use of the new classification system. Data 
of forty branches for years prior to 1986 are from a different source, i.e., 
the industrial general survey conducted in 1985. See below.
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split between the two . At the second level of division by major commodity 
group, light industry is divided into those using agricultural materials and 
those using non-agricultural materials, and heavy industry into extracting 
(mining), materials-producing, and finished-good processing. It is clear that 
sub-branch data are needed for these groupings, either at the primary level 
or second level. Approximation has to be made when sub-branch data are 
unavailable, and that is what we will do later on in the next chapter with 
price indexes processing.
Table 4-3. NVIO by annual reports(A.R.) and general survey(G.S.), bil. yuan
1980 1984 1985
A.R. G.S. A.R. G.S. A.R. G.S.
Total 164.8 159.8 224.6 223.5 276.7 273.7
State 131.9 130.3 172.1 172.9 205.8 203.9
Collective 32.2 28.5 50.6 48.5 67.9 66.6
Other 0.7 1.1 1.9 2.1 3.0 3.1
Light industry 67.3 64.2 89.1 86.1 108.8 106.0
Heavy industry 97.5 95.6 135.5 137.4 168.0 167.7
Large 53.3 65.0 76.0 86.4 97 .8 99.3
Medium 32.0 34.2 43.7 42.6 52 .9 51.6
Small 79.5 60.7 105.0 94.5 126.1 122. 7
Source and note; For NVIO by annual report, see'ZGGYJJtJZL 198b. p.137; tor NVIO by general survey, see 
ZGGYJJTJNJ 1992, pp.142-45. All are in current prices and for independent-accounting industrial enterprises 
only.
23 See ZGGYJJTJZL 1986. pp.126-27; ZGGYJJTJZL 1987. pp.38-45. We may also 
note that classification by light and heavy industry under the new system 
slightly enlarges the coverage of heavy industry. Measured in 1980 prices, the 
GVIO of heavy industry in 1985 is 41.8 billion yuan based bn the old 
classification and 42.2 billion yuan based-on the new classification, whilst 
GVIO of light industry changes from 41.1 to 40.7 billion yuan accordingly for 
the same year.
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Table 4-4. Some financial indicators by annual report and general survey, bil. 
yuan
1980 1985
A.R. G.S. A.R. G.S.
Fixed assets
State 373.0 378.3 595.6 598.4
Collective 39.7 35.9 88.9 89.4
Quota circulation fund
State 113.6 112.4 162.3 161.2
Collective 26.1 25.1 61.6 60.1
Profit and tax
State 90.7 92.0 133.4 132.7
Collective 14.9 13.8 31.1 31.0
Source and note: For figures from annual report, see ZGGYJJTJZL 1 9 8 6 , pp.l'/V-78; for Figures From 
general survey, see ZGGYJJTJNJ 1 9 9 2 , p p . 103, 116, and 142. Fixed assets are year-end original value. All are 
for independent-accounting industrial enterprises only.
Finally, it should be pointed out that for the period 1980-1985, data 
sources in the ZGGYJJTJZL and ZGGYJJTJNJ are actually different. Data in 
ZGGYJJTJZL are all based on annual statistical reports, but data in ZGGYJJTJNJ 
for 1980-1985(in almost all cases for 1980 and 1985 only) are based on a 
nation-wide industrial general survey conducted in 1985. Results from the 
general survey are believed to be more reliable. The two data sources are 
compared in Table 4-3 and 4-4. Differences in some cases are quite 
substantial. Generally speaking, the net value of industrial output is over­
estimated in annual reports compared to that in the general survey, and this 
is particularly true for small enterprises. It may not be the case that small 
enterprises overstated their NVIO, but rather that some of the small 
enterprises changed their status of size in the general survey. For financial
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indicators listed in Table 4-4, we only have figures on state and collective 
ownerships, and it is found that problems of over-estimation and under­
estimation both exist. Also because the ZGGYJJTJZL provides much less detailed 
data of different categories compared to the ZGGYJJTJNJ. we abandon attempts 
to construct, by using data in ZGGYJJTJZL. time series for the missing years 
in 1980-1985 in ZGGYJJTJNJ. Only in a few cases(e.g., estimating time series 
of capital stock) do we have to refer to the ZGGYJJTJZL.
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Chapter Five
Output and Input Growth in China's Industry: 1980-1992
Obtaining reliable output and input series is important for studying 
productivity change. As we will show in the summary of TFP studies on post­
reform China's industry in the next chapter, a good deal of disagreement among 
researchers occurs concerning how to measure the output and input growth in 
China's industry. There are several questions that have been raised: (i) which 
price deflator should be used to obtain output series in constant prices; (ii) 
should factor inputs be subject to the elimination of "non-productive" 
elements and to what extent should such elimination apply; (iii) which price 
deflator should be used to obtain fixed capital input series in constant 
prices; (iv) in recognition of the explosive growth in the use of circulating 
capital by post-reform China's industrial enterprises, should this form of 
capital input be taken into account when measuring capital input series and 
total factor productivity; (v) in attempting to assign or estimate relative 
weights to labour and capital regarding their contributions to output growth, 
should we consider the changes in factor distribution of post-reform China's 
industrial output.
In this chapter we intend to reply to these questions by trying to 
construct output and input series for China's industry over 1980-1992. What 
we are particularly interested in is to establish some consistent base for
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sectoral output and input series within China’s industry. Sectors in which we 
are interested, and where data are available from official Chinese statistics 
are: divisions by form of ownership, state, collective and joint-ownership; 
by type of activity, light industry and heavy industry(including mining, 
materials-producing and finished-goods processing); and by size of enterprise, 
large-scale, medium-scale and small enterprises. The results of these sectoral 
series will be used as a compatible base for our comparative study of 
productivity change in the next chapter.
A tabulated summary of our estimates of output and input growth for 
these various sectors in China’s industry over 1980-1992 is attached in the 
appendix to this chapter(Tables A5-1 to A5-12).
I. Output Growth in China's Industry
Current Chinese statistics provide three series for industrial output: the 
gross value of industrial output(GVIO), the value added of industrial 
output(VAIO) and the.net value of industrial output(NVIO). GVIO is VAIO plus 
intermediate input, VAIO is NVIO plus depreciation charges, and NVIO is the 
sum of factor incomes (e.g., the earnings of labour and non-labour 
remuneration). Most of the previous studies on TFP in China's industry have 
tended to use GVI0(see the next chapter) and main reason for this is that data 
for GVIO have been relatively accessible in official Chinese statistics 
compared to VAIO or NVIO.
To choose between VAIO and NVIO, both now available in recent 
official Chinese statistics, we encounter a problem which appeared in the 1992 
data-set. In 1992, the scope of VAIO in China's industry changed and rendered 
the VAIO in 1992 incompatible with previous series. As shown in Table 5-1, the 
difference between VAIO and NVIO in 1992 became negative for light industry
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and the processing sector of heavy industry, which would on the face of it 
imply that there were negative depreciation charges in the year(perhaps for 
this reason actual depreciation charges are not published in the TJNJ 1993 or 
ZGGYJJTJNJ 1993). It is fair to say, however, that the NVIO series published 
in ZGGYJJTJNJ seems set to remain on a statistically consistent basis. For 
this reason we will mainly use NVIO In the present study.
Table 5-1. VAIO and NVIO in 1992, 100 mil yuan
VAIO
1992
NVIO
1992
VAIO - NVIO 
1992
Depreciation 
charges in 
1991
Whole industry 7665.5 7447.0 218.5 795.2
Light industry 2907.6 3068.1 -160.5 249.9
Heavy industry 4757.9 4378.9 379.0 545.3
Mining 827.3 661.8 165.5 105.5
Materials 1935.9 1651.8 284.1 252.8
Processing 1994.7 2065.2 -70.5 187.1
Source and note: TJNJ lt)93, p.41'/. Depreciation charges in 1991 from ZGGYJJTJNJ 1932, pp.Ib»-iTUT 
Depreciation charges in 1992 are not reported in TJNJ 1993 or ZGGYJJTJNJ 1993. All are in current prices.
There seem to be some adjustments that may be made to the existing 
data of NVIO in China's industry. First, an adjustment to the commodity value. 
Because NVIO is derived from the GVIO, it by definition also includes self­
consumption products and incomplete or unsold products. To eliminate these 
elements, an adjustment can be made by applying the ratio of revenue from 
industrial sales to GVIO. As can be seen from Table 5-2, this ratio had some 
obvious fluctuations over the period of 1980-1992, especially in 1988-1989.
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Another adjustment that we suggest for NVIO is to include 
depreciation charges drawn on non-productive fixed assets. This adjustment is 
considered necessary when deducting the non-productive element, such as 
housing, from existing fixed assets. This deduction has been advocated by some 
authors when measuring capital input growth in China’s industry^. Part of 
reason for this is to reconcile the Chinese statistics of fixed assets with 
international standards since in most market economies this kind of non­
productive element would usually be submerged under compensation to employees . 
However, to be consistent with the deduction, depreciation charges drawn on 
the non-productive element should be added to existing NVIO, i.e, no longer 
be treated as part of VAIO. As we will show later in Sec. IV, the depreciation 
charges drawn on the non-productive element should also be included in labour 
income. The impact of the non-productive fixed assets on NVIO growth, capital 
growth, and labour income growth is considered significant, as the ratio of 
this non-productive element to total fixed assets has increased in the post­
reform period, especially in 1980-1987(Table 5-2).
Table 5-2. Adjustment indicators
I n d u s t r i a l  s a l e s  
as  a % o f  GVIO
N o n - p r o d u c t i v e  a s  a % i n  
t o t a l  f i x e d  a s s e t s
1980 94.0 15.9
1985 93.7 17.2
1986 95.0 18.0
1987 95.7 18.9
1988 96.0 18.4
1989 90.7 18.2
1990 89.9 18.0
1991 93.3 18.2
1992 93.3 17.7
S o u r c e a n d  n o t e :  ZGGYJJTJNJ 1993, pp.103, 129, and 142. For independent-accounting industria l
enterprises only.
 ^ See particularly Kuan Chen, et al, "New Estimates of Fixed Investment 
and Capital Stock for Chinese State Industry", CQ, No. 114 (June 1988).
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Table A5-1 lists a series of NVIO, by sector, adjusted to commodity 
value and increased by depreciation charges on the non-productive fixed 
assets. The series in this table are still in current prices and so the next 
stage is to convert them into a constant price base.
The issue of which index of price deflators to use(i.e., that of
GVIO, VAIO, or NVIO, provided in official Chinese statistics) to obtain output
series in constant or comparable prices has become controversial. In one
study, price deflators for VAIO are derived from the price index of GVIO
}
adjusted to the price index of material consumption . This method has however 
been criticised by others, who argue that price index derived in this way 
would be inadequate to deflate output series . A crucial point in the debate, 
to our understanding, is how to treat the concept of net output with regard 
to the impact of relative changes in output prices and input(material 
consumption) prices.
There seems to be no disagreement about the difference between net 
output(VAIO or NVIO) and gross output(GVIO) in current prices, i.e., the net 
output(NV) in current prices(ignoring the difference between VAIO and NVIO) 
is the gross output(GV) in current prices minus intermediate inputs(MT) in 
current prices. Disagreement can occur however when applying the price indexes 
of gross output and intermediate inputs differently to obtain the net output 
in constant prices:
1
See Gary Jefferson, Thomas Rawski, and Yuxin Zheng, "Growth, Efficiency 
and Convergence in China’s State and Collective Industry” , Economic 
Development and Cultural Change. Vol. 40, No. 2 (1992)
i
See, Wing Thye Woo, Wen Hai, Yibiao Jin and Gang Fan, "How Successful 
Has Chinese Enterprise Reform Been? Pitfalls in Opposite Biases and Focus", 
JCE, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1994. Their criticism of Jefferson, et a l , ibid, has also 
been documented in a Chinese journal, Economic Research, April 1994. The 
counter-criticism by Jefferson, et al, appears in the same journal, October 
1994.
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A. NV(constant) = GV(constant) - MT(constant)
B. NV(constant) = (GV - MT)(constant)
Method A means that the constant net output is the difference between constant 
gross output and constant intermediate inputs, and Method B means that the 
constant net output is the difference between current gross output and current 
intermediate inputs when deflated by a gross output price index. The first 
method is that which has been used and defended by Jefferson et al. If the 
main concern is the analysis of technological progress, this Method A seems 
more appropriate than Method B because it eliminates the impact of price 
change in intermediate inputs on the growth of net output. However, if the 
main concern is productivity change or change in actual gains, the second 
method seems more appropriate because for this purpose the impact of any price 
changes in intermediate inputs on the growth of net output can no longer be 
disregarded. A faster rise in prices of intermediate inputs than in prices of 
gross output would render the net output as a diminishing series, and while 
this certainly affects any producer gains it may have nothing to do with 
technological change. Since our purpose here is productivity change rather 
than technological progress, we shall use the second method in the present 
study.
Because there are some disparities in the various price indexes for 
industrial output in post-reform China (Table 5-3), the results of using the 
different price deflating methods and price indexes would be more or less 
variable. There are two main reasons for us to use the producer price 
index(PPI), rather than the price index of NVIO or GVIO, in the present study. 
First, the price index of NVIO or GVIO is the aggregate price index for the 
whole of China's industry, and the PPI is considered closer to being specially 
applicable to the independent-accounting enterprises. Second, sectoral PPIs
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Table 5-3. Index of price deflators, previous year = 100.00
NVIO VAIO GVIO PPI
1979 101.28 101.31 101.54 101.5
1980 99.92 100.10 100.74 100.5
1981 100.29 100.88 100.45 100.2
1982 99.88 99.77 99.82 99.8
1983 99.86 100.15 99.99 99.9
1984 102.52 102.18 101.37 101.4
1985 105.08 104.61 105.07 108. 7
1986 103.07 104.95 103.14 103.8
1987 105.56 102.12 104.84 107.9
1988 108.24 109.26 109.22 115.0
1989 108.71 106.79 111.35 118.6
1990 100.39 102.29 100.80 104.1
1991 103.31 103.62 103.12 106.2
1992 104.85 103.93 102.91 106.8
China's industry, i.e, including independent-accounting enterprises and non-independent-accounting enterprises. 
PPI is the producer price index based on surveys of selected major enterprises that are presumably from 
independent-accounting e nterprises.
are now available in official Chinese statistics which are regarded as being 
particularly valuable for our study at sector or sub-sector level in post­
reform China's industry.
Based on these data, we are able to construct approximate price 
deflators for various divisions of industrial output. These divisions that we 
refer to are listed on p.118. Attempts to construct price deflators for sub­
sectors in light industry, i.e., those that uses agricultural materials and
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those that uses non-agricultural materials, are abandoned because it is felt 
that with the data classified in the old system of classification, forced 
manipulation would be subject to a large degree of error.
The procedure we follow is as follows:
(1) Construct price deflators for heavy industry and its three sub­
sectors for 1980-1987, and similarly for light industry for the same period, 
based on the PPIs of 14 branches. Referring to the old system as shown in 
Table 4-2, coal, petroleum, and forestry industry are regarded as mining 
branches; metallurgical industry, power, and building materials as material- 
producing branches; chemicals and machinery as finished-goods-processing 
branches; the remaining 6 as light industry branches. The regrouping of these 
branch seems the best way of achieving our purpose of maximally using sectoral 
PPIs in existing official Chinese statistics. With the branches-into-sector 
grouping, shares of the branches in GVIO in 1980 prices are taken as their 
weights in deriving the price indexes of the groups(sectors). Data of the 
shares are from the ZGGYJJTJNJ 1991, pp.72-73.
(2) Having obtained the price indexes of light and heavy industry, 
one way to obtain the price indexes for categories by form of ownership and 
that by size of enterprise may be to apply these price indexes to those 
categories(divisions) using the composition of output between light and heavy 
industry in these categories as a weight, i.e., p(i) = p(l)*q(l) + p(h)*q(h), 
where p(i) is the price index to be derived for a sector classified by form 
of ownership or size of enterprise, p(l) and p(h) are the price index that 
have already been obtained for light and heavy industry respectively, and q(l) 
and q(h) are the percentage share of light and heavy industry in the sector's 
output(the sum of the shares is 100).
There are however certain difficulties obtaining such information 
particularly for the whole period. Assumptions have to be made. Table 5-4
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Table 5-4. Light industry as % of GVIO, current prices, independent-accounting 
enterprises
State Collective Joint-ownership
1985 43.5 60.2 60.1
1988 40.4 71.7
1990 40.9 59.3
1992 36.7 56.0
“Tmrf“T7tTn--- - a - rmpi— n_ jj—mr
compositions in individual GVIO by the forms of ownership. They are obtained by using several finance 
indicators such as fixed assets and ratio of fixed assets to GVI0(for 1985 and 1990), profit and tax and ratio 
of profit and tax to GVI0(for 1992). For 1988, 1990 and 1992, figures for non-state{collective and joint- 
ownership) are obtained after that for state.
shows that the composition of light and heavy industrial output was quite 
different for state and non-state industry. We therefore assume a constant 
ratio of output composition respectively for state(60% heavy industry and 40% 
light industry) and non-state industry(40%:60%).
For categories by size of enterprise, data of the composition of 
output between light and heavy industry are not directly available either. 
Table 5-5 presents the results of our attempts. Corresponding figures prior 
to 1988 cannot be found. Based on the results, approximate ratios of heavy-to- 
light industry for three categories by size of enterprise are used to derive 
the price deflators for these categories: 70%:30% for large-scale industry, 
55%:45% for medium-scale industry, and 45%:55% for small industry.
(3) Table A5-2 and A5-3 list our estimates of PPIs for various 
categories of output(annual and cumulative series respectively).
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Table 5-5. Heavy industry as % of GVIO, by size of enterprise
Large-scale Medium-scale Small-scale
1988 74.6 54.8 44.9
1990 73.4 51.6
1 _ -nrm-:-jnrfln-rt*titi
43.8
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  Z G G Y J J f J N J1989, p p .361-68; ZGGYJJTJNJ 1991, pp.3bS)-77. The figures are obtained using
40 branch data of grouped GVIO by the level of fixed assets at original value. As we have indicated earlier, 
of the 40 branches, 12 exclusively belong to heavy industry with another 12 producing both heavy and light 
industry goods. For these 12 branches, we classify their status by looking at the shares of heavy industry
products in branch GVIO using 1986 datafsee ZGGYJJTJZL 1987, pp.38-45). For example, building materials
production is identified as a heavy industry branch because of its GVIO the proportion taken by heavy industry 
is over 801 in that year, whilst metal finished goods is treated as a light industry branch because the 
proportion is only about 40%, i.e., less than a half, Nine divisions are listed for groups by size of
enterprise, from a bottom level of less than 100 thousand yuan fixed assets to a top level of over 100 million
yuan fixed assets. The top three divisions are taken as large-scale enterprises, the middle two as medium- 
scale, and the last four as small enterprises. This however would be somewhat different from the criterion of 
enterprise size that has been used in compiling data. For the prescribed criterion of enterprise size, see Chen 
Shenchan, “Qiye guimu jiegou he qiye zhuzi jiegou tuize' (Structure in Size of Enterprises and Policy towards 
Enterprises' Organizational Structure),in Sun Shangqing, ed. Leng iingji jiegou duize (On Policy towards 
Economic Structure), Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1984.
II. Labour and Capital Growth in China’s Industry
1. Labour
When dealing with labour input, a more customary practice would take into 
account variables such as: the yearly average number of employees, including 
full-time and part-time employees; the average working hours per week and
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average working weeks per year per employee; and the average quality of labour 
employment as defined by the educational or working experience of a typical 
employee^. Due to the limits of data availability, we can only use the yearly 
average number of employees as an indicator of labour input in China's 
industry in the present study.
A question that has been raised is whether we should adjust the
labour employment to reflec only the productive element, i.e., excluding those
employees working on housing, schooling, medical care, etc. Several authors
have applied the ratio of the non-productive element obtained in fixed assets
5
to labour employment . This is in principle similar to Solow's approach of 
using the unemployment rate to deflate the existing capital stock^. The 
essence of the approach seems unquestionable as it is based on a two-way 
relationship between capital and labourfi.e., if labour suffers or changes in 
use, capital must have suffered or changed in use as well, and vice versa). 
It is clear that, if the purpose of analysis is to measure technological 
progress, it is deemed necessary to eliminate any non-productive or 
unused(idle) elements from the existing labour and capital stock series as 
much as possible. However, since our purpose here is to measure productivity 
which we have shown conceptually is different from technological progress, 
this premise is not warranted: workers working on non-productive activities 
are still part of employment and entitled to compensation or remuneration, 
therefore affecting the productivity measured in the total labour employment
 ^ Some other relevant factors may be easily added to this list if data 
required are available, for example, age and sex of employees(See E.F. 
Denison, Why Growth Rates Differ, Washington, D.C.: the Brookings Institution, 
1967).
R
See Kuan Chen et al. "Productivity Change in Chinese Industry", JCE, 
Vol. 12, No. 4 (1988). Also see Jefferson, et a l . op.cit.
® R.M. Solow, "Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function", 
AER, Vol. 52, 1957
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base. For this reason, we shall continue to use total employment figures 
without adjusting to exclude the non-productive elements.
Yearly-average numbers of labour employment for various sectors are 
listed in Table A5-4.
2. Capital input
Chinese statistics of the fixed capital stock in industry provide two series: 
fixed assets at their original value{i.e., at purchase costs) and at net 
value(net of depreciation charges etc). Both are in current prices and include 
those that were built for non-productive purposes, such as housing and 
schooling, etc. Several authors have pointed out that the inclusion of non­
productive fixed assets is not compatible with international accounting 
practice, and would generate an untrue trend for capital stock in industry 
over the period when reforms exerted a great influence on the allocation of 
fixed assets among productive and non-productive purposes . To our 
understanding, the removal of the non-productive element from the existing 
capital stock can be justified in two ways: first, it clarifies the productive 
base for analysis of technological progress; second, in essence non-productive 
fixed assets are part of compensation or remuneration to labour, i.e., a form 
of labour workers* long-term consumption. The second perception seems closer 
to our purpose of productivity analysis here, and we will follow a coherent 
treatment of the term: removing it from existing fixed assets(below in this 
section) and adding the depreciation charges drawn on it to labour 
income(later in the next section).
In addition, it has been found that during the post-reform period
7
See Kuan Chen, G.H, Jefferson, T.G. Rawski, H. Wang and Y. Zheng, "New 
Estimates of Fixed Investment and Capital Stock for Chinese State Industry", 
CQ, No. 114 (June 1988)
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industrial enterprises in China increased their use of circulating capital 
considerably. It seems that we should also take this issue into account when 
attempting to measure capital growth.
Our tasks in this section are therefore (i) to remove the non­
productive element from existing fixed assets; (ii) to give an explicit 
treatment of circulating capital; and (iii) to find appropriate price indexes 
for fixed assets and circulating capital, respectively.
A. Fixed Assets
For this part, our procedure runs in three steps: (i) to remove non-productive 
elements from the existing series of fixed assets in net value in current 
prices; (ii) to work out annual increments of fixed assets for productive 
purposes in net value in current prices; (iii) to find price deflators and 
apply them to the annual increments of fixed assets, and finally obtain a 
series of fixed assets for productive purposes in constant prices for 1980- 
1992.
The first step is a straightforward application of proportion
figures, i.e., those of productive fixed assets as a percentage in total fixed
assets. These figures are obtained from the fixed assets of original value and
then applied to the fixed assets of net value. The results are presented in
Table A5-5. Because the differences between productive and non-productive
fixed assets were mainly composed of depreciation charges and both kinds of
0
fixed assets were subject to the same rate of depreciation charges , this 
method is justifiable.
0
See the Statistics Department of the Shanghai Institute of Finance and 
Economics, Gongye tongjixue (Industrial Statistics), Shanghai: Zishi Press, 
1984, p.48. This book contains near-official explanatory notes on Chinese 
statistical terms.
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To obtain an annual increment of fixed assets we may apply a formula:
Kt - Kj.j + It - St (I)9
where K denotes fixed assets of year-end original value, I increment of fixed 
assets, and S decommissioned or scrapped fixed assets. If is omitted, Ij. 
is the difference between Kj. and , which may be called the net increment 
of fixed assets(still net in gross terms, not in net terms, because the base 
is not yet subject to depreciation). When is taken into account, what Ij. 
measures may be called the gross increment of fixed assets, which is of course 
larger than the net increment of fixed assets. To be accurate we should take 
the term of gross increment of fixed assets. Since S^. is not available, we 
should look for an alternative. This may be referred to as that expressed in 
the formulation for fixed assets of net value:
NKt = NK^j + Ifc - Dt - St (2)
where NK denotes fixed assets of year-end net value, D depreciation charges; 
both I and S have the same meaning as in (1) but they differ with their 
counterparts in degree. In formula (1), 1^  and Sj. are both measured in their 
original value, but in (2) they are in net value, i.e., a term after 
depreciation charges. Therefore, Sj. in (2) would be much less than its 
counterpart in (1) because it represents those fixed assets that are towards 
their end of physical life. Similarly, Ij. in (2) would be smaller than Ij. in 
(1) because even the newly-added fixed assets in the current period are also 
subject to depreciation charges. Based on these differences, we may plausibly
o
In Kuan Chen, et a l , o p . cit, Sj. is not included but this is incorrect. 
For the definition of changes in fixed assets of original value, see Gongye 
tongjixue, ibid, p.250
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hold that Sj. in (1) cannot be assumed away but Sj. in (2) may, and 1^  that is 
derived from (2), even without counting S^ ., would be approximately equal to 
Ij. in (1), the true increment of fixed assets in the current period.
Statistical results confirm the differences, as shown in Table 5-6. 
It can be seen that, except for 1991, use of formula (1) understates the 
annual increment of fixed assets compared to that from use of formula (2). 
Some reasons for series II being smaller than series I in 1991 may be that 
as defined in (1) was small in that year or that reported depreciation charges 
were understated, or both.
We shall therefore use formula (2) to derive an annual increment of 
fixed assets in China’s industry. The reliability of results from the use of 
the formula is however particularly dependent on the accuracy of reported 
depreciation charges, among other things. ZGGYJJTJNJ reported depreciation 
charges together with the depreciation rate for all categories of industry up 
to 1991. However, the figures of 1992 are not, curiously enough, available 
in either TJNJ 1993 or ZGGYJJTJNJ 1993. We therefore have to make our own 
estimates for 1992^.
Table A5-6 reports our estimate of the annual increment of productive 
fixed assets by using formula (2). To be consistent with the elimination of 
non-productive elements, depreciation charges that are used there are all 
discounted by the same ratios that are used to obtain productive fixed assets 
in Table A5-5.
Now the next thing to do is to find appropriate price deflators for 
the fixed assets. We refer to the price deflators for fixed asset investment. 
However, compilation of the price deflators for fixed asset investment started 
only recently in China and the results are first published in TJNJ 1993, and
What we do in this case is to assume that the depreciation rates in 
various sectors remain basically the same as the level of previous year and 
apply the rates on the year-end original value of fixed assets.
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Table 5-6. Annual Increment of fixed assets, 100 million yuan in current
prices
S e r i e s  I S e r i e s  I I I m i n u s  I I
1 9 8 6 9 9 5 . 8 1 0 5 4 . 3 - 5 8 . 5
1 9 8 7 1 2 3 6 . 8 1 3 4 8 . 4 - 1 1 1 . 5
1 9 8 8 1 4 8 2 . 9 1 5 7 3 . 7 - 9 0 . 8
1 9 8 9 1 8 3 2 . 8 1 9 1 4 . 5 - 8 1 . 7
1 9 9 0 1 9 1 6 . 0 2 0 4 5 . 0 - 1 2 9 . 0
1 9 9 1 2 7 6 6 . 3 2 6 7 6 . 0 9 0 . 3
Source and note: ZGGYJJTJNJ ISM, p .103. Series I uses the formula b = K t - K t_ ! ; and series 11 uses
the formula I t = N K t - N K t_! + D t . The figures are for all i n d e p e n d e n t-accounting industrial enterprises and
including non- p r o d u c t i v e  fixed a s sets(same for D t ).
only for 1991 and 1992. They are based on individual price deflators of three 
components of investment: construction and equipment installation, equipment 
and apparatus, and miscellaneous. It seems plausible to follow this procedure 
to work out the price deflators for previous years, back to 1980. We have 
implicit price deflators for the construction sector and the producer price 
index for the machinery industry, which may be taken as analogous to the price 
deflators for construction and equipment installation in investment and the 
price deflators for equipment and apparatus in investment, respectively. As 
shown in Table 5-7, however, both of the IPDs and the PPIs are lower than 
their counterparts in investment. For equipment and apparatus, the gaps may 
be caused by import prices, as China's industry used more imported equipment 
and apparatus in the post-reform period. By "import prices", we mainly mean 
the effects of devaluation of RMB over the period. From 1980 to 1992, the 
exchange rate of RMB against the US dollar in commodity trade fell by 11.4% 
annually. To use the analogous price deflators, some adjustments are
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necessary.
Table 5-7. Investment price indexes, previous year = 100.0
Construction Equipment or Machinery
Investment PD IPD Investment PD PPI
1991 109.7 108.4 106.1 102.8
1992 116.8 114.5 109.4 106.6
Source and note: TJNJ 19DJ; for investment price detlatorfPD), p .269: lor implicit price deflator!IPD] 
for co n s t r u c t i o n  sector, p p . 50-51; for the producer price i n d e x , p . 268.
We take a short-cut by simply assuming a constant difference existing 
between the IPDs or PPIs and their counterparts in investment. For
construction and equipment installation, the difference is set to one 
percentage point; and for equipment and apparatus, it is set to three
percentage-points. As we have found no way to obtain price deflators or their 
analogues for the miscellaneous part in investment, we have to leave that 
aside.
By applying the price deflators listed in Table 5-8, we obtain newly-
added industrial fixed assets for productive purposes in constant prices
listed in Table A5-7. Based on these results, productive fixed assets of year- 
end net value in constant prices can be obtained by using formula (2). Here, 
however, 1^  has become a series in constant prices and Dj. is for depreciation 
charges on productive fixed assets only. The estimates are reported in Table 
A5-8.
B. Circulating Capital
There are basically two reasons for us to consider the issue of the growth of
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Table 5-8. Price deflators for fixed assets, previous year = 100.00
1981 103.44 1987 108.96
1982 103.51 1988 114.79
1983 104.67 1989 113.16
1984 106.01 1990 107.30
1985 111.42 1991 109.5
1986 108.34 1992 115.3
c onstr u c t i o n  and adjusted p roducers price indexes for siachinery industry we i g h t e d  by the shares of constr u c t i o n  
and equipment in total investment respectively. For the IPDs and PPIs, see Table 3-9; for adjustment, see the 
text; for the weights, see SSB, Zhonq q u o  gudin zican touzi tongji ziliao (Statistical Data of China's Fixed 
Asset Investment) [ZGGDZCTZZL], con s e c u t i v e  issues since 1985. The last two years are d i r e c t l y  from TJNJ 1993, 
p . 269.
circulating capital and its role in post-reform China's industry. First, post­
reform China's industrial enterprises tended to use more circulating capital 
in addition to their use of fixed capital. The ratio of circulating capital 
to fixed assets has risen considerably since the mid-1980s: from 48% in 1985 
to 56% in 1992(this is a measurement of the quota of circulating capital only 
and for independent-accounting enterprises only(ZGGYJJTJNJ 1993. pp.103 and 
116); a much higher change in the ratio is found when including the non-quota 
circulating capital: from 70% to 110% (Table A5-9)).
Second, an important factor that has contributed to the accelerating 
use of circulating capital is that industrial enterprises in post-reform 
China, facing financial constraints on expanding their investment in fixed 
assets, have been actually able, in one way or another, to use circulating 
capital to invest in fixed assets, albeit that the actual amount of such use
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was hardly apparent to observers^. Statistics of fixed assets may not be 
able therefore to reflect fully changes in investment in fixed assets or fixed 
asset stock.
Table 5-9. Yearly-average balances of full circulating capital, 100 million
yuan, 1992
TJNJ figures Our estimates Difference
State 10096.4 10343.0 246.6
Collective 4058.0 4247.5 189.6
Joint-ownership 1338.7 1381.3 42.6
Light industry 6932.2 7280.6 348.4
Heavy industry 8560.9 8702.6 141.5
Large 5381.7 5493.2 111.6
Medium 3584.9 3692.7 107.8
Small 6526.5 6798.5 272.0
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  All are tor indep e n d e n t - a c c o u n t i n g  industrial e n terprises only. TJNJ 1 V 9 3 , p .4 2 b ; our
estimates are based on figures in ZGGYJJTJNJ 1 9 9 3 , p p . 116-119. The d i f f erence is Colu m n  Two minus Column One.
A characteristic of the use of circulating capital in post-reform 
China's industry is that the non-quota circulating capital increased far
According to a provincial survey, there was 100 million yuan of 
circulating capital used on investment in fixed assets in 1985(See Wu Jinliang 
and Hu Ji, eds. Zhongguo jingjide dongtai fenxi he duize yan.jiu (Studies on 
Chinese Economic Movements and Counter-policies), Beijing: Zhongguo renmin 
daixue chubanshe, 1989, p.108). This is about 3% of all circulating capital 
used by independent-accounting Chinese industrial enterprises in that year. 
Not coincidentally, in the "Ten Prohibitions" regarding the use of circulating 
capital, set in 1984 by the Commercial and Industrial Bank of China, a body 
regulating and allocating circulating capital for Chinese industry, number one 
is that no circulating capital should be used to conduct basic construction 
(see the People's Bank of China: Zhongguo jingrong nianjian (Almanac of 
China's Finance and Banking), Beijing: Zhongguo jingrong chubanshe, 1986, VI- 
43.
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faster than the quota circulating capital. Our task here is therefore to 
estimate the growth of full circulating capital at yearly-average balances 
including both the quota and non-quota circulating capital, as official 
Chinese statistics do not provide the yearly-average full circulating capital 
prior to 1992, Available in the statistics are three series: (i) year-end
balances of full circulating capital; (ii) year-end balances of quota 
circulating capital; and (iii) yearly-average balances of quota circulating 
capital. Our procedure is to obtain the ratio of the first two series and 
multiply it by the third series. The validity of this procedure can be checked 
by comparing the data of 1992 which is the first year when data of yearly- 
average full circulating capital are available(Table 5-9).
As Table 5-9 reveals, results based on our procedure over-estimate 
somewhat the full circulating capital for 1992, ranging from less than 
2%(heavy industry) to 5%(light industry). However, because this procedure is 
actually used for years before 1992, our results might nevertheless under­
estimate the true increasing trend of full circulating capital over the 
period.
The series showing our estimate of full circulating capital in 
current prices are listed in Table A5-9. They should of course be deflated by 
an appropriate price index. Conceptually, a price index for circulating 
capital should be a weighted sum of the price indexes of intermediate inputs 
and output since circulating capital is used for inventories of intermediate 
inputs and output. According to a survey, China's industrial enterprises
tended to use about 55% of circulating capital on intermediate inputs and 45%
12on output inventory . As we pointed out above, industrial enterprises in
12 See, Yang Xitian, "Gongye qiye zhijing xiangchuang he xingdai diaozhen 
duize" (The Status Quo Capital Situation in Industrial Enterprises and 
Adjustment Policy towards Lending), in Zhongguo de jingrong kaige he hebi 
chenzhe (Financial Reforms and Monetary Policy in China), ed. by Shen Boliang, 
Beijing: Jingji guanli chubanshe, 1992, p.355
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post-reform China have also used circulating capital to invest in fixed
assets, so the price index of fixed assets should be taken into account as
well, though to a much smaller degree. The weights we assign to intermediate
inputs, output and fixed assets are accordingly: 50%, 40%, and 10%,
respectively. We have already obtained the price index of output(i.e., PPIs
in Table A5-2) and that of fixed assets(Table 5-8). The price index of
intermediate inputs that has been published for China's industry elsewhere is
n
considered suitable for our use . The results are presented in Table 5-10. 
Based on these results, a series showing full circulating capital in constant 
prices are obtained and reported in Table A5-10.
Table 5-10. Price deflators for circulating capital, 1980=100 .00
Annual Cumulative Annual Cumulative
1981 103.36 103.36 1987 109.45 148.43
1982 101.65 105.07 1988 117.31 174.12
1983 102.71 107.91 1989 121..29 211.19
1984 103.62 111.82 1990 105.26 222.30
1985 113.29 126.68 1991 108.00 240.08
1986 107.05 135.61 1992 109.02 261.74
Source and note: See the text.
13 The price index published in the State Price Bureau: Wu.jia
nianjlan(Price Yearbook of China) [WJNJ], 1991, pp.538-39); and Zhongguo jing.ji 
nian.jian (Almanac of China's Economy(recent issues since 1991) is (previous 
year = 100.0 ):
1985 118.0(to 1980) 1989 126.4
1986 109.5 1990 105.6
1987 111.0 1991 109.1
1988 120.2 1992 111 .0
For the missing years of 1981-1984, we use the PPI of heavy industry and the 
procurement price index of agricultural products (weighted 0.8 and 0 .2 , 
respectively) to derive the price index of industrial intermediate inputs.
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III. Labour and Capital Shares in Output
There are two reasons for us to measure the labour and capital shares in 
output in post-reform China's industry: first, considerable changes have
occurred to the factor distribution of output over the period; second, to 
avoid arbitrariness in assigning weights to the labour and capital 
contribution to output growth, when measuring total factor productivity. As 
we will show in the next chapter, previous studies of TFP in China’s industry 
often relied on some assumptions about the respective weights because of the 
lack of reliable estimates. Any estimation of factor shares indeed encounters 
a number of financial complications arising from Chinese statistical and 
accounting practice. Our elaboration here can be regarded as part of a 
clarification made of existing Chinese statistical data. Though the results 
of the work are still preliminary in nature, they may represent a significant 
step towards the development of empirical investigation of the issue.
Major financial complications concerning labour and capital income 
in Chinese statistics are associated with the terms wage and profit. Below are 
some illustrations of the issue.
First, wages bills in Chinese statistics are smaller than labour 
income. There will have been some payments to labour that were not included 
in wage bills. Most notable of these are bonuses and employees' welfare 
benefits. Enterprise reform legislation since 1980 stipulated that bonuses and 
employees’ welfare benefits cannot be included on wage bills if they exceed 
a certain limit of the existing total wage bills of an enterprise, 30% for 
bonuses and 10% for welfare benefits. The additional bonuses and welfare 
benefits, i.e., those that cannot be discharged as a cost item, could 
therefore only be delivered from retained profits. Therefore, a complete
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estimate of labour income would take into account any distribution of retained 
profits. In addition, as we pointed out earlier, under the current economic 
system, there has been a section of the total payments to labour that exists 
in the form of depreciation charges on non-productive fixed assets such as 
housing and schooling etc. Most important as evidence is the fact that 
depreciation charges on non-productive fixed assets increased faster than wage 
bills in 1980-1992(Table 5-11). This makes it imperative to include the 
depreciation charges on non-productive fixed assets as part of labour income.
Table 5-11. 
assets, 100
Wage bills 
million yuan
and depreciation 
in current prices
charges on non-productive fixed
State enterprise Collective enterprise
I II I II
1980 275.5 21.3 84.6 2.4
1985 459.7 43.4 159.9 7.0
1988 792.3 72.0 253.4 17.4
1990 1031.2 89.0 304.3 24.6
1991 1151.4 102.2 341.6 28.1
1992 1335.9 121.1 379.8 36.6
Source and note: Column I is total wage bills, for all enterprises including non-independent-accounting- 
enterprises, see TJNJ 199 3 , pp.126 and 128; Colunn II is depreciation charges on non-productive fixed assets, 
for independent-accounting enterprises only, see ZGGYJJTJNJ 1992, p. 103. For 1992 depreciation charges on n on­
productive fixed assets, see note to Table 3-8.
Likewise, profits in Chinese statistics are not exactly a term equal 
to payment for capital use. This may be illustrated by one of its components, 
retained profits. According to the profit retention system that was introduced 
in 1979-1980, enterprises were obliged to allocate their retained profits
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between remuneration to employees and production development, and to give 
priority to production development. In reality, however, enterprises tended 
to spend more of their retained profits on remuneration to employees such as
Table 5-12. Distribution of retained profits
Retained 
profits(100 
million yuan)
% of total retained profits
Production fund Energy fund The rest
1980 69.2 17.9 82.1
1981 84.9 12.3 87.7
1982 112.0 34.5 65.5
1983 154.3 24.7 10.0 65.3
1984 188.4 23.4 15.0 61.6
1985 240.5 38.6 15.0 46.4
1986 252.1 30.9 15.0 54.1
1987 274.9 44.1 15.0 40.9
1988 336.3 31.7 15.0 53.3
Source and note: The State Economic System Reform Commission, ed,. Zhongguo qiye kaige shiuian (The 
First Decade of Enterprise Reform in China), Beijing: Kaige chubanshe, 1990, p . 646. The figures are for state 
in-budget industrial enterprises. The energy fund has had a fiied rate since it was introduced in 1983.
increases in bonuses and welfare benefits in addition to those that were 
disbursed under cost expenditures. As shown in Table 5-12, in the early years 
when the profit retention system was introduced, little of the retained 
profits were allocated for production development. In recognition of the 
problem, the state introduced a quasi-tax on retained profits, e.g, the energy 
fund in 1983. The state also used some other measures, and enterprises were 
forced to reduce payment of bonuses and welfare benefits from retained
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profits. Nevertheless, these items as payment to employees were maintained at 
a high level. Another comprehensive survey reveals that from 1979 to 1988, 
about 55% of the total retained profits in China's industry as a whole were 
discharged in bonuses and staff welfare^.
Another complication of profits in China's industry is that the 
difference between reported gross profits and the residual of output after 
subtracting costs became wider over the period(Table 5-13). The major 
components of revenue from industrial sales in China are total costs, product 
tax, and profits on sales. The total costs include the purchase of
intermediate inputs, depreciation charges, wage bills, and part of any
ISinterest charges , etc. The product tax had a unique importance in China’s 
industry, so that it has been always separately listed. Profits on industrial 
sales are the residual of the revenue of industrial sales after subtracting 
the total costs and the product tax. On the other hand, the reported gross 
profits are, by definition, the profits on industrial sales adjusted by the 
balance of non-operation revenue and non-business outlay. The difference 
between profits on industrial sales and reported gross profits is small when 
the non-operation balances are small. As can be seen from Table 5-13, the 
difference was indeed small in 1980. But since 1988, the difference has become 
substantial. Except for the inference that the increase of this difference 
must have been caused by an accelerating non-operation outlay, little is known 
about any details of this non-operation outlay, e.g., how much went to 
employees.
In the light of the above argument, it seems that directly measuring 
capital income would be more difficult than measuring labour. We therefore
^  See the same source to Table 5-12, p.264.
15 The current Chinese practice is that interest payments on circulating 
capital loans are debited from the cost account, and interest payments on 
basic construction and some other loans are from the profit account instead.
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Table 5-13. Profits in China’s industry, 100 million yuan
Total
sales
Total
costs
Product
tax
Profits 
on sales
Reported gross 
profits
1980 4418.7 3304.2 364.1 750.4 701.1
1985 7899.3 6113.7 713.1 1072.5 929.4
1987 10890.1 8839.0 888.4 1162.7 1005.0
1988 14001.2 11267.6 1098.9 1634.7 1189.9
1989 15847.0 13065.9 1275.1 1506.0 1000.3
1990 16793.1 14219,8 1386.2 1187 .3 559.8
1991 20597.5 17356.6 1590.5 1650.3 642.8
1992 25866.3 21565.7 1827.7 2473.0 972.4
Source and note: ZGGYJJTJKJ 1 9 9 3 . pp. 129. Profits op sales are total sales minus total costs and product 
tax. See the text for detailed definitions of profits on industrial sales and reported gross profits, and 
explanation on the difference between the two terms.
attempt to measure labour income in the first instance. We have identified 
three major components of labour income in China’s industry: wage bills, 
depreciation charges on non-productive fixed assets, and the part of retained 
profits that is spent on employees. Subtracting these items from NVIO, we may 
obtain the part of the net output which is due to capital, which includes the 
product tax, part of retained profits for non-labour use, as well as 
miscellaneous items submerged under the non-operation outlay or associated 
with capital use.
Data of wage bills are not published in ZGGYJJTJNJ and that published 
in TJNJ are for whole sectors by forms of ownership, i.e., including non­
independent-accounting enterprises and excluding rural collective enterprises. 
The series of Zhongguo laodong gongzi tongji nianjian (Statistical Yearbook 
of China's Labour and Wages) published by SSB provide detailed data for wage
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bills for various categories by forms of ownership or by sector/sub-sector,
but again, the scope of data is different from what we have in ZGGYJJTJNJ. As
an alternative, existing data in ZGGYJJTJNJ are used to estimate wage bills,
based on data of the composition of total costs. Since the major components
in total costs are purchases of intermediate inputs, depreciation charges,
interest payments for circulating capital loans, and wage bills, we only need
information on the first three to obtain the wage bills. Data of depreciation
charges are readily available, and that of intermediate inputs can be obtained
by deducting VAIO from GVIO. The data of interest payments for circulating
capital loans in China's industry are not directly available, but we may make
some conjectures since we have data of circulating capital. One source
suggests that interest payments for the use of circulating capital have been
quite stable in proportion to the yearly-average balance of quota circulating 
1 ficapital . We therefore assume a constant ratio of interest payments to quota 
circulating capital for China's industry over the period. We may note from 
Table 5-14 that the results of our estimated wage bills are different from 
those published in TJNJ. The differences may be due to the scope of this data. 
For instance, our estimates for collective industry include rural collective 
enterprises which is however excluded in the TJNJ figures; for the joint- 
ownership enterprises differences in the coverage of TJNJ and ZGGYJJTJNJ are
evidenced by the fact that there are wide disparities in the reported number
17of year-end staff workers .
1 fi
In the state construction sector, from 1989 to 1992, interest payments 
as a percentage of yearly-average balances of quota circulating capital 
changed very little, from 3.6% to 3.1%, when the general interest rate for 
circulating capital loans fell by nearly three percentage-points(TJNJ various 
issues for construction sector). Note that the interest payments reported in 
the state construction sector included those for non-circulating capital 
loans.
17 See TJNJ 1991. p.107, TJNJ 1993. p.109, and ZGGYJJTJNJ 1993. p.90. A 
statistical problem is that whilst TJNJ figures are supposed to cover all 
independent-accounting and non-independent-accounting enterprises and that of
Adding the depreciation charges on non-productive fixed assets and 
the retained profits that were distributed to employees, we then obtain total 
labour income, and this is tabulated in Table A5-11. The share of total labour 
income in the revised NVIO is listed in Table A5-12. Because retained profits 
for the years prior to 1986 are not listed in ZGGYJJTJNJ except for large- and 
medium-scale enterprises, labour income for the period of 1980-1985 may be 
slightly understated.
Table 5-14. Average wage bills per worker in ChinaTs industry
State Collective Joint -ownership
TJNJ Our TJNJ Our TJNJ Our
figures estimate figures estimate figures estimate
1980 852 755 622 577 778
1985 1239 1245 969 857 1342 775
1987 1601 2036 1195 1165 1789 2039
1988 1931 2136 1419 1209 2292 2023
1989 2177 2413 1556 1372 2635 2938
1990 2409 2985 1670 1472 2908 3130
1991 2627 3295 1853 1626 3386 2946
1992 2995 3752 2094 1944 3872 3235
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  TJNJ tiqures troa TJNJ pp. 13b, 11/ and 138; our estimates trom Table Ab-4 and 
A5-11. The collective in TJNJ is for urban collective enterprises only.
ZGGYJJTJNJ deal with independent-accounting enterprises only, the reported 
numbers of year-end staff workers in TJNJ were remarkably lower than that in 
ZGGYJJTJNJ. Either of the results is actually possible: the number of staff 
workers may have been understated in TJNJ or overstated in ZGGYJJTJNJ.
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Appendix To Chapter Five
Output and Input Series in China's Industry 1980- 1992
Table A5-1. Adjusted NVIO in current prices, 100 million yuan
State Collective Joint-ownership
1980 1255.5 26(5^ 8 9.8
1984
1985 1974.2 611.1 29.7
1986 2181.3 680.9 35.5
1987 2555.8 805.7 61.1
1988 3094.7 1037.7 98.0
1989 3317.0 1104.9 140.3
1990 3415.9 1110.1 181.4
1991 3998.9 1347.5 331.1
1992 4852.2 1730.1 560.4
Light Heavy
industry industry Mining Materials Processing
1980 589.6 944.7 185.9 380.2 378. 6
1984
1985 994.8 1617.2 266.0 610.2 741.0
1986 938.8 1747.1 305.8 688.6 752.7
1987 1365.5 2050.4 364.1 799.5 886.8
1988 1751.8 2473.0 401.8 953.1 1118.1
1989 1876.2 2685.7 438.0 1059.2 1188.5
1990 2013.0 2677.1 452.7 1058.1 1166.3
1991 2373.7 3281.2 513.9 1296.3 1471.0
1992 2802.4 4061.1 380.2 1694.9 1986.0
Large Medium Small
1980 669.4 1T5.8 552 .9
1984 872.0 403.0
1985 991.4 484.1 1148.1
1986 1056.6 571.6 1275.3
1987 1306.8 658.9 1462.8
1988 1562.2 826.2 1843.3
1989 1756.9 871.9 1933.6
1990 1930.1 985.7 1885.2
1991 2365.2 1094.3 2218.6
1992 3376.8 1433.9 2562.5
Source and note: Adjusted NVIO is the results of existing NVIO multiplied 
by the ratio of revenue of industrial sales to GVIO plus depreciation 
charges on non-productive fixed assets. The last term is the results of 
total depreciation charges multiplied by the non-productive part as a 
% of total fixed assets in year-end original value. For NVIO, GVIO, 
revenue of industrial sales, and fixed assets, see ZGGYJJTJNJ 1993. 
pp.103-106, 129-132 and 142-145; for depreciation charges up to 1991, 
see ZGGYJJTJNJ 1992, pp.103-106. Depreciation charges for 1992 are our 
own estimates based on depreciation rates in earlier years.
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Table A5-2. Producer price index in China's industry, previous
year=100.00
All industry State Non-state
1981 100.2 100.1 100.3
1982 99.8 99.9 99.7
1983 99.9 100.2 99.6
1984 101.4 101. 7 101.1
1985 108.7 110.0 106.7
1986 103.8 103.8 103.2
1987 107.9 108.0 108.0
1988 115.0 115.1 115.8
1989 118.6 118.6 118.5
1990 104.1 104.1 103.9
1991 106.2 106.1 105.1
1992 106.8 106.9 105.6
1981
Light
industry
Heavy
industry Mining Materials Processing
ru'075.. 99.9 TO 2.5”"" 101.7 .. 98.1
1982 99.4 100.2 102.0 100.8 99.4
1983 98.6 101.2 103.7 102.6 99.9
1984 100.0 102.8 107.5 103.0 101.5
1985 104.3 110.4 108.8 110.9 111.7
1986 102 .2 104.8 100.6 107.5 103.6
1987 108.2 107.8 114.1 106.9 107.2
1988 117.2 113. 7 109.3 113.5 114.7
1989 118.2 118.9 114.2 116.4 121.8
1990 103.6 104.4 107.9 105.9 102.5
1991 103.2 108.0 112.8 111.8 103.8
1992 103.2 109.3 112.6 110.2 107.4
1981
Large Medium Smal 1
100.1 100.2 100.2
1982 99.9 99.8 99.8
1983 100.4 100.0 99.8
1984 102.0 101.5 101.3
1985 108.6 107.7 107.1
1986 104.0 103.6 103.4
1987 107.9 108.0 108.0
1988 114.8 115.3 115.6
1989 118. 7 118.6 118.5
1990 104.2 104.0 104.0
1991 106.6 105.8 105.4
1992 107.5 106.6 106.0
Source and note: Figures for 1985-1992 light and heavy industry including 
its components are directly from the WJNJ 1991, pp.538-39, and TJNJ 
1993, p.268; for heavy industry at sub-division level before 1985, the 
producer price index is weighted by the shares of individual branches 
in GVIO measured in 1980 prices; see TJNJ 1993. for the price index for 
14 branches, and ZGGYJJTJNJ 1991. pp.72-73, for the shares. To be 
consistent with general producer price index, the light industry price 
index is derived using the formula: pj = (Pg “ ph*sh^/,sl’ w^ere Pq ♦ P) > 
and p^ stand for the price indexes of whole industry, light industry 
and heavy industry, respectively, and and for the share of light 
and heavy industry in GVI0(see ZGGYJJTJZL 1986, p.186). Collective and 
joint-ownership industry are treated as having the same price indexes 
here.
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Table A5-3. Adjusted NVIO, 100 million yuan in 1980 prices
1980
State Collective Joint-ownership
1255.5 260.8 9.8
1984
1985 1795.6 567.2 27.6
1986 1912.1 612.2 31.9
1987 2075.2 670.5 50.8
1988 2183.1 745.7 70.4
1989 1972.5 670.1 85.1
1990 1951.7 647.9 105.9
1991 2153.9 748.1 183.8
1992 2445.7 909.3 294,5
1980
Light
industry
Heavy
industry Minining Materials Processing
589.6 944.7 185.9 380.2 378.6
1984
1985 968.9 1388.7 209.8 507.9 671.0
1986 893.3 1430.7 239.7 533.2 657.8
1987 1200.7 1552.0 250.1 579.0 722.9
1988 1314.4 1655.5 252.5 608.2 794.8
1989 1191.0 1515.4 241.1 580.7 693.6
1990 1233.4 1442.6 230.9 547.7 664.0
1991 1409.3 1639.5 232.4 600.3 806.8
1992 1612.2 1981.1 254.6 712.2 1014.3
1980
Large Medium Smal 1
669. 4 315.8 ... "55 2 ."9
1984 851.6 396.7
1985 891.8 442. 7 1061.5
1986 913.8 504.4 1140.8
1987 1047.2 538.5 1211.3
1988 1091.0 585.7 1320.1
1989 1033.7 521.2 1168.4
1990 1090.3 514.7 1095.7
1991 1253.8 594.1 1223.9
1992 1665.7 730.5 1334.2
Source and note: Table A5-1 and A5-2.
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Table A5-4. Yearly--average number of staff member. thousands,
1980-1992
State Collective Joint-ownership
1980 31,571.3 16,755.6 289.3
1984 36,450.6 23,093.7 469.5
1985 37,578.7 25,791.3 551.3
1986 38,867.4 28,995.4 616.5
1987 40,108.3 29,978.9 870.1
1988 41,425.2 30,564.6 1,126.0
1989 42,342.5 30,408.4 1,455.7
1990 42,944.6 30,124.7 1,747.9
1991 44,459.4 31,186.4 2,333.0
1992 44,649.1 31,250.8 3,117.5
1980
Light
industry
Heavy
industry Mining Materials Processing
17,688.9 30,921.0 6,940.8 6,298.9 17,681.3
1984 23,647.6 36,351.4 8,140.1 7,610.6 20,600.7
1985 25,640.6 38,277.8 8,443.6 8,069.4 21,764.8
1986 27,908.9 40,570.1 9,136.4 8,587.0 22,846.7
1987 29,489.2 41,460.1 8,968.3 9,095.8 23,396.0
1988 30,516.7 42,629.0 9,144.6 9,648.7 23,835.7
1989 30,981.8 43,227.2 9,325.8 10,202.7 23,698.7
1990 31,365.5 43,446.7 9,470.8 10,417.7 23,558.2
1991 32,977.9 44,996.7 9,857.9 10,833.2 24,305.6
1992 33,247.3 45,770.8 9,771.4 11,324.8 24,671.4
1980
Large Medium Small
10,360.0 8,048.1 30,209.1
1984 11,690.2 9,269.2 39,054.5
1985 11,956.1 9,423.1 42,535.5
1986 12,785.0 9,862.2 45,828.7
1987 13,500.1 10,633.7 46,837.1
1988 14,497.2 ■ 11,146.9 47,467.9
1989 15,681.6 11,736.0 46,788.2
1990 16,633.2 12,105.4 46,073.1
1991 17,829.7 13,146.5 47,000.6
1992 22,325.3 13,821.0 43,167.4
S o u r c e  a n d  not e :  The figures are obtained from NVIO divided by NVIO per 
head of staff member in individual categories. By the original 
ZGGYJJTJNJ editor's definition, staff members used here are referred to 
their yearly-average number. See ZGGYJJTJNJ 1993, pp.142-45 and 181-84.
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Table A5-5. Fixed Assets for productive purpose, year-end net
value, 100 mil. Yuan in current prices, 1980-1992
1980
State Collective Joint-ownership
2,152.2 234.3 7.7
1984 2,791.4 449.1 18.9
1985 3,310.1 570.7 33.2
1986 3,703.6 699.0 42.5
1987 4,219.6 854.2 75.4
1988 4,894.5 1,044.6 119.8
1989 5,716.6 1,239.9 209.3
1990 6,596.8 1,394.7 326.7
1991 7,825.4 1,593.0 417.9
1992 9,031.0 1,823.5 764.0
1980
Light
industry
Heavy
industry Mining Materials Processing
442.1 1,953.2 355.9 859.2 738.1
1984
1985 1,013.4 2,903.2 591.2 1,310.5 1,001.4
1986 1,203.0 3,246.8 670.4 1,492.1 1,084.3
1987 1,486.5 3,668.4 759.1 1,699.3 1,209.9
1988 1,776.6 4,287.8 903.7 2,027.3 1,356.9
1989 2,120.0 5,052.8 1,103.3 2,447.4 1,502.2
1990 2,471.7 5,852.9 1,343.2 2,864.7 1,644.9
1991 2,912.9 6,922.7 1,569.2 3,385.5 1,968.0
1992 3,466.7 8,152.6 1,800.5 4,081.1 2,271.0
1980
Large Medium Small
1,091.4 550.2 751.3
1984 1,481.8 727.0 1,050.7
1985 1,673.0 809.6 1,428.9
1986 1,953.1 880.1 1,608.4
1987 2,229.6 1,040.6 1,875.3
1988 2,687.6 1,184.0 2,183.1
1989 3,329.2 1,342.1 2,490.5
1990 4,022.6 1,522.2 2,768.3
1991 4,884.5 1,914.2 3,030.3
1992 6,094.6 2,212.1 3,304.2
S o u r c e  a n d  note: Fixed assets that were established for productive purpose 
are listed under year-end original cost in ZGGYJJTJNJ 1993. pp.103-106. 
The ratios are therefore applied to fixed assets of net value listed in 
the same source. Except for large- and medium-scale enterprises, all 
categories have no 1984 data listed accordingly. However, we found 
elsewhere in ZGGYJJTJZL 1986, pp.176-78, that figures of fixed assets 
in 1984 are available for all independent-accounting industrial 
enterprises(original value only), as well as for state and collective 
independent-accounting industrial enterprises(both original and net 
value). We therefore use 1985 productive ratios to derive 1984 
productive fixed assets at net value for state and collective 
enterprises, and to apply the 1985 ratio of net value to original value 
to derive 1984 total fixed assets at net value for all independent- 
accounting industrial enterprises, which are further used to obtain 1985 
productive fixed assets at net value for joint-ownership and small 
enterprises. Note that the statistical scope in ZGGYJJTJNJ and 
ZGGYJJTJZL is slightly different.
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Table A5-6. Newly-added fixed asset for productive purpose, year-
end net value, 100 mil. Yuan in current prices
S t a t e C o l l e c t i v e J o i n t - o w n e r s h i p
1984 1,240.1 327.7 15.3
1985 719.2 166.1 16.3
1986 624.4 192.6 12.2
1987 776.9 228.8 38.6
1988 985.3 283.1 53.8
1989 1,175.6 304.0 105.8
1990 1,274.0 277.7 141.2
1991 1,704.2 335.4 127.9
1992 1,766.0 392.3 404.8
L i g h t H e a v y
i n d u s t r y i n d u s t r y  M i n i n g M a t e r i a l s P r o c e s s i n g
1984 576.5 1,273.8 314.8 555.8 403.2
1985 214.9 408.4 108.5 176.1 123.8
1986 272.2 557.1 131.8 263.1 162.3
1987 382.9 660.8 141.6 304.6 214.6
1988 414.5 902.8 204.5 446.8 251.4
1989 490.7 1,094.3 267.3 565.9 261.1
1990 520.8 1,169.9 314.3 587.2 268.4
1991 642.8 1,520.5 309.5 739.1 471.9
1992 795.2 1,840.5 351.7 1008.2 480.6
L a r g e M e d i u m S m a l l
1984 692.0 310.0 557.4
1985 299.0 129.1 470.5
1986 405.2 124.2 297.7
1987 420.0 222.4 385.2
1988 630.4 219.9 467.7
1989 852.4 242.4 489.5
1990 935.0 274.8 480.4
1991 1,174.4 513.9 476.9
1992 1,606.1 449.0 508.6
S o u r c e a n d  note: Newly-added productive fixed assets at net value are
derived using a formula: Ij. = NKj. - NKj._j + Dj., where I is for newly- 
added productive fixed assets, NK is productive fixed assets of net 
value(Table A5-4), and D is depreciation charges on productive fixed 
assets(a result of applying productive ratios in fixed assets of 
original value to total depreciation charges). For the missing data in 
1981-1984 or 1981-1985 for light and heavy industry, geometric 
interpolation is used for both productive fixed assets and productive 
depreciation charges. One unappealing result of this is that true growth 
of newly-added fixed assets in 1985, especially for light and heavy 
industry, may have been seriously understated. Sums of the three 
categories in 1984 and 1985 are also divergent from each other. 
Depreciation charges in 1992 are a result using our estimates of the 
depreciation rate based on 1987-1988 and 1991 data, i.e., the increase 
1988 over 1987 times the depreciation rate in 1991, except for the 
mining industry for which the 1991 rate is used (ZGGYJJTJNJ 1992. 
pp.168-171).
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Table A5-7. Newly-added fixed assets, year-end value of 100 mil.
Yuan in 1980 prices
1980-
State Collective Joint-ownership
84 1,120.9 29479""... . 13. V
1985 543.3 125.5 12.3
1986 435.4 134.2 8.5
1987 497.2 146.4 24.7
1988 549.3 157.8 30.0
1989 579.2 149.8 52.1
1990 584.9 127.5 64.8
1991 714.6 140.6 53.6
1992 642.2 142.7 147.2
1980-■84
Light
industry
Heavy
industry Mining Materials Processing
51878 " 1,150.8 283.9 502.3 364.6
1985 162.3 308.5 81.9 133.0 93.6
1986 189.8 388.5 91.9 183.5 113.1
1987 245.1 422.9 90.6 194.9 137.3
1988 231.1 503.3 114.0 249.1 140. 2
1989 241.8 539.1 131.7 278.8 128.6
1990 239.1 537.1 144.3 269.6 123.2
1991 269.5 637.6 129.8 309.9 197.9
1992 289.2 669.3 127.9 366.6 174.8
1980-■84
Large Medium Small
640.4 280.4 503.0
1985 225.9 97.5 355.5
1986 282.5 86.6 207.6
1987 268.8 142.4 246.5
1988 351.4 122.6 260.8
1989 419.9 119.4 241.2
1990 429.3 126.2 220.6
1991 492.4 215.5 200.0
1992 584.1 163.3 185.0
Source and note: See the text for the implicit price deflator for fixed 
assets. A yearly breakdown of total newly-added fixed assets in current 
prices in 1980-1984 as shown in Table A5-5 is made before applying the 
IPDs. Similarly to Table A5-5, the sums of the three categories in 1984 
and 1985 are sharply different.
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Table A5-8. Fixed assets for productive purpose, year-end net
value. 100 mil. Yuan in 1980 prices
State Collective Joint-ownership
1980 2,152,2 234.3 7.7
1984 2,672.3 416.2 17.3
1985 3,015.1 497.2 27.6
1986 3,219.6 567.2 33.2
1987 3,455.9 640.0 52.2
1988 3,697.8 705.2 72.9
1989 3,923.4 746.3 108.7
1990 4,114.6 750.9 149.7
1991 4,353.5 754.4 166.7
1992 4,435.3 735.2 255.1
1980
Light
industry
Heavy
industry Mining Materials Processing
442.1 1,953.2 355.9 859.2 738.05
1984 800.8 2,557.6 503.2 1,150.9 903.53
1985 903.3 2,680.3 533.8 1,213.9 932.54
1986 1,010.4 2,855.2 573.2 1,315.8 966.31
1987 1,156.1 3,047.4 610.8 1,421.8 1,014.68
1988 1,262.9 3,267,3 664.9 1,552.1 1,050.37
1989 1,357.2 3,477.1 728.9 1,685.1 1,063.23
1990 1,427.3 3,644.5 798.8 1,784.8 1,060.81
1991 1,497.0 3,831.4 845.1 1,876.5 1,109.83
1992 1,544.8 3,958.9 878.6 1,973.3 1,107.01
1980
Large Medium Small
1,091.4 550.2 751.3
1984 1,430.2 697.4 996.3
1985 1,548.3 748.4 1,259.5
1986 1,705.7 781.4 1,374.8
1987 1,831.0 861.7 1,487.6
1988 2,010.0 908.6 1,588.4
1989 2,219.2 943.7 1,647.5
1990 2,406.9 975.1 1,665.4
1991 2,586.8 1,068.9 1,650.5
1992 2,775.0 1,080.9 1,600.8
S o u r c e  a n d  note: The new series of fixed assets in constant prices are
based on the formula: NK^ = NK^.j + Ij. - , where NK and I are for fixed
assets of year-end net value and newly-added fixed assets, respectively, 
having same meanings as in Table A5-5 but they are now in 1980 prices 
(from Table A5-6); D is depreciation charges on productive fixed assets, 
again the same as that which was used to generate newly-added productive 
fixed assets in current prices in Table A5-5. Note that except for 1984, 
the sums of the three categories are virtually the same.
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Table A5-9. Full circulating capital, yearly-average balances,
100 mil. Yuan in current prices, 1980-1992
1980
State Collective Joint-ownership
1,476.7 401.9 17.9
1984 1,923.8 773.7 53.2
1985 2,324.4 994.5 69.9
1986 2,867.3 1,235.5 81.9
1987 3,313.6 1,468.5 111.9
1988 3,906.0 1,819.8 189.4
1989 5,222.8 2,242.1 338.5
1990 7,120.6 2,750.9 516.0
1991 8,856.3 3,344.0 803.5
1992 10,096.4 4,058.0 1,338.7
1980
Light
industry
Heavy
industry Mining Materials Processing
534.7 1,356.3 167.6 35-970 829.7
1984 1,040.0 1,666.9 189.0 419.6 1,058.3
1985 1,285.4 2,042.9 231.6 514.3 1,297.1
1986 1,667.9 2,512.2 283.6 646.4 1,582.2
1987 2,021.3 2,880.6 308.6 770.9 1,801.2
1988 2,575.5 3,342.6 330.5 909.7 2,102.4
1989 3,482.8 4,309.4 419.0 1,237.0 2,653.4
1990 4,551.1 5,818.0 575.5 1,804.4 3,438.1
1991 5,792.1 7,214.0 700.5 2,364.0 4,149.5
1992 6,932.7 8,560.9 816.1 2,810.2 4,934.6
1980
Large Medium Small
612.6 356.9 895.5
1984 770.7 501.6 1,460.1
1985 914.6 605.8 1,856.6
1986 1,173.7 782.9 2,220.4
1987 1,397.9 945.3 2,550.1
1988 1,713.2 1,153.1 3,048.7
1989 2,515.1 1,553.5 3,727.3
1990 3,585.1 2,165.4 4,631.8
1991 4,509.4 2,804.5 5,694.6
1992 5,381.7 3,584.9 6,526.5
Source and note: Yearly-average balances of full circulating capital(FY) 
are derived based on the formula: FY^ = QYt * (FRfVQRj.), where QY is 
yearly-average balances of quota circulating capital, FR year-end 
balances of full circulating capital, and QR year-end balances of quota 
circulating capital. All data up to 1991 are from ZGGYJJTJNJ 1992. 
pp.116-19. 1992 figures are directly from TJNJ 1993. p.419. Geometric 
interpolation is used to generate the missing figures for 1984.
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Table A5-10. Full circulating capital, yearly-average balances.
100 mil. Yuan in 1980 prices, 1980-1992
1980
State Collective Joint-ownership
1,476.7 401.9 17.9
1984 1,720.5 691.9 47. 6
1985 1,834.8 785.1 55.2
1986 2,114.3 911.0 60.4
1987 2,232.5 989.4 75.4
1988 2,243.3 1,045.1 108.8
1989 2,473.1 1,035.9 160.3
1990 3,203.1 1,237.5 232.1
1991 3,688.9 1,392.9 334.7
1992 3,857.4 1,550.4 511.5
1980
Light
industry
Heavy
industry Mining Materials Processing
534.7 1,356.3 167.6 359.0 829.7
1984 930. 1 1,490.7 169.0 375.3 946.5
1985 1,014.7 1,612.7 182.8 406.0 1,023.9
1986 1,229 .9 1,852.5 209.2 476.6 1,166.7
1987 1,361.8 1,940.7 207.9 519.4 1,213.5
1988 1,479.1 1,919.7 189.8 522.4 1,207.4
1989 1,649.1 2,039.5 197.4 585.7 1,256.4
1990 2,047.3 2,617.2 258.9 811.7 1,546.6
1991 2,412.6 3,004.8 291.9 984.7 1,728.4
1992 2,648.7 3,270.8 311.8 1,073.7 1,885.3
1980
Large Medium Small
612.6 356 ."9 ....."" 895.5
1984 689.3 448.6 1,305.8
1985 722 .0 478.2 1,465.5
1986 865.5 577.3 1,637.3
1987 941.8 636.9 1,718.1
1988 983.9 662.3 1,750.9
1989 1,190.9 735.6 1,764.9
1990 1,612.7 974.1 2,083.6
1991 1,878.3 1,168.2 2,372.0
1992 2,056.1 1,365.6 2,493.5
Source and note: See the text for implicit price deflators for circulating 
capital that are used to convert Table A5-9 here.
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Table A5-11. Total labour income, 100 million yuan in current
prices
State Collective Joint-ownership
1980 259.8 99.1 2.3
1984
1985 511.3 228.1 4.6
1986
1987 1039.2 406.2 22.7
1988 1151.2 444.2 30.7
1989 1288.3 488.4 52.9
1990 1505.4 509.7 68.8
1991 1701.9 577.5 102.2
1992 1955.9 704.2 149.7
1980
Light
industry
Heavy
industry Mining Materials Processing
99.1 273.0 "76 V 7 . ' 66.0 130.3
1984
1985 238.1 474.0 115.0 122.4 236.6
1986
1987 531.5 927.6 245.2 243.0 439.5
1988 597.0 1,022.2 260.4 269.0 492.9
1989 670.0 1,261.2 332.6 297.5 631.0
1990 789.7 1,273.8 361.7 317.9 594.2
1991 872.1 1,480.5 382.7 395.1 702.7
1992 1027.4 1,755.3 397.5 509.8 848.0
1980
Large Medium Small
129.5 85.8 186.8
1984 233.4 118.9
1985 293.3 144.8 401.8
1986
1987 475.2 249.9 749.0
1988 519.6 290.3 811.1
1989 620.5 326.4 882 .3
1990 774.0 380.0 933.6
1991 941.4 457.3 980.4
1992 1520.9 544.7 975.8
S o u r c e  a n d  note: The total labour income is a sum of three items: wage
bills in industrial costs, depreciation charges on non-productive fixed 
assets, and retained profits distributed to employees. Wage bills in 
industrial costs are the industrial costs after deducting material 
consumption, interest payments, and depreciation charges; material 
consumption is GVIO minus NVIO and depreciation charges that is 
discounted by the ratio of revenue of industrial sales to GVIO; interest 
payments are yearly-average balances of quota circulating capital 
multiplied by a constant rate of 3%. Depreciation charges on non­
productive fixed assets are total depreciation charges multiplied by the 
ratio of the non-productive to total fixed assets of year-end original 
value. Retained profits distributed to employees are assumed to account 
for a constant 60% of total retained profits. All data are from 
ZGGYJJTJNJ 1992 and 1993, Part III.
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Table A5-12. Labour income as % in NVIO, 1980-1992
State Collective Joint-ownership
1980 20. 7 38.0 23.6
1984
1985 25.9 37.3 15.5
1986
1987 40.7 50.4 37.3
1988 37.2 42.8 31.3
1989 38.8 44.2 37.7
1990 44.1 45.9 37.9
1991 42.6 42.9 30.9
1992 40.3 40.7 26.7
Light Heavy
industry industry Mining Materials Processing
1980 16.8 28.9 41.3 17.4 34.42
1984
1985 23.9 29.3 53.2 20.1 31.93
1986
1987 38.9 45.2 67.3 30.4 49.56
1988 34.1 41.3 64.8 28.2 44.08
1989 35.7 47.0 75.9 28.1 44.68
1990 38.2 47.6 79.9 30.0 50.95
1991 36.7 45.1 74.5 30.5 47.77
1992 36.7 43.2 62.7 30.1 42.70
Large Medium Smal 1
1980 19.4 27.2 33 .8
1984 26.8 29.5
1985 29.6 29.9 35.0
1986
1987 36.4 37.9 51.2
1988 33.3 35. 1 44.0
1989 35.3 37.4 45.6
1990 40.1 42.4 49.5
1991 39.8 41.8 44.2
1992 45.0 38.0 38. 1
Source and note: Table A5-1 and A5-11.
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Table A5-13. Summary of output and inputs for whole industry
NVIO
adjusted 
100 ail. 
yuan in 
current 
prices
NVIO 
adjusted 
100 mil 
yuan in 
1980 
prices
Labour
force
millions
Fixed
assets for 
productive 
purpose,
100 mil. 
yuan in 1980 
prices
Full
circulating
capital,
100 mil. 
yuan in 
1980 
prices
Total 
capital, 
100 mil. 
yuan in 
1980 
prices
Labour 
income, 
100 mil. 
yuan in 
current 
prices
Labour 
income 
as % of 
adjusted 
NVIO
1980 1526.1 1526.1 48.6 2394.2 1896.5 4,290.7 361.2 23.7
1984 60.0 3105.8 2460.0 5,565.8
1985 2615.0 2390.4 63.9 3539.8 2675.1 6,214.9 744.1 28.5
1986 2897.7 2556.2 68.5 3820.1 3085.7 6,905.8
1987 3422.6 2796.3 71.0 4148.1 3297.2 7,445.4 1468.1 42.9
1988 4230.4 2999.2 73.1 4475.8 3397.2 7,873.0 1626.1 38.4
1989 4562.2 2727.7 74.2 4778.4 3669.2 8,447.7 1829.6 40.1
1990 4707.4 2705.5 74.8 5015.2 4672.7 9,687.9 2083,9 44.3
1991 5677.5 3085.8 78.0 5274.6 5416.4 10,691.0 2381.6 42.0
1992 7142.7 3649.5 79.0 5425.6 5919.2 11,344.9 2809.7 39.3
Source and note: Results from Tables A5-1, 3, 4, 8, 10 and 11. Total capital is the sum of fixed assets 
and circulating capital. The last column is calculated in current prices for both labour income and 
adjusted NVIO.
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Chapter Six
Productivity Change in China's industry: 1980-1992
In Chapter Four we established a version of TFP analysis: total factor
productivity as an indicator of productivity change. We noted that sources of 
productivity change as indicated in the TFP estimate.may include technological 
progress, sectoral relations or sectoral shifts, and changes in market 
conditions, as well as changes in technical efficiency. Because it is still 
difficult to measure these elements separably in a single study, we will focus 
on a TFP estimate defined in the broad sense in our empirical study of post­
reform China's industry.
In Chapter Five we attempted to construct a statistically compatible 
base for output and input series in 1980-1992 China's industry, covering a 
number of sectors classified by various criteria. Though the work has 
encountered problems in quite a few areas with incomplete or inaccurate data, 
the results of the work are believed helpful, and allow us to pursue our 
empirical investigation of the issue at sector level.
In this chapter we proceed to an empirical investigation of 
productivity change in post-reform China's industry based on the theoretical 
work in Chapter Four and statistical work in Chapter Five. In Section I we 
will first give an overall description of productivity change in 1980-1992 
China's industry, which is compared to previous studies on the same issue. In
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Section II, our empirical investigation is conducted at sector level, and with 
regard to both sector-specific factors and the underlying economy-wide 
factors. We wish to identify some main decisive factors in productivity change 
as well as in output and input growth in post-reform China's industry. In 
Section III we will relate sectoral TFP estimates with sectoral shifts in 
order to find out whether structural changes in the post-reform period have 
helped to improve overall industrial productivity.
I. Overall Trend in Productivity Change in Post-Reform China’s Industry
The use of TFP analysis to judge productivity change in post-1949 China’s 
economy appeared in the early 1980s when the time series data began to be 
available to western analysts. The results of early studies of TFP in China's 
economy or industry tended to show that the post-1949 Chinese economy, up to 
the early 1980s, was unimpressive in achieving productivity improvement for 
its output growth^. Some observers have been led by these studies to conclude 
the "dismal failure" of reforms in early 1980s . The early studies, however, 
had a common drawback that capital stock was not adjusted to take account of 
price changes . Later studies, which emerged since the late 1980s, as
* Representative studies are: Gene Tidrick, Productivity Growth and
Technical Change in Chinese Industry. The World Bank Staff Working Paper 761, 
1986(a study based on the World Bank's research trip to China in 1984); 
Gregory Chow, The Chinese Economy, New York: Harper & Row, 1985; and Thomas 
Rawski, "Overview: Industry and Transport", in USCJEC ed, China's Economy
towards the Year of 2000, Washington, D.C., 1986. In Tidrick's study, TFP 
measured In China's national income in 1975-1981 was slightly better than in 
1952-1975; Chow's study ran through 1952-1981 and found that virtually all 
Industrial growth was ascribable to an increase in the capital stock. Rawski 
focused on 1978-1984 but still arrived at a low TFP estimated result.
i
See, for example, Bruce Reynolds, "Introduction to the Special Issue 
on Chinese Economic Reform", JCE, September 1987
This problem has been put under a thorough examination by Kuan Chen, 
Gary Jefferson, Thomas Rawski, H. Wang and Y, Zheng, "New Estimates of Fixed 
Investment and Capital Stock For Chinese State Industry", CQ, No. 114 (June
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summarised in Table 6-1, tended to overcome this drawback and were able to 
demonstrate that post-reform China achieved an overall positive productivity 
change along with its rapid industrial growth.
At least two conclusions concerning the overall trend in productivity
change in post-reform China's industry can be drawn from results of the later
studies. First, compared to the pre-reform period, industrial productivity has
improved. Second, the role of the productivity increase in industrial growth
began to rise close to a level prevailing in developing as well as in
developed economies^. The overall achievement in productivity improvement in
post-reform China's industry is impressive, and in general it reflects the
significant positive impact of reforms. Our study of productivity change in
post-reform China's industry follows the strand of development embodied in the
later studies and is aimed at exploring the more detailed sources of
5
productivity change. Compared to the later studies summarised in Table 6-1 , 
our study focuses on the period 1980-1992, uses the net output series in most 
cases, and treats capital inputs with new insights(taking into account 
circulating capital and carefully explaining the nature of non-productive 
fixed assets). More importantly, we pursue the study into sector level, and
1988). Most subsequent studies of TFP have followed the suggested approach: 
use a certain price index to deflate existing capital stock.
 ^ A World Bank-sponsored research shows that in 1970s and early 1980s, 
the average contribution to economic growth by productivity increase was 31% 
in 19 developing countries, and 49% in 12 developed countries(Hollis Chenery, 
et_al, eds. Industrialization and Growth: A Comparative Study, New York: OUP, 
1986 Ch. 2). For South Korea in 1960-1973 and Japan in 1966-1973, the same 
ratio was 42% and 41%, respectively (J.Kendrick and B.Vaccara, eds. New 
Developments in Productivity Measurement and Analysis, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1980). For post-reform China, the contribution of productivity 
increase was in a range of 23% to 60%(top panel of Table 6-1).
t:
Studies listed in the lower panel of Table 6-1 are those using sample 
survey data. We may note that some of them, though using the same data-set, 
yielded different TFP estimates. The discrepancies seem not due to any 
techniques employed, but mostly to data-processing methods, such as the choice 
of price deflators, the deduction of non-productive elements etc.
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Table 6-1. Summary of TFP Estimates of Post-Reform China's industry
Period Data-set Output 
growth
Labour
growth
Capital
growth
TFP(% of 
o.growth)
Authors
1975-85 GVO 8.8 43.2(a:.4) D.Perkins, 1988
1981-84 NI 8.7 3.2 8.3 40.2(a:.6) 
27.6(a:.4)
Derberger, 1988
1978-85 GVIO, 
SOE, a
8.6 2.5 4.8 55.8(a:.46) K.Chen at al, 
1987
ditto ditto,p 8.6 2.5 4.0 60.5(a:.46) ditto
1980-88 GVIO,
SOE
8.5 3.3 6.4 28.3 Jefferson et al 
1990
ditto GVIO,
COE
16.9 4.8 12.5 27.3 ditto
1978-92 GVIO 11.1 4.2 12.7 23.4(a:.5) Die Lo, 1994
ditto GVIO,
SOE
7.8 2.9 11.6 7.7(a:.5) 
18.8(a:.4)
ditto
ditto GVIO,
COEs
16.8 5.5 17.8 30.4(a:.5) 
23.1(a:.4)
ditto
ditto GVIO,
LMEs
12.2 5.0 13.2 25. 3 (cf: .5) 
31.9(a:.4)
ditto
1982-87 122 TVEs Positive J.Svejnar, 1990
1980-87 700+
SOEs
Negative D.A.Hay et al, 
1993
1980-87 700+
SOEs
Positive Jefferson & 
Singh, 1993
1984-88 300 SOEs Negative Woo et a l ,.1994
1984-87 200 TVEs Positive ditto
1980-89 769 SOEsBy branch, 2.3(L) to 7.9(H) Positive T.Groves et al, 
1995
1980-89 769 SOEsBy branch, O.O(L) to 9.1(H) Mixed Liu & Liu, 1994
N o t e :  a: contributing weight assigned to~TabouT~input(the remaining proportion is therefore for capital 
input); a: capital and labour series adjusted to the 'unproductive" elements; p: price deflator changed to the 
1980 base; HI: national income for China's economy; GVO: gross value of output for China's economy; GVIO: gross 
value of industrial output for China's industry or its sectors; SOEs: state-owned enterprises; COEs: collective 
enterprises; TVEs: township and village enterprises; LME s : large- and medium-sized state-owned enterprises. 
Details of publication sources of the listed studies are given in the Bibliography at the end of the thesis.
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Table 6-2. Annual growth rate of output and inputs in China's industry 1980- 
1992, %
1980-85 1985-88 1988-92 1980-92
GVIO
output growth 10.3 10.3 7.9 9.5
input growth 6.5 7.4 5.1 6.2
TFP 3.8 2.9 2.8 3.3
VAIO
output growth 9.5 7.1 2 .1* 6 .8*
input growth 7.6 7.3 4.5* 6.9*
TFP 1.9 -0.2 -2.4* -0.1*
NVIO
output growth 9.2 6.9 5.4 7.4
input growth 7.6 7.2 3.8 6 .4
TFP 1.6 -0.3 1.6 1.0
and 1993) are deflated by the same producer price index as in Table A5-3. VAIO is NVIO plus depreciation 
charges(up to 1991). Total inputs for GVIO is the sum of fixed assets net of the non-productive element, 
labour, and intermediate inputs(GVIO minus NVIO and depreciation charges); and for VAIO and NVIO, total inputs 
exclude intermediate inputs. Weights of these factors are their shares in GVIO, VAIO and NVIO, 
respectively(Table A5-13 and ZGGYJJY3NJ 1993). Fixed assets in 1980 constant prices are from Table A5-13. 
Intermediate inputs in current prices are deflated by the price index of major industrial material 
purchasefW J N J , various issues). For the sake of compatibility, NVIO here is unrevised(i.e, not adjusted to the 
ratio of sales to GVIO and include depreciation charges on non-productive fixed assets). TFP is output growth 
after subtracting input growth.
we aim at disentangling the overall impact of reforms on productivity change 
in China's industry. In some aspects, our estimates appear quite close to the 
previous studies. For instance, our estimate of overall TFP using gross output 
series(GVIO) shows that in 1980-1992, over 30% of industrial growth was 
contributed by productivity improvement(Table 6-2), a level in the middle 
range of previous estimates.
For an overall description of productivity change in post-reform
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China's industry, we should note two important issues: the implication of TFP 
analysis using different output concepts, and a comparison of TFP estimates 
with and without the inclusion of circulating capital. Table 6-2 compares the 
results of TFP estimates using three series of output in 1980-1992 China's 
industry: GVIO, VAIO and NVIO, The results show that over the period 1980- 
1992, the percentage of TFP to output growth was about 34.7% when measured in 
GVIO, but only 13.5% when measured in NVI0(the figure of VAIO for the period 
is incompatible). Because intermediate inputs are the differentiating factor 
between gross output and net output, the disparities between the TFP estimates 
seem to have reflected the changing role of intermediate inputs in post-reform 
China's industry. This may be evaluated in two aspects. First, we may note 
that the growth rate of NVIO or VAIO was substantially lower than GVIO 
throughout the period. This implies that prices of intermediate inputs 
increased faster than industrial output prices, and also that an increased 
part of industrial output was implicitly transferred away from industry in the 
form of intermediate inputs. Second, the efficiency of intermediate input use 
has improved, especially in 1980-1985. We may note that in 1980-1992 
(particularly in 1980-1985), the measured growth of total factor inputs when 
including intermediate inputs was lower than that excluding intermediate 
inputs. This implies that China's industrial enterprises tended to use fewer 
intermediate inputs, in real terms, compared to their use of other factors 
(particularly capital). The evidence seems to suggest that in the post-reform 
period, when the relative prices of intermediate inputs began to rise as part 
of the restoration of market relations, China's industrial enterprises were 
able to a certain degree to improve their efficiency in the use of 
intermediate inputs to cope with the situation.
A comparison of TFP estimates between series including and excluding 
circulating capital is made in Table 6-3. It appears that there were no
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Table 6-3. TFP estimates: comparison of capital use
Growth rate 1980-85 1985-88 1988-92 1980-1992
Output(NVIO) 9.4 7.9 5.0 7.5
Labour 5.6 4.6 2.0 4.1
Fixed assets 8.1 8.1 4.9 7.2
Circulating capital 7.1 8.3 14.9 10.0
TFI 1 7.2 6.7 3.5 6.2
TFI 2 6.9 6.8 6.4 7.2
TFP 1 2.2 1.2 1.5 1.3
TFP 2 2.5 1 .1 -1.4 0.3
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  Table A b - 1 1  NVIO here is the adjusted series and therefore different Iron that in 
Table 6-2. TFI is the contribution of total factor input to output growth; 1 is the calculation based on fixed 
assets only, and 2 is that based on fixed assets plus circulating capital.
significant differences in TFP estimates between the two series in 1980-1985 
and 1985-1988(TFP 1 and 2 were similar in amount in the two periods). Looking 
more closely, we may note that the relative relations between the two TFP 
estimates have begun to change from the first period to the second period. TFP 
estimate including circulating capital was larger than that excluding 
circulating capital in 1980-1985, but became smaller in 1985-1988. In 1988- 
1992, the TFP estimate which included circulating capital became ever further 
negative, an outcome of the sharp increase in the use of circulating capital 
by China's industrial enterprises in this period(15% annually). As we have 
indicated earlier(Section II of Chapter Three), the sharply increased use of 
circulating capital was associated with the imperfections of financial markets 
or some unbalanced reforms of the funding system: short-term capital lending 
became an sector with "softer constraints" on industrial enterprises relative
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to long-term capital lending or funding. A question that may be addressed is 
that, if the constraints on short-term capital lending had been as hard as 
those on long-term funding, China's industrial enterprises would have not been 
able to use circulating capital so excessively since the late 1980s. The 
evidence in Table 6-3 clearly shows that the productivity change in post­
reform China's industry has been negatively affected by excessive use of 
circulating capital.
Our overview is that post-reform China's industry has improved its- 
productivity, compared both to the pre-reform period and to international 
experience. Of this achievement, improved efficiency in the use of 
intermediate inputs is particularly impressive. However, the process of 
productivity improvement has been to a degree interrupted by excessive use of 
circulating capital since the late 1980s.
II. Productivity Change in Sectors of China's Industry
In what follows we will present our TFP estimates for various sectors in 
China's industry: by form of ownership: state, collective, and joint-ownership 
industry; by type of activity, light and heavy industry(and mining, material 
producing and finished-good processing industry within heavy industry); and 
by size of enterprise, large-, medium- and small-sized enterprises. In 
interpreting these results, we shall first look at the relationship between 
output growth and input growth with regard to their change over periods, i.e, 
1980-1985, 1985-1988, and 1988-1992. Based on these comparisons, we will then 
explore underlying factors that are considered responsible for the relative 
changes in output and inputs.
1. Sectors by Form of Ownership
1 6 6
Table 6-4. TFP estimates of sectors by form of ownership
Output
growth
Input growth Total factor
Labour Capital Total productivity
1980-1985
state 7.0 3.6 7.0 6.3 0.8
collective 16.8 9.0 16.2 13.5 3.3
joint-ownership 23.0 13.8 29.0 25.4 -2.4
1985-1988
state 6.7 3.3 7.0 6.1 0.7
collective 9.6 5.8 12.4 9.9 -0.4
joint-ownership 36.6 26.9 38.2 36.5 0.2
1988-1992
state 3.1 1.9 4.7 3.6 -0.5
collective 6.7 0.6 1 .1 0.8 5.8
joint-ownership 43.2 28.9 36.8 34.3 8.8
1980-1992
state 5.7 2.9 6.2 5.5 0.2
collective 11.0 5.3 10.0 8.2 2.7
joint-ownership 32.8 21.9 33.8 31.0 1.8
Source and note: In this and subsequent tables below, revised NVIO is used to calculate output growth 
rates, see Table A3-4. Capital is a sum of fixed assets for productive purposes and circulating capital, see 
Table A3-8 and A3-10. Total input growth is a sum of labour and capital growth weighted by their share in 
revised NVIO, see Table A3-12. TFP is output growth after subtracting total input growth.
Table 6-4 lists our TFP estimates for sectors classified by form of ownership: 
state, collective, and joint-ownership. Overall, in the period 1980-1992, 
these three sectors all achieved productivity growth though the achievement 
in the state sector was relatively small. When looking at the different 
periods of time, productivity change in the state sector was positive in 1980- 
1985 and 1985-1988 but became negative in 1988-1992. The main direct reason 
for the latter trend seems to be the decline in industrial output growth in 
the state sector(down to 3% from about 7% in the previous periods). Notably, 
the joint-ownership sector saw a sharp rise in its industrial output growth
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in 1988-1992(a further rise to 43% from 37% in 1985-1988). That part(or an 
increasingly large part) of state industry began to transform into joint- 
ownership industries may be an important underlying factor which explains this 
relative change in the output growth of the state sector and joint-ownership 
sector®.
In the light of the fast growth of non-state enterprises, including 
collective enterprises, the greatest difficulty preventing state enterprises 
from achieving productivity improvement was the change in market conditions: 
the loss or weakening of the monopolistic position that state enterprises had 
enjoyed in the pre-reform period. Loss of monopolistic position had two 
immediate and interrelated impacts on state enterprises: they had to concede 
market shares, and suffered relative increases in the costs of production. 
With this background, it is not surprising that productivity growth in the 
state sector was relatively small in the period under study. Yet this low 
achievement in productivity growth would not necessarily suggest that 
technological progress or improvement in technical efficiency was sluggish in 
state industry during the period. In the post-reform period, China has 
continued and increased its imports of foreign technology, mainly aimed at up-
i
grading its industrial base . State enterprises were the main beneficiary of 
this process. Studies on the technical efficiency issue in state industrial 
enterprises also tend to show that some progress has been made in this
® In 1988, joint-ownership enterprises involving state enterprises(joint 
state-collective, joint state-individual, and joint foreign of which most 
involved state enterprises) accounted for 89% of joint-ownership industrial 
output(see Robert Michael Field, "China’s Industrial Performance since 1978", 
C Q , No. 131 (September 1992), p.579). It is likely to be the case that most 
of the state enterprises that changed into a joint-ownership status would be 
those that performed better.
7
For an overview of China's foreign technology imports since early 
1980s, see Denis Fred Simon, "China's Acquisition and Assimilation of Foreign 
Technology: Boogieing*s Search for Excellence", in USCJEC, ed. China's
Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s. Washington, D.C. Vol. II, 1991
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respect, though this is not distributed evenly among individual branches .
In the two non-state sectors, collective and joint-ownership, a 
common trend is that productivity growth accelerated in the later period, 
1988-1992, which may partly explain the increased difficulties encountered by 
state enterprises in improving their productivity in the same period. In the 
acceleration of productivity growth, collective enterprises seem to have 
benefited more from greater efficiency in factor use: labour and capital input 
growth was much slower than in the previous periods; for joint-ownership 
enterprises, they seem still to be reliant on high and accelerated output 
growth. Overall, economic growth paths, in terms of the relationship between 
output growth and input growth, do not seem to have shown strong signs of 
convergence among the three sectors, when looked at by form of ownership. 
Competition between them and within them emerged, but the constraints facing 
each sector were still different in some aspects(e.g ., in the capital markets 
or funding system). Market integration still awaits development in this 
respect.
2. Sectors by Type of Activity
It seems a bit surprising that light industry, a fast growing sector when 
comparing to heavy industry, saw its productivity rate fall in 1980-1985(Table 
6-5). This period 1980-1985 is when light industry began to gain an impetus 
towards growth from both market expansion and the reforms in the enterprise 
incentive system. The fall in productivity in 1980-1985 was directly produced 
by the faster growth in factor inputs(particularly capital inputs) over growth
o
See, for example, Groves, et al, op.cit.; Liu and Liu, o p .cit. These 
empirical studies use a large data-set of state industrial enterprises and 
found technical efficiency improvement was particularly positive in branches 
like metallurgy, machinery, electronics, and chemicals.
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Table 6-5. TFP estimates of light and heavy industry
Output Input growth Total factor
growth Labour Capital Total productivity
1980-1985
Light 10.5 7.7 15.4 14.1 -3.6
Heavy 8.0 4.4 6.5 5.9 2.1
1985-1988
Light 10.7 6.0 11.8 10.4 0.3
Heavy 6.0 3.7 6.8 5.9 0.1
1988-1992
Light 5.2 2.2 5.2 4.2 1.1
Heavy 4.6 1.8 4.9 3.6 1.0
1980-1992
Light 8.7 5.4 11.0 10.1 -1.3
Heavy 6.4 3.3 6.1 5.3 1 .1
Source and note: See Table 6-4.
in output. It seems that during that period although demand for light industry
goods grew fast there was a great deal of technological progress(characterised
o
by the rapit capital growth and rise in capital-labour ratio) . In addition, 
the productivity change in light industry in 1980-1985 seems to have been 
affected by the change in market conditions: the traditional monopolistic
q
The phenomenon looks more perplexing if we relate it with the so-called 
Verdoorn’s Law: productivity growth would tend to be higher when output growth 
is accelerated. Die Lo has tested the hypothesis for post-reform Chinese 
industry and found it empirically applicablefMarket and Institutional 
Regulation in Chinese Industrialisation. PhD Thesis, the University of Leeds, 
1994, Ch. Six).
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Table 6-6. TFP estimates of sectors in heavy industry
Output Input growth Total factor
growth Labour Capital Total productivity
1980-1985
mining 2.4 4.0 8.5 6.6 -4.2
materials 6.0 5.1 7.2 6.8 -0.8
processing 12.1 4.2 4.8 4.6 7.5
1985-1988
mining 6 .4 2.7 7.6 5.0 1.4
materials 6.2 6.1 8.5 8.1 -1.9
processing 5.8 3.1 4.1 3.7 2.1
1988-1992
mining 1 .1 1.7 7.2 3.6 -2.5
materials 3.8 4.1 6.2 5.6 -1.8
processing 6.9 0.9 1.3 1 .1 5.8
1980-1992
mining 2.7 2.9 7.8 3.9 -1.2
materials 5.4 5.0 7.2 6.5 -1.2
processing 8.7 2.8 3.4 3.8 4.8
Source and note: See Table 6-4.
structure broke up into a competitive structure. A vast number of non-state 
enterprises, especially TVEs, emerged in light industrial markets. Regional 
and local SOEs also received stronger stimulation under decentralisation, and 
participated in the quest for a larger market share. Competition began to 
become a commonplace in light industry. Intensified competition may have 
helped light industrial enterprises to improve their technical efficiency and 
accelerate technological progress, but in that particular period(1980-1985) , 
these effects might not have been sufficiently large enough to override the 
negative impact of these changing market conditions on the productivity rate.
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That fact that productivity in light industry began to increase after 1985 is 
a strong indication that in the long run the transformation of market 
structure did however help to improve productivity.
Compared to light industry, heavy industry grew less fast in 1980- 
1992. Nevertheless, heavy industry has achieved an overall positive and fairly 
stable increase in productivity over the period. Because heavy industry is a 
huge sector and development within the sector seems quite uneven, we should 
look into the sub-sectors in heavy industry.
Output growth, input growth and productivity change are summarised 
in Table 6-6 for three sub-sectors in heavy industry in 1980-1992: mining, 
material producing, and heavy industrial finished-good processing. It is 
striking that these three sectors had considerably different experiences of 
post-1980 growth: productivity change was negative in the mining and material- 
producing sectors, and positive and large in the finished-good processing 
sector (it contributed over 55% of the output growth in the sector and 
supported the whole heavy industry sector's result of overall productivity 
growth in 1980-1992). The finished-good processing sector is of particular 
interest: it achieved productivity growth not only in a period when its output 
growth was relatively fast(i.e, in 1980-1985 and 1988-1992 when its growth 
rate was higher than that in the mining and material-producing sectors), but 
also in a period when its output growth was relatively slow(i.e, in 1985-1988, 
when its growth rate was lower than that in mining and material-producing 
sectors). Another feature of growth in finished-good processing sector is that 
fixed capital increased relatively slowly throughout the period(compared to 
both labour growth in the same sector and capital growth in the other 
sectors).
The main reasons for this achievement of productivity growth without 
the sector incurring substantial capital increases may include both the fast
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technological progress made in this sector in general, and the structural 
transformation of traditional state military enterprises in particular. 
Several empirical investigations have generally confirmed that, compared to 
other manufacturing branches, China’s machinery industry (in a broad definition 
it includes machine-tools, electronics, transport equipment, and so forth), 
achieved a better performance in technological progress in the 1980s, and this 
achievement was recorded in both state enterprises and non-state 
enterprises^.
For state enterprises in this sector, the conversion of defence- 
related production into civilian-oriented production seems also to have played 
an important role. A significant portion of the sector is believed to have 
consisted of defence-related production in the pre-1980 period^. In branches 
such as machinery, electronics, shipbuilding, and the aircraft and aerospace 
industry, military enterprises are believed to have had the best technical 
equipment and most skilful labour force in China, at least up to the early 
years of the post-reform period. Since the late 1970s, when China began to re­
shape its development strategy and international relations, defence-related
12industrial enterprises began to turn to civilian-oriented alternatives . The
For studies based on state enterprises data, see Groves, et a l , 
o p .cit; Hay, et a l , op.cit; for studies based on TVEs data, see, Svejvar, 
op.cit.
^  Approximately, out of the total production(GVIO) in machinery, 
transport equipment, electricity equipment, electronics , and instrument-making 
industry, at least 13% might belong to military enterprises. This is derived 
from two figures: One: civilian products in military enterprises in
electronics, shipbuilding, aircraft and aerospace industry, weaponry, and 
nuclear industry, were worth 23 billion yuan in 1988, about nine times that 
in 198Q(Zhongguo li.iie dianzi gongye nian.jian (Almanac of China's Machinery and 
Electronics Industry) 1989, Volume of Machinery, 1-13); Two: the percentage 
proportion of civilian products to the GVIO of the military enterprises of the 
same scope was 23% in 1980(Zhongguo gongye nian.jian(Almanac of China's 
Industry) 1991, p.130).
12 For an overall description of Ghina’s transformation of its defence 
industry, see: Keith Crane and K. C. Yel, Economic Reform and the Military in 
Poland, Hungary, and China, the RAND, 1991; and Mel Gurtov, "Swords into
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conversion has been carried out quite successfully, as civilian-oriented
production rapidly developed and has become a leading activity in most of the
traditionally military enterprises. The overall proportion of civilian-
oriented production in the total production of military enterprises has risen
1 q
to 60% in 1989 from 15% in 1978 . In some branches, like electronics and the
shipbuilding industry, the conversion is nearly complete: over 90% of
production in these traditional military enterprises was civilian-oriented 
products in the late 1980s^. This conversion has apparently helped to 
improve productivity in the sector: production grew faster than capital and 
labour because of the extensive use of existing equipment and the existence 
of a skilled labour force etc. The successful transformation of defence- 
related industry has formed an important part of the marketisation process in 
post-reform China's industry.
In mining and material-producing sectors, the major problems facing 
enterprises seem quite different from those factors in finished-good 
processing sector: there exist relatively low prices for output, and
technological backwardness largely due to the pre-reform policy that pursued 
self-sufficiency in all major industrial material supply. To support 
industrialisation in manufacturing industries, pre-reform China apparently 
adopted a price policy that favoured industrial finished goods (including light 
industrial goods) and therefore acted against industrial materials 
(particularly industrial energy goods). Meanwhile, pre-reform China invested 
heavily in the material-producing sector including the iron and steel
Market Shares: China's Conversion of Military Industry to Civilian 
Production", CQ, NO. 134 (June 1993)
^  Almanac of China's Industry 1991, p.130; Keith Crane and K.C. Yeh, 
o p .cit., p .108
1 A
Almanac of China's Machinery and Electronics Industry 1989, Volume of 
Machinery, 1-13; Almanac of China's Industry 1991, p.131.
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industry. The encouragement of regional self-sufficiency such as in the coal 
industry also led to a great number of technologically inefficient enterprises 
appeared in these sectors. In the post-reform period, these problems began to 
be increasingly exposed as enterprises faced more marketisation. Though the 
prices of industrial energy and materials products relative to other 
industrial products rose relatively fast in the post-reform period, especially 
after the mid-1980s, they seemed still not sufficient to cover the increases 
in costs of production because of the serious technological inefficiencies or 
constraints . When production in these sectors grew relatively slow and 
engendered the shortages of supply, the state responded by increasing capital 
inputs. Indeed, as we can see from Table 6-6 , capital increased relatively 
fast in the mining and material producing sectors throughout the period of 
1980-1992(compared to their output growth and to capital growth in finished- 
good processing sector). Though the pressures leading to the imbalance were 
relieved by such response from government funding, it was achieved 
nevertheless at the price of productivity growth.
3. Sectors by Size of Enterprise
There are three notable features of productivity change as indicated in TFP
estimates for large-, medium- and small-size enterprises in 1980-1992, as can
be seen from Table 6-7. First, productivity change was positive for all of the 
three sectors. Overall, small industry achieved the highest productivity 
growth, with the next in medium-size industry, and the lowest productivity 
growth in large-size industry. Second, the relative productivity growth in the
1S Observers have noted that in China's coal and petroleum mining 
industry, production has entered late maturity in several important areas.
Continued heavy investment would therefore generate much less return. See, the
World Bank, China: Macroeconomic Stability and Industrial Growth under
Decentralised Socialism, Washington, D.C., 1990, pp.50-51.
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Table 6-7. TFP estimates of sectors by size of enterprise
Output Input growth Total factor
growth Labour Capital Total productivity
1980-1985
Large 5.9 2.9 7.2 6 .4 -0.5
Medium 7.0 3.2 6.4 5.5 1.5
Small 13.9 7,1 10.9 9.6 4.3
1985-1988
Large 7.0 6.6 9.1 8.4 -1.4
Medium 9.8 5.8 6.7 6.4 3.4
Small 7.5 3.7 8.0 6.5 1.0
1988-1992
Large 11.2 11.4 8.4 9.4 1.8
Medium 5.7 5.5 4.4 4.8 0.9
Small 0.3 -2.4 0.2 -0.9 1.2
1980-1992
Large 7.9 6 .6 8.1 7.8 0.1
Medium 7.2 4.6 5.8 5.5 1.8
Small 7.6 3.0 6.5 5.3 2.3
Source and note: See Table 6-4.
three sectors experienced some changes over the period. In 1980-1985, 
productivity growth was negative in large industry, modest in medium industry 
(which accounted for 20% of output growth), and substantial in small industry 
(which accounted for 30% of output growth). In 1985-1988, while productivity 
growth continued to be negative in large industry, it became substantial in 
medium industry(which accounted for 35% of output growth) but became only 
modest in small industry(which accounted for 13% of output growth). 
Furthermore, in 1988-1992, productivity growth became positive in large 
industry, when it also continued to be an important factor in supporting 
output growth in medium and small industry. Third, it is the small industrial
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enterprises that were able to achieve significant productivity growth 
throughout the period 1980-1992. Below is our brief discussion which focuses 
on large and small industry.
The most notable characteristic of small industry seems to be its 
flexibility in the use of factor inputs. This may be evidenced by the fact 
that small industry was the only sector that could reduce its labour growth 
substantially when its output growth slowed down. In 1988-1992, the output 
growth rate in small industry decreased considerably, down to 0.3% from 7.5% 
in 1985-1988. During this period, labour inputs ceased to grow and in fact the 
number of workers employed in small industry was reduced. The result was that 
though the output growth sharply slowed down, productivity continued to 
increase in the period. In large- and medium-size industry, on the other hand, 
the growth of labour inputs seems less closely associated with output growth. 
For example, in medium-size industry, the output growth rate in 1988-1992 was 
5.7%, lower than the 7.0% of 1980-1985, but the growth rate of labour inputs 
in this period was 5.5%, much higher than the 3.2% of 1980-1985. Even if we 
compare with the immediately previous period, 1985-1988, it is still evident 
that medium-size industry was unable to reduce its growth rate of labour 
inputs in 1988-1992(there was only a 0.3 percentage-point fall from the 
figures of 1985-1988) in proportion to the decrease in its output growth(which 
had a 4.1 percentage-point fall).
The greater flexibility in the use of labour inputs in small industry 
may be mainly attributed to the fact that small industry faced a rather 
different labour market compared to large- and medium-size industry. About 
two-thirds of the small enterprises under our study were township enterprises 
operating in rural areas or on the periphery between urban and countryside 
areas. Workers in these areas were usually able to have more alternative 
employment opportunities than urban workers, for example, they might simply
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return to agricultural activities. Being made redundant would therefore pose 
no great threat to these workers. In contrast, in urban areas where most 
large- and medium-sized enterprises were located, workers relied on existing 
employment to a great degree, as alternative employment opportunities were 
scarce or insufficient.
In principle, large- and medium-sized enterprises would be more able 
to seek economies of scale than small enterprises. In China, it has been the 
case that large enterprises were in general technologically advanced, capital, 
intensive, and had more access to some infrastructure(such as transport and 
electricity power supply etc). From Table 6-7, we can see that capital inputs 
grew fastest in large industry over 1980-1992. This fact again implies that 
considerable technological progress may have been made in large industry over 
the period. We seem to have no reason to believe that the large industry would 
be relatively unimpressive in productivity growth, especially when compared 
to small industry^.
In the light of the above discussion of the flexibility in the use 
of labour inputs, the main reason that we suspect may explain the phenomenon 
of significant productivity growth in small enterprises in comparison with 
large enterprises is a certain degree of over-employment in the large
There have been several studies which appear to show that the factor 
of economies of scale seemed not to be significant in China's industry, and 
this, if it is the case, would explain why large enterprises had no apparent 
advantages in productivity growth over, say, small enterprises. See: L.Q. Jia, 
"A Quantitative Analysis of Chinese Industrial Structure and Technical Change: 
Production Functions for Aggregate Industry, Sectoral Industries, and Small 
Scale Industry", Applied Economics. Vol. 23, No. 11 (1991). The article
concludes that in China in 1952-1985, large and medium enterprises exhibited 
decreasing returns, where rural and small industry showing increasing 
returns); also, Yanrui Wu, "Scale, Factor Intensity and Efficiency: An
Empirical Study of the Chinese Coal Industry", Applied Economics, Vol. 25, No. 
3 (1993). Its author also concludes that no gain from scale economies was 
found in the investigation using 1985 survey data. These studies, we suspect, 
deal with a difficult question and use a method In which the scale factor and 
technical efficiency seem to have not been clearly disentangled.
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enterprises. Given the data we have used for the present study, it is 
impossible to measure directly any degree of over-employment in large 
industrial enterprises. However, this explanation may be inferred by the 
existence of two facts: first, labour productivity growth was slowest in large 
industry in 1980-1992 compared to medium and small industry(this may be seen 
from Table 6-7 by comparing labour growth and output growth in the bottom 
panel); second, in many industrial branches, labour productivity is seen to 
decrease as the size of the enterprises being studied increases(this is found 
from the panel data classified by size of enterprise in recent issues of 
ZGGYJJTJNJ). The existence of over-employment creates a problem of technical 
inefficiency, and a fundamental cause of this problem is state enterprises' 
commitment to employees’ interests such as safeguarding work and providing 
employment for employees' other family members.
III. Sectoral Shifts and Productivity Change
The preceding discussion of productivity change is conducted by looking at 
some individual sectors in China's industry. Here we wish to give an overall 
description, and examine the effect of sectoral shifts on productivity growth 
in post-reform China's industry. The purpose of the examination is to find out 
how productivity change has been associated with sectoral shifts.
The results of output and input growth, together with TFP(as a % of 
output growth) in the various industrial sectors are summarised in Table 6-8 . 
There are, approximately, four types of relationship between productivity 
growth and output growth which we may observe from Table 6-8 : (i) high TFP 
associated with high output: the processing sector of heavy industry in 1980- 
1985, and small industry in 1980-1985; (ii) high TFP associated with slow 
output growth: processing heavy industry in 1985-1988 and small industry in
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Table 6-8. Summary of output and total input growth and TFP as a % of output
growth in 1980-1992 China's industry
1980-1985 1985 -1988 1988-1992
Output TFI TFP Output TFI TFP Dutput TFI TFP
By form of ownership
SOE 7.0 6.3 10.8 6.7 6.1 9.8 3.1 3.6 -16.8
COE 16.8 13.5 19.8 9.6 9.9 -3.9 6.7 0.8 87.4
JOE 23.0 25.4 -10.5 36.6 36.5 0.4 43.2 34.3 20.5
By type of activity
Light 10.5 14.1 -34.6 10.7 10.4 2.6 5.2 4.2 20.8
Heavy 8.0 5.9 26.3 6.0 5,9 2.3 4.6 3.6 20.9
Mining 2.4 6.6 -170.9 6.4 5.0 21.8 1 .1 3.6 -229.1
Materials 6.0 6.8 -14.1 6.2 8.1 -30.2 3.4 5.6 -54.3
Processing 12.1 4.6 62.1 5.8 3.7 35.6 6.9 1.1 83.8
By size of enterprise
Large 5.9 6.4 -8.3 7.0 8.4 -20.3 7.9 9.4 15.8
Medium 7.0 5.5 21.5 9.8 6.4 34.6 7.4 4.8 15.0
Small 13.9 9.6 31.1 7.5 6.5 13.4 2.7 -0.9 444.4
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  Tables 6-4 to b-7. TFI is total factor inputs. The extremely high proportion of TFT 
as a I of output growth in 1988-1992 small industry was mainly due to the negative growth of TFI.
1988-1992; (iii) low TFP associated with high output growth: joint-ownership 
enterprises in 1980-1985 and light industry in 1980-1985; (iv) low TFP 
associated with slow output growth: mining industry in 1980-1985 and 1988- 
1992, and state enterprises in 1988-1992. These varied relations between 
output growth and productivity change imply that productivity change has been 
a "sectoral phenomenon" in post-reform China's industry: it has relied to a 
large extent on the characteristics of the industrial sector we are concerned 
with(much of our discussion in the previous section has dealt with the 
characteristics of the industrial sectors). Put another way, productivity
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growth in post-reform China's industry has been more or less unbalanced 
between the sectors, and integrated development in these industrial sectors 
remains to be seen.
A further important issue concerning overall productivity growth in 
post-reform China’s industry is the impact of sectoral shifts. Given the 
unbalanced productivity growth of various China's industrial sectors, it is 
important to ask whether sectoral shifts have affected aggregate productivity 
growth. At first sight, it seems that the question may be answered by 
comparing input growth and TFP among sectors. For example, by comparing output 
growth and TFP in state and non-state(collective and joint-ownership)
industry, we may note that joint-ownership enterprises had a higher input 
growth rate and TFP than state enterprises, in 1988-1992(Table 6-8 ). This
indicates that a faster growing sector had a higher productivity growth. In
other words, the sectoral shift towards joint-ownership enterprises sector 
helped the aggregate productivity growth in the period. A similar relationship 
existed between collective enterprises and state enterprises in 1980-1985, 
between small enterprises and large- and medium-sized enterprises in 1980- 
1985, and between light and heavy industry in 1985-1988. Overall in the period 
1980-1992 it is particularly impressive that sectoral shifts towards non-state 
industry (collective and joint-ownership) have been in line with the move from 
slower productivity growth(in state industry) into faster productivity
growth(in non-state industry)(see the bottom panel in Table 6-4).
However, this comparison of input growth and TFP should not be 
pursued too far. First, the sectoral differentials in productivity or 
productivity growth in China's industry were also in some aspects associated 
with policy biases and historical factors. For instance, in the mining sector, 
productivity was relatively low and productivity growth was also relatively 
slow. The main reasons included the relatively low prices for mining products,
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and the relatively high production costs in the sector. A problem in the 1980s 
was that any rapid or large rise in the price of mining products would greatly 
hinder industrial development in the downstream sectors. In addition, the 
relatively high production cost level reflected the fact that development in 
this sector was pursued with little regard to production efficiency in the 
pre-reform period. Given these constraints on the mining sector, continued 
fast growth in and factor shifts towards industrial sectors other than mining 
would cause severe imbalances between them, and therefore hinder industrial 
development. In other words, sectoral shifts that simply exploited 
differentials in productivity without hindrance would cause obstructions in 
the growth of the entirety of post-reform China’s industry.
Second, the comparison may have some methodological problems, as we 
have indicated in Chapter Four(Section II). A higher TFP may imply that 
productivity growth is faster in a sector, but may not necessarily mean that 
the sector has a higher productivity than other sectors. Therefore, shifts of 
resources towards a sector with a higher TFP would not necessarily comply with
Table 6-9. Comparing productivity in 
= 1.0), 1980 and 1985
light and heavy industry(heavy industry
1980 1985
Labour productivity 1.5 1.4
Capital/labour ratio 0.4 0.5
Capital/output ratio 0.3 0.4
Total profits as % of fixed capital 3.4 2.2
Source and note: ZGGYJJTJfiJ l ^ J , pp.lbb and lb9. Labour productivity here is GVIO per worker; 
capital/labour ratio is fixed capital per worker; capital/output ratio is fixed capital/GViO ratio; total 
profits include tax.
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the hypothesis of a move from lower productivity towards higher productivity. 
Compare light and heavy industry in 1980-1985. During this period, TFP was 
negative in light industry and positive in heavy industry. Meanwhile, factor 
input growth was faster in light industry than in heavy industry. From these 
observations we should not however conclude that the sectoral shift towards 
light industry was associated with a move from higher productivity towards 
lower productivity. In fact, by various measures, productivity in light 
industry was higher than in heavy industry in that period. As shown in Table 
6-9, in 1980, at an average level, workers in light industry used less than 
half of the capital that was used in heavy industry, but produced one and a 
half times the output as that of heavy industry. Also, in light industry the 
capital-output ratio was much lower and the profit rate much higher in 1980. 
By 1985, the gap between light and heavy industry had become smaller(that may 
have been due to the faster productivity growth of heavy industry in 1980- 
1985), but the superiority of light industry over heavy industry in terms of 
productivity difference remained. The case of this relative growth in light 
and heavy industry in fact shows that, while factor inputs indeed tended to 
shift towards the sector with higher productivity, productivity growth in the 
sector was nonetheless slower than in a sector with a lower level of actual 
productivity.
To study the impact of factor reallocation among sectors, we may take 
the measure of labour productivity and use a formula that was illustrated in 
Chapter Four(Section II). A possible problem with the measure of labour 
productivity is that it may not reflect the true relative productivity in one 
sector because of sectoral differences in capital-labour ratio. For example, 
labour productivity would be always higher in large-size enterprises as they 
tend to use more capital at per worker level. The productivity with which 
capital is used would however not be always higher in large-sized enterprises.
183
Table 6-10. Growth of labour productivity and the reallocation effect
Sectors by form of 
Total
ownership
SOE COE JOE Weighted growth Reallocation
1980-85 19.1 20.1 41.3 47.7 23.9 -4.8
1985-88 13.0 10.3 11.0 24.8 10.6 2.4
1988-92 9.3 3.9 19.3 51.1 8.9 0.4
Sectors by type of activity
Total Light Heavy Weighted growth Reallocation
1980-85 16.9 13.4 18,,8 16.7 0.2
1985-88 10.1 14.0 7.,1 9.9 0.2
1988-92 12.0 12.6 11,.1 11.8 0.2
Sectors by size of enterprise
Total Large Medium Small Weighted growth Reallocation
1980-85 18.5 15.4 19.7 36.4 23.8 -5.3
1985-88 9.3 0.9 11.8 11.4 7.6 1.7
1988-92 14.7 -0.9 0.6 11.1 4.7 10.0
Source and note: Labour productivity is measured by the net value of o utput(Table A5-3) per worker(Table 
A5-4). The weighted growth is sectoral labour productivity weighted by sectoral share in output. The 
reallocation effect is the total labour productivity growth deducted by the weighted labour productivity. 
Because of statistical discrepancies, the total level of labour productivity and its growth in sectors 
classified by different criteria is slightly different. Calculations are, however, based on consistent figures.
Despite this possible problem, we wish to use the measure of labour 
productivity for the purpose of comparison. Table 6-10 summarises the growth 
of labour productivity in various sectors in post-reform China's industry and 
calculates the reallocation effect.
From the table, we may firstly note that, in China's industrial 
sectors classified by the form of ownership, the reallocation effect on 
aggregate labour productivity growth was negative in 1980-1985 but became 
positive after 1985. The negative reallocation effect in 1980-1985 seems 
mainly due to the fact that labour productivity was highest in state 
enterprises in 1980 but sectoral shifts were against.state industry in 1980-
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1985. For sectors classified by type of activity(light and heavy industry) the 
reallocation effect has been always positive throughout the period of 1980- 
1992, but also small in proportion to overall labour productivity growth in 
the period. For industry when classified by size of enterprises a similar 
situation existed, except in 1988-1992, as that for industry classified by 
form of ownership. The reallocation effect was negative in 1980-1985 but 
became positive after 1985. It is notable that in 1988-1992 labour 
productivity growth was negative in large enterprises and barely existed in 
medium-sized enterprises. However, because these two sectors had a higher 
level of labour productivity than the small industry, the sectoral shift 
towards the large- and medium-sized industrial enterprises in the period has 
actually helped the overall labour productivity growth, to a significant 
degree(68% ) .
The relative labour productivity growth in large- and medium-sized
enterprises and small enterprises seems particularly interesting: when labour
productivity growth was high in all of the three sectors, the reallocation
effect was insignificant(during 1980-1985); when labour productivity growth
slowed down, the reallocation effect became substantial(during 1988-1992).
Overall, labour productivity grew much faster in small enterprises than in
large- and medium-sized enterprises during the period. These relative trends
cast a doubt over whether the sectoral shifts towards small industrial
enterprises in post-reform China was conducive to overall industrial
17productivity growth .
Broadly, we may conclude that the impact of factor reallocation among 
sectors on overall productivity growth has been positive in post-reform
17 The question has been articulated by Peter Nolan: "China’s industrial 
efficiency may well have tended to be dragged down by the proliferation of 
small firms"(Peter Nolan, State and Market in the Chinese Economy, London: 
Macmillan, 1993, p.281).
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China's industry. Given that productivity growth in individual industrial 
sectors was uneven, the positive reallocation effect may be regarded as having 
played an important role in helping China's industry to achieve overall 
productivity growth. However, through the comparison of both sectoral total 
factor productivity and sectoral labour productivity growth we have also found 
that, in a sector with higher productivity, productivity growth was often 
slower than in a sector with lower productivity, and in some cases the 
productivity growth even became negative. To explain this phenomenon, we need 
to consider further characteristics of industrial competition in post-reform 
China, and their implication for productivity growth. This forms the theme of 
our study in Part Three.
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PART T H R E E  
THE P R O C E S S  OF I N T E R A C T I O N
Chapter Seven
Transforming Market Structure in China's Industry
The preceding discussions in Part One and Part Two have demonstrated that 
post-reform China's industry has been able to pursue the effective use of 
productive resources available in the economy and to achieve, in general, a 
degree of productivity growth. The growth of productive resources and 
productivity has been closely associated with a greater market exposure faced 
by China's industrial enterprises, and their pursuit of economic growth has 
been to an increasingly large extent affected by market forces rather than by 
traditional state planning practice.
In the process of post-reform China's industrialisation, the growth 
of productive resources and productivity change were accompanied by a great 
deal of institutional and structural transformation. The traditional major 
actor in China's industry, state enterprises, began to re-shape their 
relationship with government, and non-state enterprises, especially the 
township and village enterprises (TVEs) achieved rapid development. In contrast 
to the reduction of the role of the central planning authorities in the 
economy, regional and local governments have played a more important part 
under decentralisation. Structurally, with changes in market demand and shifts 
in financial resources, the sectoral or branch composition o f •industrial 
production underwent considerable change: the traditional heavy-industry-
188
focused and domestically-oriented structure of production gave rise to a 
light-industry-led and more-outward-orientated pattern.
These institutional and structural changes were all associated with 
a increased role for market forces, and a behaviourial re-orientation of 
enterprises, especially state enterprises. Under the traditional Stalinist 
central planning system, linkages between the market and enterprise activities 
were cut off by the state through all-encompassing plans. Enterprises were 
"de-stimulated" and "disabled’' in their response to changes in market 
conditions including changes in market demand. Any quest for an increase in 
productive resources and productivity growth was thus left mainly to the state 
particularly the central government. Since reforms have empowered enterprises 
to act to an increasingly large degree without the constraints of state plans, 
and endowed enterprises with more of their own independent interests, the task 
of pursuing resource mobilisation and productivity growth has been gradually 
transferred from the state to individual enterprises, though the state still 
maintained great leverage over the final economic growth. In this sense, 
enterprises themselves have assumed or have begun to assume a central role in 
post-reform China’s industrial development.
In Part Three we therefore wish to illuminate one issue of the 
implications of the greater autonomy of enterprises for industrial development 
in post-reform China. The issue can be disentangled into several aspects. 
First, was the greater autonomy for enterprises associated with market 
integration in terms of convergence in market structures? Second, how 
significant were the differences between state and non-state enterprises in 
terms of their behaviour and financial performance? Third, what was the role 
played by regional and local government in post-reform China's industrial 
growth?
The first two questions will be dealt with in Chapter Eight below.
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In this chapter, we will start with a description of the market structure 
facing China's industrial enterprises in early years of the post-reform 
period. This is followed by a profit rate convergence analysis. The purpose 
of the analysis is to show whether and to what extent the perceived greater 
enterprise autonomy has meant that the forces of market integration have 
increased both competition and greater factor mobility. In the second section 
of the chapter, we compare state enterprises with non-state enterprises with 
regard to their structural and behaviourial differences. In the third section, 
we respond to an associated question of how the observed declining profit rate 
in post-reform China's industry was associated with enterprises' pursuit of 
increased use of resources(especially financial resources) and productivity 
growth.
It has been found in our analysis that the behaviour of post-reform 
China's industrial enterprises was still to a certain degree dependent upon 
the direct influence of governments. This finding is in principle consistent 
with the greater role played by regional and local governments in the post­
reform period. To respond to this issue, we consider post-reform regional 
growth and competition in Chapter Eight. We wish to examine how regional and 
local governments have affected industrial development in the post-reform 
period, through their impact on resource mobilisation and productivity growth.
I. Market Structure and Convergence in Returns on Capital
The literature dealing with market structure in a market economy is usually 
concerned with issues such as industrial concentration(the share in an 
industry which is taken by a few firms) and relations between large and small
190
enterprises etc^. When investigating market structure in an economy or 
Industry a frequently used measure is the profit rate. Though the profit rate 
may be affected by a number of factors, it nevertheless has a close 
relationship with market structure characterised by the presence or absence 
of monopolistic firms. Considerable disparities in the profit rate may exist 
between firms within an industry and/or between industries that are with a 
different market structure.
The underlying postulate in the literature is that firms are profit- 
seeking agents, always operating with the incentives of gain. And if there 
were full factor mobility across industry, sharp gaps in the profit rate 
across industrial sectors or branches would tend to disappear. Thus, a 
convergence of the profit rate may reflect two things: the behaviour of firms 
(whether they are profit-oriented) and factor mobility across industries 
(whether there are significant entry barriers).
The convergence analysis seems relevant to post-reform China's 
industrial growth. It would help us to see whether there have been significant 
changes in enterprise behaviour concerning profit-orientation and to what 
extent factor mobility has increased in industry. To the first question, 
whether China's enterprises have had a stronger profit motivation under 
reforms, empirical studies have already produced a good deal of evidence 
confirming a positive answer . However, a further question that may be 
addressed in this respect is whether the profit-oriented behaviour In post­
reform China's industrial enterprises has been associated with any direct 
influence of government agencies. We will come to this question in our
 ^ See Donald A. Hay and Derek. J. Morris, Industrial Economics and 
Organization: Theory and Evidence, Oxford: OUP, 2nd edition, 1991, Ch. 8 and 
Ch. 15.
2
See, Donald Hay, et al, Economic Reform and State-owned Enterprises in 
China 1979-1987. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, Ch. 2 (Enterprise autonomy and 
incentives).
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convergence analysis.
The second question, how far the factor mobility has increased in 
post-reform China’s industry, concerns market integration, especially in 
factor markets including labour and capital. Greater factor mobility means 
more freedom enjoyed by enterprises in allocating resources, with the primary 
aim of seeking gains. If greater factor mobility has facilitated a more 
efficient allocation of resources in terms of resources flowing into areas 
with a higher rate of return, it can be said to have more profoundly 
facilitated resource mobilisation and productivity growth. However, this seems 
to be a question that we must consider with care because, as some note, the 
role of greater factor mobility, together with that impetus of the stronger
profit-orientation, may not necessarily have positive implications for
3
productivity growth in the context of the China's economic system . We will 
examine the issue with special reference to the role of regional government 
in post-reform China's industrial development in the next chapter.
Moreover, we should point out that, apart from indicating profit- 
oriented enterprise.behaviour and factor mobility, any convergence in the 
profit rate would also reflect the process of price reform and its impact on 
price structure. This seems a fairly complex issue. Let us start with a look 
at price structure in the pre-reform period. Some observers have pointed out 
that the price structure in pre-reform China's industry was highly
q
To quote: "[W]ithout price reform and without measures to make the cost 
of capital to enterprise reflect its opportunity cost to the economy, free 
capital flows to the highest financial returns could result in inappropriate 
investments and waste. This problem has already become serious as enterprises, 
banks, local governments, and other administrative entities making investment 
decision become more and more responsive to profitability." William Byrd and 
Gene Tidrick, "Factor Allocation and Enterprise Incentives", in Gene Tidrick 
and Chen Jiyuan, eds. China's Industrial Reform. New York: OUP, 1987, pp.91-92
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Table 7-1. Rate of Return and Growth rate in China's industry
1952 1965 1980 1992
Light industry
Profit rate 40. 2 75.5 60.9 19.8
Annual growth rate 9.3 8.4 14.9
Heavy industry
Profit rate 17.6 22.2 17.9 11.7
Annual growth rate 14.3 9.4 13.1
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e ;  ZGGYJJTJZL 1 9 0 b . p.Ill; and ZGGYJJTJNJ 1 9 9 3 , PP.104 and 15b. Profit rate here is total 
profits and taxes as a ft of fixed assets in original value; for 1952 and 1965 it is of state enterprises only. 
Growth rate is that of GVIO in comparable prices.
distorted^. This may be seen by comparing the profit rate in different 
industrial sectors or branches. In Table 7-1 the profit rates in light and 
heavy industry are compared for the pre- and post-reform periods. It shows 
that up to 1980 light industry had a much higher profit rate than heavy 
industry. In Table 7-2, we compare the profit rates in the mining and 
processing sectors(both of heavy industry) of various products, since 1980. 
This table shows that in 1980 a common feature of the price structure 
prevailing in China's industry was that the products from the mining sector 
were priced relatively low, and processing products were priced relatively
Bela Balassa has concluded as much in the mid-1980s about the price 
structure in China, saying: "Official prices in China are the result of
governmental decisions taken at different points of time and for different 
purposes. They correspond neither to production costs nor to market 
conditions". He also argued that the basic situation has not changed much(up 
to the time at which he was writing) since the price adjustment process that 
began in 1978. See, Bela Balassa, JCE, September 1987
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Table 7-2. Total profit rate in mining and processing industries
1980 1985 1988 1990 1992
Coal
mining 6.1 1 . 2 -0.4 -4.7 -2.1
processing 20.6 16.0 14.0 13.0 11.6
Petroleum
mining 55.8 25.0 7.4 0.2 -1.2
processing 99.3 95.4 56.5 30.8 25.3
Ferrous metals
mining 7.3 16.6 12.3 9.8 9.3
processing 18.3 25.8 23.5 16. 3 15.5
Non-ferrous metals
mining 9.7 9.4 13.0 12.1 5.9
processing 17.2 19.6 19.8 11.9 9.6
Building materials
mining 17.0 14.4 15.3 13.5 9.9
processing 20.8 20.8 17.9 9.2 12.4
Source and note: ZGGYJJTJNJ 1 9 9 3 . pp. 171-79. The total profit rate here is of the same definition in 
Table 7-1. Coal p r o c essing is the e l e c t ricity power industry.
high. From Tables 7-1 and 7-2, we may also note that differences in the profit 
rate between light and heavy industry have become smaller over 1980-1992, but 
that the difference between the mining and processing sectors in heavy 
industry remained wide (except in the building materials industry).
A characteristic of pre-reform China's industrial growth is, however, 
that production growth had only a weak association with the sectoral or inter­
branch differences in profit rate. As can be seen from Table 7-1, though the 
profit rate in light industry was much higher than in heavy industry prior to
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1980, the growth rate of light industry was lower than that of heavy industry. 
This is basically because sectoral or inter-branch growth was under the 
control of the state planning authorities, who were able to decide, in line 
with their development strategy, on the allocation of productive resources. 
The dominance of state enterprises in industry made it possible for the state 
to seek the high monopoly profits in light industry(and some heavy industry) 
by strict control of any unplanned entry into these areas. The heavy-industry- 
focused policy inclination led China to shift these monopolistic gains into 
heavy industry, i.e, by investing heavily in heavy industry in the pre-reform 
period. It is therefore not surprising that heavy industry saw a higher growth 
rate in the pre-reform period.
The basic situation facing China’s industrial enterprises(as well as 
regional and local governments) at the beginning of reforms was, therefore, 
that since there were considerable differentials in sectoral or inter-branch 
profit rates in Industry, the possible gains from reallocating productive 
resources across sectors or branches looked enormously large. The fact that 
light industry achieved faster growth than heavy industry after 1980 is 
associated with the overall difference in the profit rate between light and 
heavy industry. On the other hand, the slower production growth in the mining 
sector in the same period may be also, at least partly, explained by the fact 
that the profit rate in the sector remained relatively low in general(the 
growth rate in the mining sector is not listed in Table 7-2 but can be seen 
from Table 6-6 in the previous chapter).
We may also note from Tables 7-1 and 7-2 that, by 1992, the 
difference in the profit rate between light and heavy industry had become 
smaller, but remained significant between the mining and processing sectors 
in heavy industry. One conclusion we may draw from these comparisons seems to 
be that relative prices or relative profit rates of light and heavy industry
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have been greatly affected by relative growth rates in the two areas, but that 
relative prices or relative profit rates of the mining and processing sectors 
have not, at least not to the same extent as in light and heavy industry. It 
may further imply that the price structure in the mining sector has been less 
reformed, i,e, that the relatively low prices in the mining sector have not 
been sufficiently driven up by higher growth in the sectors which generate 
demand for mining products.
This relative price relation between the mining and processing- 
sectors may at least partly explain the persistent imbalances between supply 
of and demand for mining products in China. The relatively high prices and 
profit rate in non-mining industrial sectors made them attractive for resource 
inflow, while the relatively low prices and profit rate in the mining sector 
has meant growth there lagged behind overall industrial growth. Demand for 
mining products grew in proportion with overall industrial growth and thus 
engendered the shortages in the supply of mining products. As long as the 
prices of mining products remained inflexible, the imbalances persisted, and 
so did the disparities in the profit rate.
It thus becomes clear that transforming both market structure and the 
convergence in the rate of return requires more price flexibility, in addition 
to profit orientation in enterprise behaviour as well as greater factor 
mobility. A disclaimer seems necessary here. We do not actually intend to 
argue for complete price flexibility, complete factor mobility, and complete 
profit orientation in enterprise behaviour here. What we have tried to show 
is that progress made in these three aspects would all help market integration 
and the transformation of the market structure characterised by the 
traditional state enterprise monopoly.
Several observers have suggested that post-reform China’s industry 
has made progress in improving market conditions by showing a tendency towards
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c
a convergence in the rate of return . Some of the observations are made at 
enterprise level, and some at branch level but for state industry only. The 
measures of the rate of return by which convergence is investigated are also 
used differently. It seems necessary to make some clarification of the 
criteria for measuring convergence of rate of return.
First, at what level should we measure convergence in the rate of 
return? This seems dependent on the purpose of the investigation. As we are 
concerned with price structure and market conditions, measurement at branch 
level seems most relevant here. If there is price distortion among sectors, 
say, higher-priced light industry versus lower-priced heavy industry, the 
distortion would mostly be reflected in data at sector level. Given the 
overall disparities at sector level, it is nevertheless possible that, due to 
other factors such as capital intensity, location, and individual performance 
etc, some light industry enterprises could have a lower rate of return and 
some heavy industry enterprises could have a higher rate of return. Data at 
enterprise level may therefore reflect more of the influences of these non- 
relevant variables.
The second issue is about what measure of returns should be used in 
observing any convergence. Conceptually, returns may be either before-tax 
surplus(profits plus product taxes in China) or after-tax surplus(fulfilled 
profits). Because tax schemes have an important impact on the returns to
5
For example, Gary Jefferson and Wenyi Xu find that the coefficient of 
variation in the output-capital ratio of 226 large- and medium-sized 
enterprises fell steadily from 1980 to 1989(see their, "Assessing Gains in 
Efficient Production Among China’s Industrial Enterprises", Economic 
Development and Cultural Change. Vol. 42, No. 3 (April 1994). They also 
examine the coefficient of variation in the rate of return on capital of 352 
state-owned enterprises and find it falling from 1980 to 1987(see their, "The 
Impacts of Reform on Socialist Enterprise in Transition: Structure, Conduct, 
and Performance in China’s Industry", JCE, No. 15 (1991). Based on data at 
branch level(38 state industrial branches), Barry Naughton finds that the 
coefficient of variation in the rate of profit and tax on capital was also 
falling from 1980 to 1989(see his, "Implications of the State Monopoly on 
Industry and its Relaxations", Modern China, Vol. 18, No. 1 (January 1992).
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Table 7-3. Coefficient of variation in rate of return in China's manufacturing
by branch
1980 1985 1988 1992
Total returns on total capital 1.33 1.06 1.14 1.00
exc. tobacco and coking 0.59 0.53 0.38 0.54
Net returns on total capital 0.56 0.41 0.39 0.65
exc. tobacco and coking 0.55 0.39 0.33 0.49
Total returns on fixed assets; 1.95 1.54 1.49 1.23
exc. tobacco and coking 0.62 0.46 0.31 0.35
Net returns on fixed assets 0.60 0.40 0.40 0.60
exc. tobacco and coking 0.59 0.39 0.34 0.47
Total return margin on sales 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.49
exc. tobacco and coking 0.25 0.27 0.23 0.26
Net return margin on sales 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.36
exc. tobacco and coking 0.26 0.25 0.21 0.27
Source and note: ZGGVJJtJNj 1993. Total number of manufacturing branches is JO. Total returns are
profits and product taxes, and net returns are profits only. For measures with sales, profits are those not
adjusted to non-business balances. Total capital is fixed assets net of depreciation plus yearly-average
circulating capital. For measures with capital, profits are the fulfilled profits.
enterprises^, it seems plausible that we should include the product taxes
 ^This is mostly due to the fact that the rate of product tax is usually
fixed at product or branch level in China1s industry . As a result, there are
wide discrepancies in the tax rates among branches, as shown below:
1980 1992
Food products 4.3 2.9
Forage 1.3 1.2
Tobacco 59.5 47.6
Textile 9.1 4.9
Petroleum products 12.9 11.0
Chemicals 7.9 7.7
Ferrous metals 6.4 9.1
Machinery goods 5.5 4.5
Transport equipment 3.4 3.6
Source: ZGGYJJTJNJ 1993.
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when measuring the returns in China's industrial enterprises. On the other 
hand, this question may also be related to the underlying question of the 
objectives of post-reform China’s industrial enterprises. If most of the 
industrial enterprises tended to seek the after-tax surplus, this part of the 
returns would be mostly subject to an equalisation tendency. By the same 
token, if retained profits were the major objective, the rate of return would 
go equal quickly instead. An underlying assumption is that competition between 
enterprises would be a decisive driving force for the convergence trend, if- 
any. Based on these perceptions, we will compare various measures of the rate 
of return, and seek an interpretation that is appropriate to the objectives 
of post-reform China's industrial enterprises.
The results of convergence estimates using several measures of the 
rate of return are summarised in Table 7-3. In the table we have excluded non­
manufacturing branches, mining and utilities. Compared to mining, 
manufacturing is presumably less prone to the influence of factors such as 
location, and perhaps is more capable of making adjustments in capacity. We 
have also noted that there are two extremes: tobacco and coking in China's 
range of manufacturing. The tobacco industry has usually had the highest rate 
of return in various measures, and the coking industry has represented the 
lowest end. The two industries have also had some incomparability with other 
manufacturing branches. In both branches, state enterprises still dominate. 
A monopoly policy has been in effect in the tobacco industry for a long while, 
despite the fact that it has been amongst the few branches that have 
experienced the fastest growth in production and the quickest decline in the 
profit rate in the post-reform period. Its total profit rate was over ten 
times the average level of the whole of industry in 1980, and still seven 
times as great in 1992. In the other extreme, the coking industry suffers from 
a low-price policy that has been aimed at protecting the interests of urban
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consumers. The total profit rate began to fall sharply from the late 1980s, 
resulting in a branch-wide balance-sheet loss record in 1992(the only branch 
in manufacturing that suffered an overall loss). In short, the tobacco and 
coking industries both have some features that are imcompatible with other 
industries. By excluding these two branches, the results of our examination 
can be seen to be indicative of the majority of China’s manufacturing 
production. As we will show below, the two series, i.e., that with the tobacco 
and coking industries and that without, indeed show some differing trends.
Table 7-3 provides results showing both the rate of return on capital 
and the return margin on sales. We will discuss them in order. Firstly, the 
rate of return on capital. For all measures of the rate of return on capital, 
the coefficients of variation become smaller from 1980 to 1988. In the 
remaining years of the period, i.e., 1988 to 1992, there appear to be
different trends for different measures. The coefficient of variation in the 
rate of total returns on total capital and in the same rate on fixed assets 
continued to become smaller for the whole of China’s manufacturing including 
tobacco and coking industries. But when we exclude tobacco and coking 
industries, the coefficient of variation shows a contrasting trend. On the 
other hand, the coefficient of variation in the rate of net return on total 
capital and in the same rate on fixed assets both become larger in 1988-1992, 
and the trends are same for the whole of China's manufacturing and for the 
series that excludes the tobacco and coking industries.
Before moving to discuss the implications of these results, we may 
need to decide which of the four measures would be most appropriate as an 
indicator for our examination. As we have pointed out above, the comparative 
relevance of each measure may be related to what it reveals about trends in 
convergence, i.e., a measure that shows a stronger trend towards convergence 
would be seen to be of more relevance. By this criterion, the rate of total
2 0 0
returns on fixed assets appears to be the most appropriate indicator of the 
four measures. The coefficient of variation in this measure generally 
decreases over 1980-1992 for China’s manufacturing with or without the tobacco 
and coking industries. In contrast, measures of net returns including those 
of total capital and of fixed assets do not show an overall trend of 
convergence for 1980-1992. Though the measure of total returns on total 
capital shows a similar convergence trend as that shown by the measure of 
fixed assets, the magnitude of the changes in the coefficient of variation in 
the former is nevertheless smaller than in the latter(from 1980 to 1992, for 
the whole of manufacturing, the coefficient of variation using the measure of 
total capital reduces from 1.33 to 1.00, and that of the measure on fixed 
assets reduces from 1.95 to 1.23; similar relations exist for manufacturing 
excluding the tobacco and coking industries).
The greater relevance of total returns(profits and product taxes) 
than net returns(fulfilled profits only) to the objectives of post-reform 
China's manufacturing enterprises may suggest that regional and local 
governments had a considerable influence on enterprise behaviour. This is 
equivalent to saying that the inter-branch allocation of capital was 
distributed with more regard to returns in the form of product taxes, and that 
must reflect a strong influence from regional and local governments on 
enterprise behaviour. On the other hand, the capital base may have been 
perceived by post-reform China's enterprises as primarily in the form of fixed 
assets. The use of circulating capital would have been in most cases a 
supplementary means. As we have shown in the previous chapter, the ratio of 
fixed assets to circulating capital varied with branches in post-reform 
China's industry. It seems therefore that the use of circulating capital might 
have been dependent on a number of branch-specific factors such as the 
requirements of inventory, and the intensity of competition within a branch.
2 0 1
Focusing on the rate of total returns on fixed assets, we can note 
that, up to 1988, the coefficients of variation for China’s manufacturing, 
with or without the tobacco and coking industries, became steadily smaller 
after 1980; in 1988-1992, whilst the coefficient of variation continued to 
become smaller for the whole of China’s manufacturing(from 1.49 to 1.23), it 
however became larger for manufacturing without the inclusion of the tobacco 
and coking industries(from 0.31 to 0.35). This implies that for the majority 
of China's manufacturing branches, the convergence trend in the rate of return 
was obstructed in the later years of the period, and the overall continuing 
convergence for the whole of manufacturing industry in 1988-1992 was largely 
contributed to by the falling rate of return in the tobacco industry.
What accounted for the rise in the coefficient of variation of the 
rate of total returns on fixed assets in the majority of China's manufacturing 
branches in 1988-1992? As will be shown in Section III later this chapter, 
virtually every branch in China's industry saw a decline in total returns on 
fixed assets in 1988-1992. The rise in the coefficient of variation in the 
period must therefore be explained by a sharper decline in the rate of return 
in some branches. Of all, the most notable branches include food products, 
forage, textile, fur and leather processing, and timber processing. They all 
suffered a sharp decline in the rate of return on capital in 1988-1992 and all 
are in light industry. A common feature shared by these branches is the 
relatively easy entry to the industry. This is characterised by a low capital 
intensity requirement, and insensitivity to location. Yet all of these 
branches had a higher rate of return on capital than the average level in the 
early 1980s. It is therefore very likely that over-entry or over-production 
caused the sharp decline in the rate of return in these branches over the 
period.
With the return margin on sales, the trend shown by changes, in the
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coefficient of variation in Table 7-3 is somewhat different from that shown 
with the rate of return on capital. By the measure of total return margins 
(profits and product taxes) on sales, in 1980-1992, the coefficient of 
variation became steadily larger for the whole of manufacturing, and moved 
intermittently upwards when we look at manufacturing without the tobacco and 
coking industries. By the measure of net returns(profits only) margin on 
sales, the coefficient of variation became slightly smaller for the whole of 
manufacturing and modestly smaller for manufacturing without tobacco and 
coking in 1980-1988. In 1988-1992, however, the coefficient of variation 
became larger in both cases. The differences between the trends shown in the 
measures of total return margin and net return margin may be, again, ascribed 
to the impact of tax schemes or changes in the tax schemes.
As we have said, the measure of total return margin on sales shows 
a convergence trend for the majority of China's manufacturing branches in 
1980-1988. The margin in the tobacco industry did not fall as much as the rate 
of return on capital. On the other hand, the margin in the coking industry 
fell as sharply as the rate of return on capital. This seems to be the main 
reason for the coefficient of variation for the whole of manufacturing to rise 
in 1980-1992. In the later years of 1988-1992, the reason for the coefficient 
of variation of the return margin for manufacturing excluding the tobacco and 
coking industries rising is similar to that for the rate of total return on 
fixed assets discussed above. The return margins saw a fall in every branch 
of China's manufacturing during the period, but some branches experienced a 
faster fall, and that results in the enlarged variance between branches. The 
branches which had such experience, apart from the coking industry, were food 
products, forage, textiles, fur and leather processing, and timber processing, 
similar to the result in the measure of rate of total return on fixed assets 
which we looked at earlier. The underlying driving forces are therefore
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considered to be the same in both cases: the easy entry facilitates expansion 
of production which in turn leads to increases in supply overshadowing 
increases in demand, resulting in severe downward pressures on the return 
margin.
To summarise the above discussion on the convergence trend in the 
rate of return in post-reform China's industry, we may note that, in general, 
there seems to be a distinct convergence trend in the returns on capital in 
manufacturing over 1980-1992. This would imply that inter-branch competition 
has intensified in a way which allows the allocation of capital resources to 
be pursued with regard to differentials in the returns on capital. In the 
later years of 1988-1992 the convergence trend seems to have been, however, 
obstructed by some degree of "over-competition" in several light industrial 
branches. Meanwhile, the convergence trend measured by the returns on sales 
margin seems weaker than that measured by the returns on capital. This would 
imply that price reform or any improvement in the price structure was slower 
than the process of decentralization. In other words, decentralization has 
shown a greater impact on inter-branch allocation of capital than on inter­
branch price structure. Overall, our analysis suggests that reforms have 
facilitated the transformation of market structure by promoting competition, 
relaxing entry barriers(particularly in light industry), as well as endowing 
enterprises and regional/local governments with a stronger profit-seeking 
motivation(in a broad sense). However, on the other hand, signs of unbalanced 
evolution in market structure are also being seen.
II. State versus Non-State Enterprises
Relations between state and non-state enterprises are an important aspect of 
post-reform China's industry. State enterprises used to be the pillar of
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socialist China's industry in the pre-reform period: they were a provider of 
major industrial products, and the single main source of fiscal revenue. In 
return, state enterprises received great support and protection from the 
state, such as low-cost funding and market dominance. Compared to collective 
enterprises that existed sparsely in peripheral areas in the economy, state 
enterprises were urban-oriented, more capital-intensive, technologically 
advanced, and had a more skilled labour force. Since the later 1970s when 
reforms began, however, state industry has apparently fallen behind non-state, 
industry in growth. In 1979-1992, the average growth rate in non-state 
industry is over 30% annually, almost four times as high as in state industry, 
resulting in the share of state enterprises in the gross value of industrial 
output falling from 78% to 48%. Meanwhile, massive balance-sheet losses began 
to mount in state industrial enterprises. By 1992, about one quarter of state 
independently-accounting industrial enterprises reported a loss, and the 
losses suffered by state enterprises accounted for over three-quarters of the 
total losses in all independently-accounting Industrial enterprises.
The sharply contrasting growth between state and non-state 
enterprises raises a question about the relative performance of state Industry 
compared to non-state industry. In particular, the question may be addressed 
in the way which we set forth in the previous section: did the relative 
performance of state versus non-state industry conform to the general trend 
of convergence in behaviour and performance in post-reform China's enterprises 
overall? In other words, is there a convergence trend in performance between 
state and non-state industry? In answering the question, we are concerned with 
the issue of structural and behaviourial differences between state and non-
7
state enterprises . In what follows, we will firstly compare some overall 
7
This however does not mean that we have claimed that state-owned 
enterprises are fundamentally different from, say, collective enterprises in 
organizational status and behaviour. To some observers, there seem to be
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financial indicators for state and non-state industry, and then examine some 
important structural and behaviourial factors that affect the relative 
performance of state and non-state industry. The discussion below serves as 
a supplementary description to the previous section and is therefore rather 
brief.
As shown in Table 7-4, there seems to be a convergence tendency in 
the rate of return on capital between state and non-state industry(collective 
and joint-ownership industry). From 1980 to 1992, the variance in rates of 
return among the three forms of ownership became considerably smaller(from 
238.7 to 17.1). This change has certainly embodied some effects of the overall 
decline in the rate of return on capital, but does also reflect the 
diminishing dispersion in the rate of return on capital among the various 
forms of ownership. Notably, the rate of return on capital fell at the same 
speed in state industry and in collective industry in 1980-1992. The main 
cause for the diminishing dispersion is therefore the rate of return on 
capital in joint-ownership industry, which fell faster in the period.
Compared to state and collective industry, the joint-ownership 
industry is the only one that saw a unfavourable move in the capital-output 
ratio(it is expressed in inverse terms in Table 7-4), and its price margin 
fell relatively slowly. This seems to imply that some structural factors had 
an important impact on the changes in joint-ownership industry. For instance,
complete dissimilarities between the two categories: SOEs are profit-
apathetic, administratively-backed, and innovation-incapable, while COEs are 
profit-greedy, cinderella-like, and full of creativity(see, for example, James 
B, Stepanek, "China's Enduring State Factories: Why Ten Years of Reform Have 
Left China's Big State Factories Unchanged", in USCJEC, ed. China's Economic 
Dilemmas in the 1990s, Washington, DC: Vol. II, 1991). A more recent account 
has however emphasised the wide links between local governments and township 
and village enterprises(TVEs), the backbone force in COEs(see Barry Naughton, 
"Chinese Institutional Innovation and Privatization from Below", in AER, Vol. 
84, No. 2 (May 1994)). It is also found that many of the TVEs are actually 
"state-owned"(see Dwight H. Perkins, China's 'Gradual' Approach to Market 
Reforms, Discussion Papers No 52, UNCTAD, 1992, p.20).
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Table 7-4. Rate of return in industry by form of ownership, 1980-1992
1980 1985 1988 1992
State
total returns on fixed assets 24.3 22.2 20.2 12.4
GVIO/fixed assets ratio 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1
price margin 26.4 24.0 20.9 17.3
Collective
total returns on fixed assets 38.4 34.7 27.4 19.6
GVIO/fixed assets ratio 2.4 2,4 2.5 2.6
price margin 19.3 18.5 16.0 14.3
Joint Ownership
total returns on fixed assets 55.2 42.7 32.7 20.8
GVIO/fixed assets ratio 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.2
price margin 23.3 21.7 17.9 18.2
Variance in total returns on f.a. 238.7 105.1 39.1 17.1
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  ZGGY3JTJNJ 19!) j , pp. 129 and I b b . Total returns are fulfilled profits and product taxes, 
and fixed assets are year-end sums valued at p u r chase costs. Price margins are p rofits plus product taxes as 
a p e r c entage of the revenue of sales.
it would be possible that joint-ownership industry moved in a direction that 
was towards more capital-intensive production, that had relatively high price 
margins but a relatively low rate of return on capital. Also, it is
interesting to note that compared to collective and joint-ownership industry,
0
state industry had a relatively high price margin though its returns on 
capital was relatively low. This again would imply that some structural
Q
Except for 1992 when the price margins were higher in joint-ownership 
industry than in state industry. The main reason for this would be that in 
that year some of state enterprises with higher price margins had been 
transferred to joint-ownership status.
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factors would have been acting. For instance, it would be possible that state 
enterprise would still dominate some branches with higher price margins, but 
in some other markets state enterprises would have encountered intensified 
competition from non-state enterprises, which have badly affected their 
monopolistic positions.
Fig 7-1. Some Characteristics of COEs
1— —1 Averages of 13 COE-intensive branches 
DUD Averages of all branches 
a,Capital-labour ratio b .Size ratio
000 yuan,1992 
25
13
%, 1990
17
c.Total returns on fixed assets
1980
52
33
1992
16
17
Source and note: The criterion for a branch to be COE-intensive is that non-state enterprises occupy 
a share of over 50t either in gross output or in employment(TJNJ 1993, pp.410, 417 and 426). They include: 
textiles, clothing, fur and leather products, timber processing, furniture, cultural and educational goods, 
crafts, plastics, building materials, metal products, electricity tools, electronics, and miscellaneous goods. 
The size ratio is the percentage share of the first two or three top groups of enterprises, by fixed assets, 
in gross output(ZGGYJJTJNJ 1992, p p . 373-381).
A most important structural difference between state and non-state 
enterprises is that their participation in industrial activities varies with 
industrial branches. In some branches, state enterprises maintained their 
dominant position whilst in some others non-state enterprises became a 
significant competitor. In 1992, out of 40 branches, there are 13 branches in 
which non-state enterprises had over a 50% share in either gross output or 
employment, and 17 in which state enterprises occupied over three-quarters of
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gross output or of employment. Compared to state industry, non-state industry 
is relatively concentrated in its range of production over industrial 
branches . This structural difference between state industry and non-state 
industry may be explained by some inter-branch characteristics. In particular, 
the capital-labour ratio, the size, and the rate of return are considered to 
be particularly relevant. As shown in Fig 7-1, the 13 COE-intensive branches 
were significantly different to the state-dominant branches (represented by 
the average level in Fig 7-1) in these characteristics. The capital-labour 
ratio in COE-intensive branches was much lower than the average level, and so 
was the size ratio. This suggests that the COE-intensive branches were "easy 
entry" branches as they required relatively low capital intensity and capital 
scale. Moreover, the COE-intensive branches were also those that had an above- 
average-level rate of return on capital in 1980, when the growth of non-state 
industry began to accelerate. Overall, it seems that capital constraints and 
enterprise objectives have both had impacts on the structural difference 
between non-state and state industry.
The capital constraints facing non-state enterprises can be 
interpreted in relative terms. Compared to state enterprises, non-state 
enterprises, especially collective enterprises, would usually have limited 
access to funding sources or capital markets. The entry of COEs to industrial 
activities would therefore be subject to restrictions in scale of funding. 
Because of the lack of sufficient access to capital markets, non-state 
enterprises were less able to enter some branches that had a higher 
requirement for capital even if there was higher profitability in those 
branches. As a result, the role of inter-branch differentials in the rate of 
return could therefore be overshadowed by the role of capital constraints even
g
Using the data of 1992 sales of 30 main branches, it is found that the 
coefficient of variation in branch shares for state industry is 0.95 while it 
is 1.27 for non-state industry.
209
Table 7-5. Means and variances of financial indicators for state and non-state 
industry 1992
State Non-state
Rate of return on capital: mean 10.97 13.23
variance 1.70 0.99
Rate of return on sales: mean 17.27 17.91
variance 1.04 0.56
Non-operation balances as a % of sales: mean 5.55 5.99
variance 0.19 0.07
Losses as a % of sales: mean 2.87 1.98
variance 0.06 0.01
Circulating fund/fixed asset ratio: mean 1.36 1.70
variance 4.39 3.92
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  TJNJ 1991 and 1993, and ZGGYJJTJNJ 1993. Data of state industry by branch are from 
T J N J . They consist of 23 manufacturing branches that are the base of our calculations. Figures for non-state 
enterprises are branches' total sums deducted by state enterprises'. Losses as a % of sales is of 1990.
if non-state enterprises had a stronger motivation towards profit-seeking than 
state enterprises. The fact that by 1992 the rate of return on capital in COE- 
intensive branches fell below the average level implies some degree of over­
entry of non-state enterprises to these branches.
On the other hand, the growth of state industry would also be 
naturally unbalanced as some would suffer intensified competition from non­
state enterprises and others would continue to enjoy state protection though 
to a diminishing extent. The unbalanced nature of growth in state industry can 
be exemplified by larger variances of financial performance(in several 
indicators) in state industry than in non-state industry. Table 7-5 compares 
means and variances of several financial indicators between state and non­
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state industry using 1992 inter-branch data. It shows that, compared to non­
state industry, state industry had a lower mean but a higher variance in these 
indicators: the rate of return on capital, the rate of return on sales, non­
operation balances as a % of sales, and the ratio of circulating capital to 
fixed assets. The case of losses as a % of sales seems slightly different from 
others. But if we take into account mining branches which are not included in 
the compilation for Table 7-5, a similar result emerges^. All of these 
results indicate that state industrial enterprises were more dissimilar to 
each other than to non-state industrial enterprises in financial performance. 
In other words, non-state industrial enterprises performed in a more coherent 
manner than state industrial enterprises. In this sense, the convergence trend 
in performance may be considered to be less apparent for state industry than 
either that for non-state industry or that between state and non-state 
industry.
The above description is mainly dealing with structural differences 
between state and non-state industry. There seems however to be some more 
fundamental, behaviourial differences between state and non-state enterprises. 
Though they have gained increasing autonomy over their production plans and 
pricing policy, as well as financial independence, state enterprises are still 
committed to full employment at a designated level regardless of changes in 
demand and output. To state enterprises, "[d]ismissal to cut costs remains
That is because state industry suffered its severest losses in several 
branches but in other branches its position seems not worse than non-state 
industry:
Losses as a % of sales
State Non-state 
Coal, petroleum mining, and coking 15,20 1.59
All other branches 2.05 2.08
Source and note: same as Table 7-5.
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Figure 7-2. Employment in SOEs and TVEs (in industry)
1988
a. Growth rate of GVIO
1989
b. Employment
1990
25%
SOEs
60 mil 
TVEs
Source and note: TJNJ 1993, pp.52, 107 and 395.
illegal"^. On the other hand, non-state enterprise, especially TVEs, have
been less tied up with the task of stabilising employment either because local
1?administrative bodies are generally unable to do so or management in TVEs
13is much less willing to accept the costs incurred therewith . This
Christopher Howe, "Foreword", in Korzec Michael, Labour and the 
Failure of Reform in China. London: Macmillan and St Martin Press, 1992, p.ix. 
It may be noted however that in urban China there is wide concern over 
possible massive unemployment if SOEs are fully empowered with free dismissal 
on a cost reduction basis. In particular, effective safeguard measures dealing 
with lay-offs from SOEs have been developed relatively slowly in post-reform 
China(see, for example, A. B. Atkinson, Unemployment Insurance and Economic 
Reform in China, CP No 7, STIRCED, London School of Economics, 1993).
1 ? See, Dwight H. Perkins, China’s 'Gradual* Approach to Market Reforms, 
op.cit. Perkins stresses particularly that unlike the central government that 
can have various fiscal and credit means, local governments have to "jettison" 
loss-making TVEs to reorganize their limited financial resources(p.21) .
11
See Patrick Bolton, Privatization, and the Separation of Ownership and 
Control, Discussion Paper, London: CEA Conference, December 1993. Behaviourial 
characteristics of TVEs in this respect are also described in the following 
publications: Martin Weitzman and C.Xu, "Chinese Township Village Enterprises 
as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives", JCE, October 1993; William Byrd and Ling 
Quingsong, eds. China’s Rural Industry: Structure. Development and Reform, New 
York: OUP, 1990.
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behaviourial difference is certainly reflected in relations between output 
growth and changes in employment in state industry and industrial TVEs. As 
shown in Fig 7-2, in 1989-1992 when China's industry was under retrenchment, 
the growth rate of GVIO fell sharply. Changes in employment in state industry 
and TVEs moved however in opposite directions in the period: the number of 
wage-workers continued to increase in state industry but employees in TVEs 
were reduced. As a matter of fact, the output growth rate in state industry 
(3%) was much lower than that in TVEs(10%) in these two years. In the light 
of reforms that have made progress in transforming many other aspects of SOEs' 
behaviour, the commitment to maximum employment that remains for most SOEs can 
therefore be regarded as the main cause of the "long-term loss"^ in state 
industry.
Our main conclusion from above discussion is that structural and 
behaviourial factors that differ between state and non-state industry have 
interacted in affecting the relative performances in the post-reform period. 
On the structural side, state industry has some advantages over non-state 
industry due to the continued protection it receives from governments, and the 
capital constraints facing non-state industry. On the behaviourial side, non­
state enterprises seem to have a stronger profit-seeking motivation and face 
less restrictions in their adjustment of factor use(including employment) to 
market forces, that enables them to be in a better competing position than
SOEs. As a result, overall, the convergence trend in non-state industry is
more clearly marked than in state industry.
III. Falling Profit Rate in China's Industry: Causes and Implications
^  A term used in Donald Hay et al, Economic Reform and State-Owned 
Enterprises in China 1979-1987, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993
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The falling profit rate in post-reform China's industry has been a widely 
noted issue. Official Chinese statistics often quote two measures of the rate 
of return for China's industry: the profits and product tax on GVIO, and that 
on total capital. By either of the two measures, the profit rate in China's 
industry as a whole declined considerably in 1980-1992. The former fell from 
23% in 1980 to 10% in 1992, and the latter from 25% to 10% in the same period.
Table 7-6. International comparison of profit rate, 1980-1991
1980 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
China 14.9 8.9 8.2 5.7 3.0 2.9
Germany 4.0 5.5 5.6 5.4 5.4
Japan 7.6 8.9 9.3 9.3 9.0 9.2
Korea 6.8 8.4 8.1 7.8 7.4 7.8
UK 6.7 14.1
USA 11.6 13.7
Source and note: The profit rate for China has been adjusted to profits only as a % of GVI0(2GGYJJTJNJ 
1 9 9 3 , pp. 129 and 142). For Germany, Japan, and Korea, the profit rate is the net o p erating surplus as a $ of 
gross output in manufacturing; for UK and USA, the denominator is value added. For all countries other than 
China: the UN, National Accounts S t a t i s t i c s . 1991 and 1993.
The falling profit rate in China's industry seems particularly
extraordinary when compared with other countries’ experience over the same
period(Table 7-6). In calculating the rate of return, we take the measure of
total net surplus for China's industry, which is the nearest counterpart in
Chinese statistics to the net operating surplus in the United Nations'
11national accounting system . By this measure, we see the rate of return 
11 Use of the rate of return on capital seems preferable to the use of 
the rate of return on gross output for the purpose of international 
comparison. However, even in the UN statistics, there are a wide range of
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declined sharply in China's industry over 1980-1991, when no similar trend can 
be found for all other countries in the table. The comparison made with the 
year 1980 may be questionable, because it is a year when the industrial 
countries suffered from the recession and therefore the rate of return was 
relatively low for these countries. However, even focusing on the period of 
1987-1991 only, we can still see that the trend is quite different for China 
and for other countries. While it was rather stable in Germany, Japan, and 
Korea, the rate of return continued to decline in China's industry over the 
five years, with a record low level at 3% in 1991. It is clear that the rate 
of return in post-reform China's industry deteriorated.
Many observers have attributed the falling profit rate to a number
of structural factors, such as intensified competition in China's industrial
markets, and changes in relative prices for industrial output and input goods,
as well as rising labour costs in industry^. Some economists have also
related it to the issue of the performance of post-reform China's industry,
17particularly that of state-owned enterprises . It appears however that most 
of these interpretations have been based on some casual observations. We wish 
to seek a systematic examination of the issue using official statistical 
figures.
Our analysis is as follows: first, we shall give a brief description 
of the situation and identify categorically the main factors that precipitated
discrepancies in individual countries' measures of capital stock, that render 
the rate of return on capital incompatible between countries.
^  See William A. Byrd, Chinese Industrial Firms under Reform. New York: 
OUP, 1991, p.26; Athar Hussain and Nicholas Stern, Economic Reforms and Public 
Finance in China, Discussion Paper CP/23, STICERD, London School of Economics, 
1992, pp.21-22; Barry Naughton, "Monetary Implication of Balanced Economic 
Growth and the Current Macroeconomic Disturbances in China", in China's 
Contemporary Economic Reforms as a Development Strategy, ed. by Dieter Cassel, 
Gunter Heiduk, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1992, p.115
17
Jeffrey Sachs and Wing Thye Woo, "Reform in China and Russia", 
Economic Policy. No. 18 (1994)
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the falling profit rate in post-reform China's industry. The main indicators 
that we have identified are sharply-increasing negative non-operation 
balances, excessive use of circulating funds, and the convergence trend in the 
rate of sales' surplus on fixed assets. The behavioral and structural factors 
behind these indicators will be examined subsequently.
In the following study, we will focus on the measure of fulfilled 
profits on total capital. Our analysis will in the first instance follow a 
categorical decomposition of the measure in order to identify some main and 
directly observable explainatory factors. Categorically, the measure of 
fulfilled profits on total capital is related to three other measures by a 
differencing item in Chinese statistics: (1) profits recorded in the operation 
account(i .e ., the sales' account) in proportion to total capital, and the 
differencing item is non-operation balances; (2 ) fulfilled profits in 
proportion to fixed assets, and the differencing item is the circulating fund; 
(3) as a combined version of the first two measures, profits generated in the 
operation account in proportion to fixed assets, and the combined differencing 
items are non-operation balances and the circulating fund. Table 7-7 itemises 
the rates of change in 1980-1992 by these measures.
Table 7-7. Measuring returns on capital in China's industry(%)
1980 1985 1988 1992
Fulfilled profits/total capital
00sfi—1 11.5 8.9 3.3
Sales profits/total capital 15.8 13.2 12.3 8.4
Fulfilled profits/fixed assets 24.7 19.7 16.0 6.9
Sales profits/fixed assets 26.4 22.7 22.0 17.5
Source: ZGGYJJTJNJ 1993, pp.103-142.
216
Table 7-8. Explaining the fall in fulfilled profits on total capital in 1980- 
1992
Fall in various measures in 
1992 (%)
1980- Explaining the fall in fulfilled 
profits/total capital (%)
I. Fulfilled profits/total 77.7 By falls in II-IV 100.0
capital
II. Sales profits/fixed 33.7 By fall in II 43.4
assets
III. Sales profits/total 46.8 By increase in negative non­ 14.4
capital operation balances
IV. Fulfilled profits/fixed 72.1 By increase in circulating 42.2
assets fund
Source: See Table 7-7 and the text.
With the conceptual relations described above, we are now able to 
describe changes in fulfilled profits on total capital in terms of the changes 
which occurred in the other three measures. This is done in Table 7-8. The 
right panel shows falls in the four measures in a percentage ratio for 1980- 
1992. They are the results of straightforward calculation of the change rate 
by end-points. In the right panel are the relative percentage weights of the 
change rates of measures II to IV in the change rate of fulfilled profits on 
total capital. The calculation is at two levels. It firstly calculates the 
weight of the change rate in sales profits on fixed assets(dividing I by II), 
and the residual can be regarded as the combined weights of the change rates 
of measures III and IV. The former is 43.4%(listed in the table) and the 
combined weights are 56.6%(not listed in the table). At the second level, the 
56.6% is further split into measures III and IV, i.e., between the two 
differencing items, non-operation balances and circulating fund. The result 
is that besides the effect of the fall in sales profits on fixed assets, the 
increase in negative non-operation balances accounts for 14.4% of the fall in 
fulfilled profits on total capital, and the increase in the use of circulating
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funds accounts for another 42.2% of the fall.
Having identified those elements directly responsible for the 
declining fulfilled profits on total capital, we shall further explore the 
factors behind them. The discussion below is divided into consideration of 
these individual differencing elements, in three sections.
1. Non-Operation Balances
This is the differencing element between fulfilled profits and sales profits. 
As shown in Table 7-8, 14.4% of the overall fall in fulfilled profits on total 
capital can be attributed to the increase in the negative non-operational 
balances. This is quite significant but has nevertheless often been neglected. 
Official Chinese statistics do not provide any details of non-operation 
accounts, and perhaps this is the main reason for its omission.
Table 7-9. Non-operation balances in China' s industry, 100 million yuan
Profits from 
sales
Fulfilled
profits
Non-operation
balances
As a % of sale 
revenue
1980 750.4 701.1 -49.4 1.1
1985 1072.5 929.4 -143.1 1.8
1988 1634.7 1189.9 -444.8 3.2
1989 1506.0 1000.3 -505.6 3,2
1990 1187.3 559.8 -627.5 3,7
1991 1650.3 642.8 -1007.6 4.9
1992 2473.0 972.4 -1500.7 5.8
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  For profits from sales and fulfilled profits, see the Z O g V jJTJNJ 1 9 9 1 , p.12SI. N o n ­
operation balances are the profits from sales s u btracting from the fulfilled profits.
218
It is however possible to estimate the amount and changing trend of 
the non-operation balances from existing statistics. By definition, fulfilled 
profits are profits from the sales account (sales revenue after deducting 
costs and product taxes) minus non-operation balances. Data of fulfilled 
profits and sales profits are readily available in Chinese statistics. Table 
7-9 shows that non-operation balances see an overall accelerating trend, as 
measured in their percentage proportion to sales revenue, in 1980-1992. This 
seems to suggest that there are some common persistent factors behind the 
pervasive increase in negative non-operation balances among China's industrial 
enterprises.
Statistically, non-operation balances are the results of balancing 
revenue and outlay in non-operation accounts. In general, most enterprises can 
be assumed to have non-operation revenue and non-operation outlay at a same 
time. An increase in negative non-operation balances would therefore imply a 
faster increase in non-operation outlay than non-operation revenue. Why and 
how could it happen? Changes in Chinese legislation concerning accounting 
management and enterprise financial independence could be an answer. In pre­
reform years, non-operation outlay legitimately contained items such as loss 
from stoppage of work, write-off of surplus goods, loss from experimental 
failure, and outlay for schooling of staff dependents, etc. These would stay 
fairly stable in proportion to growth of production. New regulations 
introduced since the mid-1980s have however actually extended the range of 
non-operation outlay by explicitly excluding some items from the normal 
operation account. For instance, interest payments for capital construction 
loans can no longer be accounted for under business expenditures. In addition, 
it is stipulated in the new regulations that all expenses that are deemed not 
to do with productive activities cannot be disbursed from the normal business 
account. This is in reality nothing less than to allow for change in
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accounting practice: expenses or expenditures to do with non-productive
purposes can be now legally accommodated or covered under non-operation 
outlay..
Main new items in non-operation outlay may include: interest payments 
and penalties; various fees and fines imposed by governmental agencies 
concerning enterprises’ social and environmental liabilities etc; "ex gratia" 
contributions made to various organizational bodies; implicit subsidies to 
employees including managers. The last two elements would particularly be 
important when tax schemes are considered. As an increase in non-operation 
outlay would help reduce enterprises' liability in enterprise income tax(not 
the liability in product taxes which may be reduced only by a legitimate 
increase in production costs in the business account), China's enterprises 
have certain incentives to increase their non-operation outlay especially for 
the purpose of the implicit transfer of income.
2. Circulating Fund
Circulating capital is the differencing item between fulfilled profits on 
total capital and that on fixed assets. As shown in Table 7-8, from 1980 to 
1992, the increase in use of the circulating fund led to a fall in fulfilled 
profits on total capital of 42.2%. This is remarkably high by any standard. 
If China's industrial enterprises had used the circulating fund at a constant 
ratio to their use of fixed assets over the period, the fulfilled profits on 
total capital would have fallen only by 57.8%, maintaining a level of some 
8.1% instead of 3.3% in 1992.
Table 7-10 shows that the ratio of the circulating fund to fixed 
assets rose considerably in China's industry over 1980-1992. Similarly to the 
case of non-operation balances, all types of industrial enterprises, except
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Table 7-10. Ratio of circulating fund to fixed assets
All industry 1980 1992
1980 0.7 State 0.6 0.9
1985 0.7 Collective 1.5 1.8
1987
00o Joint-ownership 2.0 1.5
1988 0.8 Light 1.0 1.6
1989 0.9 Heavy 0.6 0.9
1990 1.0 Large 0.5 0.7
1991 1 .1 Medium 0.6 1.3
1992 1.1 Small 1.0 1.6
Source and note: Circulating fund is y e a r l y - a v e r a g e ”?ull circulating fund, see Table A5-9; fixed assets 
are year-end stock of fixed assets net of d e p reciation etc, see the ZGGYJJTJNJ 1 9 9 3 , p . 103.
for joint-ownership enterprises, saw a rising ratio of the circulating fund 
to fixed assets in the period. The joint-ownership enterprises had the highest 
ratio in 1980, and their level(1.5) in 1992, although decreased, was still far 
above the average level(l.l). It appears that by 1992 the ratio of circulating 
capital to fixed assets had adjusted to be much more equal over all the types 
of China's industrial enterprises, yet at a higher average level than in 1980.
Indeed we have found that the variation of relative use of 
circulating capital to fixed assets at branch level became smaller in 1980- 
1992. The coefficient of variatlon(CV) and mean of the ratio of (quota) 
circulating fund to fixed assets for 30 Chinese manufacturing branches in
1980-1992 are:
CV Mean(%)
1980 0.56 88.6
1985 0.54 80.5
1988 0.46 81.4
1992 0.41 87.5
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This again suggests that there were some common factors affecting China’s 
industrial enterprises’ use of the circulating fund in relation to their use 
of fixed capital. These factors may include changes in the function of the 
circulating fund, and unbalanced reforms in financial markets concerning both 
the circulating fund and fixed capital.
Traditionally, the function of the circulating fund is to finance
enterprise inventory needs which supposedly vary with branches. Rising
inflation expectations and increasing difficulties in sales in the post-reform
period have however motivated China's industrial enterprises to stock more
both of raw materials and finished goods. There is a good deal of evidence
18since the mid-1980s which confirms this trend in China . Rising inflation
expectations is an indication of the deterioration of macroeconomic
environment in China while increasing difficulties in sales may reflect
intensified competition in industrial markets. Besides this change, that is
still within the traditional function of the circulating fund, there were some
new distinctive uses of the fund. One was to use the circulating fund as a
last resort, by which loss-making enterprises could escape from instant
bankruptcy and poor-performing enterprises could falsely maintain their
financial status in a false form. A survey conducted in 1990 shows that, in
a province, about 10% of the circulating fund was used to patch up an implicit
10
balance-sheet loss by enterprises . Another was to use the circulating fund 
18 Yang Xitian, 1992. ’’Danqian gongye qiye zijing liudong zhuangkuang ji 
hebi xingdai zhengzhe duizhe" (Current Situations of Industrial Enterprises' 
Cash Flow and Counter-measures of Monetary and Credit Policy), in Shen 
Peiliang, ed. Zhongguo jingrong galke he hebi zhengzhe (Financial Reforms and 
Monetary Policy in China), Beijing: Jingji gaike chubanshe, p.356; the Policy 
Research Department of the State Council, "Guanyu liudong zijing zhuangkuang 
de fenxi" (Analysis of Current Situations of Circulating Fund), in Wu 
Jingliang, ed. Zhongguo iingji de dongtai fenxi he duizhe yanjiu (Studies in 
China’s Economic Changes and Counter-measures), Beijing: Zhongguo renmin 
daixue chubanshe, 1989, pp.106-112; and William A. Byrd, o p .cit., pp.75, 134 
and 288-295.
19 Yang Xitian, o p .cit.
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as a disguise for actual investment in fixed assets, though this was employed
to a lesser degree. An estimate based on a survey in 1985 concludes that about
2% of the circulating fund was used for investment in fixed assets in a 
20province .
As we can see from Table 7-10, the rise in the ratio of the use of
circulating fund to the use of fixed capital began after 1985. This coincides
with China's financial reforms that have partially commercialized the banking
sector in the area of circulating fund loans. While the state still maintained
tight or relatively tight control on long-term capital markets, i.e., the
investment fund for fixed asset construction, banking institutions have been
allowed a larger degree of autonomy in operating their short-term capital
finance in the form of circulating fund loans. Meanwhile, regional/local
governments gained increasingly substantial access to short-term capital
markets by influencing the behaviour of decentralized banking institutions in
their individual administrative territories. Several economists have warned
in the later 1980s that with these partial financial reforms traditional "soft
21budget constraints" began to change into "soft lending constraints" . To be 
more precise, the difference is that the lending constraints are softer in 
circulating fund markets than in fixed capital markets, and this why China's 
industrial enterprises were able to increase their use of the circulating fund 
faster than their use of fixed capital, after the mid-1980s.
3. Sales Profits on Fixed Assets
The fall in sales profits on fixed assets contributed over 43% of the overall 
The Policy Research Department of the State Council, op.cit.
21 Bruce Reynolds, ed. Chinese Economic Reform: How Far, How Fast?, New 
York: Academic Press, 1988
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decline in fulfilled profits on total capital in China's industry during the 
period 1980-1992, as shown in Table 7-8. It is the largest single factor that 
affected the changes in industrial profitability and therefore it merits more 
of our attention.
We may firstly note that in 1980-1992 there appears to be a 
convergence tendency for returns on fixed assets among China's industrial 
branches, as shown below(Table 7-11). Some branches with higher sales profits 
on fixed assets in 1980 saw the rate declining by 1992(typical branches 
include the tobacco and clothing industries etc), and some branches with lower 
sales profits on fixed assets in 1980 saw the rate rising by 1992(typical 
branches include the machinery and transport equipment industries etc) . Unlike 
the ratio of circulating fund to fixed assets, the narrowing variance in sales 
profits on fixed assets is moving around a smaller mean, i.e., the overall 
rate has been declining over the period.
Table 7-11. Sales profits on fixed assets
Coefficient of variation Mean(%)
1980 0.56 46.4
1985 0.36 35.5
1988 0.34 31.8
1992 0.35 24.9
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  ZGGYJJTjNJ 199 1 . Calculations exclude maximum and minlauffi extremes in 30 manufacturing 
branches.
There were a number of factors that might have had certain impact on 
the changes in sales profits on fixed assets, such as growth in the capital 
base, rising labour costs, and rising relative prices of industrial materials. 
We examine these factors briefly in order. Firstly, growth in the capital 
base.
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Table 7-12. Regression of changes in profit rate on capital growth
Form of 
estimation
Est. of 
parameter
t-value adj F statistic D-W
statistic
p = aA -0.90 -3.85 0.36 14.82 1.66
P = 3B -0.76 -4.68 0.46 21.88 1.91
Source and note: p -- change in sales profits on fixed assets in 19^0-1992; A —  change in fixed assets 
per worker in 1980-1992; B -- change in fixed assets in 1980-1992(in current prices). The total number of 
manufacturing branches in regression is 26(tobacco, forage, petroleum and coking branches are excluded because 
of their extreme nature). All variables are in logarithm. Because of the collinearity between A and B, the 
regression is carried out separately for the two variables. All data are from ZGGYJJTJNJ 1993.
The results of a regression of changes in sales profits on growth in 
fixed assets using branch data clearly shows that there is a negative 
correlation between changes in the two(Table 7-12). An interpretation is that 
a branch undergoing faster growth in its capital base(measured either in total 
scale or in average level per worker) would also see its sales profits on 
fixed assets falling faster; on the other hand, a branch undergoing slower 
growth in its capital base would see its sales profits on fixed assets also 
falling slower(or maybe rising).
This correlation would imply an overall falling trend in sales 
profits on fixed assets in China's manufacturing as the capital base saw a 
fast growth over the period under study. It does not however necessarily mean 
that inter-branch variation around the overall declining profitability would 
become smaller as well. This could come into being only with an uneven growth 
in the capital base among branches, i.e., if lower-capital-based branches grew 
faster than higher-capital-based branches. This is indeed the case for China's 
manufacturing in 1980-1992. We use a standard of 1980 to divide all China's 
manufacturing branches into capital-intensive and labour-intensive branches,
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and find that fixed assets per worker grew faster in labour-intensive 
branches(defined as having fixed assets per worker lower than industrial 
average level) than in capital-intensive branches over the period 1980-1992: 
that of 17 labour-intensive branches increased at 4.84% annually, and that of 
13 capital-intensive branches at 2.84 annually. As sales profits on fixed 
assets were negatively associated with the level of fixed assets per worker, 
this would certainly help to make the level of profitability more equal among 
branches over the period.
It should also be noted that the degree of association between sales 
profits on fixed assets and the growth of the capital base, as shown by the
i
adjusted R in Table 7-12, was modest. This leaves room for other factors to 
be taken into account. A comparison made of capital-intensive and labour- 
intensive branches shows that labour-intensive branches also suffered a 
greater decline in sales profits on fixed assets in 1980-1992, which implies 
that fast rising labour costs were indeed an important factor responsible for 
the overall fall in industrial profitability. In a same manner, a comparison 
made of material-intensive and non-material-intensive branches (defined as the 
ratio of material consumption to the gross value of output in a branch) shows 
in addition that material-intensive branches suffered a greater decline in 
sales profits on fixed assets over the period, which implies that rising 
relative prices in industrial materials were also an important factor 
responsible for the overall fall in industrial profitability.
% change in sales profits on fixed assets in 1980-92
17 labour-intensive branches
13 capital-intensive branches — 1 1 . 7 ( - 4 . 4  if excluding coking) 
-46.0
15 material-intensive branches -49.7
15 non-material-intensive branches -12.7
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As far as the issue of magnitude is concerned, we may reasonably 
conclude from the above results that among all of these relevant factors that 
affect falling rate of return on capital in post-reform China's industry, the 
most important factor is capital growth, and the next is the increase in 
labour costs, with the changes in relative prices of industrial inputs to 
outputs as the least significant factor. Of capital growth it is particularly 
important that changes took the form of inter-branch shifts, i.e., that 
capital base grew unevenly among industrial branches. In branches that had 
traditionally had high returns such as the tobacco and textile industries, the 
capital base grew far faster than in other branches that had traditionally had 
low returns, such as machinery. As shown in Table 7-13, capital growth in 
terms of fixed assets per worker was faster in 17 traditionally high return 
branches than in 13 traditionally low return branches; accordingly, the rate 
of return fell more quickly in the high-return branches than in low-return 
branches.
Table 7-13. Comparison of high-return and low-return branches
17 high-return 
branches
13 low-return 
branches
% change in sales profits on
fixed assets in 1980-1992 -52.9
00CM1
Growth of fixed assets per
worker in 1980-1992 4.4 3.4
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  ZGGYJJTJNJ 19!)j . Status of faiqh- and low-returns is classified using 1980 criterion.
The inter-branch capital shifts, the faster rise of wages than output 
growth, and greater increases in input prices than in output prices, were all
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taking place along with structural adjustments in post-reform China's 
industry. The outcome of these structural adjustments was a realignment in 
inter-branch differentials in prices and rates of return, as well as in the 
cost structure of China's industry.
To summarise our discussions above, we have found the following main 
elements to be directly responsible for the overall and steady decline in 
fulfilled profits on total capital in post-reform China's industry: increases 
in negative non-operation balances, increases in the use of the circulating 
fund relative to fixed assets, and falls in sales profits on fixed assets. The 
main reasons for the increases in negative non-operation balances include some 
degree of deterioration of the business environment for China's industrial 
enterprises, and an implicit transfer of enterprises income. The excessive use 
of the circulating fund is associated with functional changes which is in turn 
partly related with the reluctance of the state to abandon its commitment to 
employment stability especially in SOEs. For whatever causes are behind the 
excessive use of the circulating fund, the supply-side causes seem to be the 
unbalanced reforms in the state banking system: the softer nature of short­
term capital lending. For the last element we have also identified several 
underlying factors: faster capital growth in traditionally labour-intensive 
branches; rising labour costs; and the rising relative prices of industrial 
materials.
These factors can be further categorized into structural and 
institutional types. Rising relative prices of industrial materials may well 
be regarded of the structural type. One of the main reasons for high returns 
in pre-reform China's industry was the low price of materials, particularly 
of agricultural materials used in industry. Against this background, 
industrial profitability would consequently fall with rises in input prices, 
relative to the change in output prices. Another structural change was capital
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Chapter Eight
Regional Growth and Competition
We have set forth the proposition, at the beginning of the present study, that 
economic growth may be regarded as a process in which major actors respond to 
changes in market conditions including demand changes by mobilising and 
allocating the productive resources available to them, with the objective of 
seeking gains from production expansion. Focusing on this process, we have 
demonstrated that in the post-reform period, (i) demand for industrial goods 
in China has grown fast in general; (ii) China’s industry has been able to 
increase its use of productive resources, particularly capital resources; 
(iii) with a greater orientation towards profit, China's industrial 
enterprises have been increasingly able to allocate their use of capital in 
line with sectoral differentials in productivity and profit rate. In our study 
of the profit-orientation behaviour of industrial enterprises, it is also 
found that tax returns were an important factor that affected capital shifts 
across industrial sectors or branches. This suggests that governments, 
especially regional and local governments, have had a significant influence 
on enterprise behaviour. In one sense, regional and local governments have 
also become a major actor in post-reform China's industry, alongside 
enterprises and the central government.
In the light of the greater role played by China's regional and local
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governments in economic development, their impact on industrial growth and 
productivity change should be taken into account. In particular, we have found 
in our study of productivity change(Chapter Six) that although overall 
productivity growth in post-reform China’s industry has been positive, 
achievements in productivity growth were unbalanced between the various 
industrial sectors. More specifically, it appears to be the case that in the 
post-reform period, productivity growth tended to be relatively slow or small 
in some industrial sectors with a higher productivity, compared to some 
industrial sectors with a lower productivity. This phenomenon requires an 
explanation which deals with the relative changes in industrial competence, 
that is believed to have been under the influence of regional and local 
governments.
To give a thorough account of the economic role played by regional
and local governments, their influence on resource mobilisation should also
be taken into account. In this chapter, we will consider the two aspects of 
regional and local governments' economic role: resource mobilisation and the 
allocation of production, with special reference to their implications for 
productivity change.
The organisation of the study is as follows. In Section I, we will
give an overview of regional industrial growth before and after reforms
started. We will show that disparities in regional industrial growth have 
become larger in China since the mid-1980s, mainly because greater market 
exposure has exerted an uneven influence on regional governments’ ability to 
increase productive resources as well as on their access to "resource 
markets". In Section II, we try to identify some characteristics of regional 
industrial competition by examining trends in the geographical spread of 
industrial production, at product level, in post-reform China. The evidence 
that we produce clearly shows that there was a close association between the
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growth of industrial production and the increase of regional participation. 
The greater regional participation in industrial production is in particular 
related to two factors: market demand and raw material supply. Two industrial 
branches are highlighted in these analyses: the chemical fertiliser and
cigarette industries. In Section III, we will compare factor mobility across 
industry and across regions, intending to show some overall characteristics 
of factor markets in post-reform China's industry.
I. Regional Industrial Growth in China
Generally speaking, national economic growth must take place through regional 
economic growth: either through more rapid economic growth in some regions or 
through more even economic growth in all regions. As a result, national 
production may be concentrated or more equally dispersed over regions at any 
point in time. In Maoist China, national economic growth was apparently 
pursued with the emphasis on more equal geographical production distribution, 
or even regional economic growth. In the early 1950s, industrial activities 
in China were regarded by the central government as "highly geographically 
unbalanced" and "irrational both from the economic point of view and in 
respect to national defence"^. In 1952, the coastal provincial regions 
produced nearly 70% of China's total industrial output(Table 8-1), of which 
the five coastal provinces of Shanghai, Liaoning, Hebei, Jiangsu, and Shandong 
alone accounted for about 58% of national industrial output. Against this 
background, the Chinese government adopted a policy orientation in favour of 
the inland region by shifting industrial production towards the inland region, 
especially heavy industry. From 1952 to 1978, the share of the coastal region
* This belief was firmly recorded in China's First Five-Year Plan for 
1953-1957(published in 1955). See Chu-yuan Cheng, China's Economic 
Development, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982, p.431.
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Table 8-1. Geographical distribution of industrial output(%), 1952-1992
1952 1965 1978 1985 1992
All industry
Coastal region 69.4 63.1 60.9 60.3(59.4) 67.6
Inland region 30.6 36.9 39.0 39.7(40.6) 32.4
Light industry
Coastal region 71.5 67.3 64.5 65.2(63.6) 72.4
Inland region 28.5 32.7 35.5 34.8(36.4) 27.6
Heavy industry
Coastal region 65.5 58.8 58.2 55.5(55.6) 63.7
Inland region 34.5 41.2 41.8 45.5(44.4) 36.3
Source and note: 2GGYJJTJZL lWb, pp.b-b and 22b: TJKJ i, p.61. Comparable prices are used for 1952 
to 1985 in the original compilationfZGGYJJTJNJ 1986, p.226); figures in parenthesis and of 1992 are in current 
prices. Coastal region includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainanfin 1992). Inland region is the rest of the mainland China.
in China’s national industrial production fell to 61%. While the overall 
relative positions of the coastal and inland regions did not change much over 
1978-1985, the share taken by the inland region in China's heavy industry 
production continued to rise in the period, from 42% to 46%. With this faster 
growth in the inland region, China’s industrial production thus moved towards 
a more equal geographical distribution during the pre-reform period .
More notably, in pursuit of the development strategy of regional
The equality trend can be seen from the narrowing variation among 
regional industrial production. The coefficient of variation for 29 provinces 
are(in parenthesis are 27 provinces excluding the largest and smallest 
provinces):
1952 1965 1980 1985 1992
1.27 1.09 0.85 0.80 0.91
(1.08) (0.82) (0.73) (0.72) (0.80)
The decreasing trend in the variation continued until 1985, and turned around 
in 1985-1992. See also, WB, China: Macroeconomic Stability and Industrial 
Growth under Decentralised Socialism. Washington, D.C., 1991, Ch. 3
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economic growth, pre-reform China specifically advocated the policy of
provincial self-sufficiency, encouraging provinces to diversify their
production activities between the upstream and downstream industrial sectors,
and among basic machinery and consumer good production. Because production
conditions and demand conditions were widely different among individual
regions, efforts made in the various provincial regions for diversification
and self-sufficiency(though they brought about a similar sectoral or branch
composition of industrial production) inevitably resulted in some wide
3
disparities in profit rate at provincial level .
Since the mid-1980s, relative economic growth including industrial 
growth in the coastal and inland regions began change significantly. The 
faster industrial growth that the coastal region gained in 1985-1992 enabled 
the region to take a greater share in China's total industrial production by 
1992 (67.7%, a level close to the 69.4% in 1952). Moreover, the rising
importance of the coastal region has been seen in both light and heavy 
industry. Overall, industrial production seems to have become more unequally 
spread among China's provincial regions during 1985-1992, in terms of a 
greater regional variation in national industrial production(Footnote 2).
It would be interesting to consider the main reasons behind the 
unequal regional growth in post-reform China in the context of the central 
government's continued policy orientation towards equal regional growth and 
provincial governments' stronger quest for accelerating economic growth in 
their own regions. A serious doubt about any change in the regional 
development strategy in post-reform China has been raised by an observer, who 
has put it:
It remains to be seen whether China's recent reforms signed an end
3
See the World Bank, China: Long-term Development Problems and Options. 
Washington, D.C., 1985, Ch. 5
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to the Maoist pattern of development. Tendencies toward excessive 
geographical dispersion in new industries such as consumer electronics, new 
obstacles to interprovincial trade in agricultural products such as tobacco 
and cotton, and occasional recourse to the familiar rhetoric of self- 
sufficiency, suggest that the legacy of the Maoist era may influence the 
pattern of activity for some time^.
Evidence shows that the central government has maintained its financial 
inclination towards the inland region. In 1989-1991, the share of the coastal 
region in basic construction investment, a form of investment much under the 
influence of the central government, fell from 52.5% to 48.7%; whilst measured 
in total fixed capital investment, which includes other forms of investment, 
the share taken by the coastal region remained virtually unchanged, from 57.5% 
to 57.0% . Faster growth in the coastal region seems to be explained by 
factors other than its reliance on central government’s direct financial 
support.
Obviously, because the coastal region was a traditionally developed 
area in China, it had some comparative advantages over the inland region, such 
as a skilled labour force, a more mature industrial base, and a less 
insufficient infrastructure, etc. Amongst all, the most important factor to 
explain the different growth speeds in the coastal and inland regions seems 
however to be the degree to which industrial growth relied upon the growth in
 ^ Thomas P. Lyons, Economic Integration and Planing in Maoist China, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p.279
c;
See Zhongguo guding zichan touzi tongji ziliao (Statistical Data of 
China's Fixed Asset Investment) 1990-1991, pp.28 and 75. A more precise 
description of the central government’s inclination may concern its role as 
"a budgetary transfer agency” between richer and poorer regions(David L. 
Denny, ’'Provincial Economic Differences Diminished in the Decade of Reform” , 
in the USCJEC, ed. China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s, Washington, D.C., 
Vol. I, 1991). As most of the poorer provinces were in the inland region, the 
inclination for the poorer and that for the inland region overlapped.
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the state industry sector. As shown in Table 8-2, the coastal region's share 
in total state industrial production was declining in 1981-1992, but its share 
in non-state industrial production rose considerably. Of the coastal region, 
the fastest growth was seen in the five south-eastern provinces, Shanghai, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong(and Hainan after 1985). By 1992, 
whilst the five provinces held little more than one-quarter of China's state 
industrial production, they accounted for nearly half of China's collective 
industrial production and over three-quarters of China's joint-ownership 
industrial production. In these five provinces, overall industrial growth was 
therefore greatly due to the proliferation of the non-state sector.
Table 8-2. Share of coastal region in industrial output (%), 1981-1992
State CollectiveJoint-
ownership
Individual 
and private
1981 Coastal region 58.3 67.5
of which: south-eastern region 28.9 39.3
1988 Coastal region 54.4 72.2 94.5 55.2
of which: south-eastern region 27.3 44.7 74.2 24.1
1992 Coastal region 55.1 75.3 93.4 58.2
of which: south-eastern region 27.6 46.1 76,6 25.2
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  tJNJ 1981, 1989 and 199J, Coastal region is defined the same as before. South-eastern 
region included Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan. Data of joint-ownership and 
individual industrial production are not available until 1988.
Of the non-state sector, it is particularly impressive that a great 
proportion of China's joint-ownership industry located in the coastal region 
and especially in the five south-western coastal provinces{six if we include 
Hainan). Of this joint-ownership industry, a significant proportion was 
foreign-related enterprises. The coastal region has shown its comparative 
advantages, when compared with the inland region, in absorbing foreign
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investment. In 1989, out of total foreign direct investment in mainland China,
61% went to the six south-western coastal provinces. In 1992, the same ratio
rose to 75%. This vast foreign capital inflow has been aimed at export-
oriented manufacturing and was therefore greatly conducive to industrial
growth in these regions. The relative success of the coastal region in
absorbing foreign direct investment may be partly ascribed to its geographical
position neighbouring and historical ethnic affinity to areas such as Hong
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, etc^. A more important factor was doubtlessly the
open-door policy implemented in these provinces. A string of special economic
zones were first established in these south-western coastal provinces, where
foreign-related enterprises then became a major force in pursuing export-
7
oriented manufacturing .
Compared to the coastal region, the inland region continued to rely 
on state industry and funding support from the central government to a 
relatively large extent. As the growth of state industry was overshadowed by 
the growth of non-state industry overall and the central government's 
financial capability shrank relatively, the inland region was thus exposed to 
disadvantages. Although non-state industry has grown fast and indeed much 
faster than state industry in the inland region, the pace of growth and the 
scale of non-state industry in the inland region were still behind that in the 
coastal region. As a result, the inland region saw its share in China's 
industrial production falling in the later years of the post-reform period.
The above discussion may be summarised as follows: as the central
k A detailed account of the close investment and trade links of Guangdong 
and Fujian with Hong Kong and Taiwan can be seen from Robert Ash and Y.Y. 
Yueh, "Economic Integration within Greater China: Trade and Investment Flows 
between China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan", CQ, No. 136 (December 1993)
7
In some SEZs such as Zhuhai (neighbouring Macau), foreign-related firms 
contributed over half of total exports. Overall, foreign-owned firms 
contributed 20% of China's manufactured exports in 1992, against 1% in 
1985(the UN, World Economic Survey, 1993, p.197)
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government favoured the inland region especially in the pre-reform period, the 
inland region gained faster industrial growth than the coastal region; since 
reforms started, the leverage of the central government over regional growth 
became less strong than it had been, and market forces began to play a more 
important part; in the process of seeking gains from market expansion, the 
coastal region exhibited a clear comparative advantage over the inland region: 
using foreign capital to develop export-oriented manufacturing enterprises; 
mainly based on this comparative advantage, the coastal region was able to 
achieve faster industrial growth than the inland region after the later 1980s; 
and despite the central government's continued bias, the inland region was 
unable to achieve industrial growth as high as that in the coastal region 
because its main markets were at home, or more .specifically, within the 
region.
An immediate implication of the regional industrial growth in post­
reform China seems to be that for a region, the pursuit of production 
expansion based on its own markets might help to accelerate industrial growth 
for a certain period of time, especially when there is support from outside 
sources such as the central government, but that continued reliance on the 
local markets would however inevitably render the region exposed to a greater 
disadvantage, its growth lagging behind those regions which are also seeking 
expansion in markets outside their own regions. As we have noted, the reliance 
on local markets was part of the legacy of Maoist development strategy, and 
as we will demonstrate next, it has continued to be in effect in post-reform 
China's industry, except for the coastal regions that we have discussed. To 
our understanding, this issue has an enormous implication for overall 
industrial growth and productivity change in post-reform China. We will 
dedicate our study in the next section to this issue with special reference 
to its implications for regional growth and productivity change.
238
II. Regional Growth through Localised Production Expansion
Many observers have noted that there were strong equalisation tendencies in
China’s regional industrial production: various provincial regions tended to
participate in many common industrial activities; production such as iron and
0
steel and durable consumer goods was widespread over many regions . In what 
follows, we will first examine the overall equalisation(or concentration) 
trends, at branch level, during the post-reform period; this investigation is 
then followed by an examination at product level, which will help us to 
establish the association between regional equalisation tendencies and 
industrial growth. Based on these investigations, we address the question of 
by what means regional governments have been able to pursue industrial 
expansion in their own regions. The implications of the efforts made by 
regional governments to achieve industrial growth and productivity will be 
discussed in line with these findings.
Whether there is a equalisation tendency in regional production may 
be looked at two interrelated ways: regional specialisation that indicates 
production concentration within a region; and regional concentration that 
indicates production concentration over regions. Empirically, we may use a 
"vertical" measure to measure regional specialisation: the change in the 
branch composition of a region's industrial production over time; on the other 
hand, we may use a "horizontal" measure to measure regional concentration: the 
change in the regional composition of industrial production in a branch over 
time. The former measure would help to show whether a region tends to
0
See the World Bank, China: Long-Term Development Problems-and Options, 
o p .cit. , Ch. 5; also, China: Macroeconomic Stability and Industrial Growth 
under Decentralised Socialism. Washington, D.C, 1990; Thomas P. Lyons, 
o p .cit.; A. Hussain, Olson Lanjouw and L. Li, The Chinese Television Industry: 
The Interaction between Government Policy and Market Forces. CP/9, STICERD, 
London School of Economics, 1991
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Table 8-3. Coefficient of variation in 26 provinces by 18 manufacturing 
branches
1985 1990 Change
Beijing .86 .88 +
Liaoning .89 .90 +
Jiangsu 1.09 1.12 +
Zhej iang 1.10 1.24 +
Guangxi 1.21 1.26 +
Yunnan 1.73 2.07 +
Share of above regions in total GVIO 30.6 30.2
Tianjin .80 .80
Hebei 1.09 .97 -
Shanxi 1.07 1.06 -
Inner Mongolia 1.28 1.23 -
Jilin .95 .87 -
Helongjiang .99 .97 -
Shanghai .93 .85 -
Anhui 1.21 1.07 -
Fujian 1.09 .92 -
Jiangxi .88 .77 -
Shandong 1.20 1,05 -
Henan 1.24 1.02 -
Hubei .98 .93 -
Hunan .97 .88 -
Guangdong .81 .78 -
Sichuan 1.09 .95 -
Guizhou 1.44 1.41 -
Shaaxi 1.06 .96 -
Gansu .93 .89 -
Xinjiang 1.37 1.35 -
Share of above regions in total GVIO 68.9 69.0
Source and note: The calculation is on productions of 18 manufacturing branches as detailed in table 
8-4. Data sources are also same to Table 8-4.
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Table 8-4. Coefficient of variation in 18 manufacturing branches by 26 
provinces
1985 1990 Change
Food, beverage & cigarette .56 .59 +
Textiles 1.07 1.18 +
Paper-making .63 .65 +
Chemicals .73 .75 +
Pharmaceutical goods .73 .75 +
Plastics 1.01 1.08
Building materials .70 .72 +
Metal goods .83 .86 +
Machinery .80 .82 +
Electricity equipment .96 1.01 +
Electronics & Telecommunication goods 1.16 1.17
Share of above branches in total GVIO 68.8 68.5
Coking, gas & coal
CTl
oi—i .97 -
Timber .96 .90 -
Petroleum refinement 1.40 1.25 -
Chemical fibre 1.67 1.44 -
Rubber .80 .79 -
Ferrous metals processing 1.10 1.00 -
Transport equipment .83 .81 -
Share of above branches in total GVIO 19.1 19.3
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  The calculation is on the production of 26 provincial regions in total gross value of 
a branch in current prices. Qinghai, Ningxia and Tibet are excluded and Hainan is in Guangdong in 1990. For 
data from 1985, see the ZGGYJJTJZL 1 9 8 6 , p p . 9-18; for data from 1990, see the ZGGY J J T J N J  1 9 9 1 , p p . 203-293. The 
s tarting year and 18 branches are chosen because of the data availability. Total GVIO is for whole industry 
excluding extracting and ele c t r i c i t y  power industry. The difference in GVIO shares taken by the two sets of
b ranches is due to other manuf a c t u r i n g  branches that are not counted in our calculation.
concentrate on a few industrial products, whilst the latter would help to show 
whether national production in one branch tends to concentrate in a few
regions,
Tables 8-3 and 8-4 report the empirical results of regional
specialisation and regional concentration trends in China's manufacturing over
241
1985-1990. In the two tables, we use the coefficient of variation to measure 
the production dispersion over branches(the "vertical" measure) and over 
regions!the "horizontal" measure). As the tables show, the results are mixed. 
In Table 8-3, out of the twenty six provincial regions, six saw the variation 
rising or not falling and twenty saw the variation falling over the period. 
The six regions accounted for about 30% of China's manufacturing production 
in the branches, and the twenty regions accounted for about 70%. This seems 
to imply that the majority of the China's provincial regions tended to engage 
in more manufacturing branches or tended to diversify their industrial 
activities over more manufacturing branches in the period. In interpreting 
these results, we should however be aware of the possible effect of regional 
size on regional branch composition. Most of the Chinese provinces were quite 
large in terms of population or land acreage, and a degree of diversification 
would well be expected. Also, the scope of some of the manufacturing branches 
in our study is very broad. For example, the branch of textiles includes all 
types of textile activities, and it alone accounted for over 10% of China's 
total industrial production in the period. The broadness could possibly 
conceal some actual equalisation or concentration trends in a subset of a 
branch. We shall therefore look into trends at product level, as will be shown 
later^.
In Table 8-3 out of eighteen manufacturing branches, eleven saw the 
variation becoming larger and seven saw the variation becoming smaller. The 
eleven branches accounted for about 69% of China's manufacturing production 
and the seven less than one fifth in the period. This seems to imply that 
production in China's main manufacturing branches has tended to move towards
q
We may note from the Table 8-3 that, in the six provincial regions 
seeing the variation rising in 1985-1990, five belong to the coastal region 
(those excluding Yunnan). How significant this association would be awaits 
further observations.
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a degree of regional concentration over the period. In interpreting the trend, 
again we have to consider the high level of aggregation in measurement, i.e, 
the broadness of scope of some branches. As we have shown earlier, overall, 
industrial production in China has tended to shift into the coastal region 
since the mid-1980s. The results that we see here in Table 8-4 may therefore 
be a reflection of this overall regional growth trend. More interestingly, 
these results seem to suggest that despite the fact that there were some 
apparent equalisation or diversification tendencies in individual regions1 
manufacturing production, overall manufacturing production at branch level 
still tended to concentrate in a few regions. An implication of these relative 
changes in regional specialisation and regional concentration seems to be that 
though most of China's provincial regions have sought their industrial 
expansion in a similar manner, i.e., diversification over various 
manufacturing branches, the outcomes of their efforts were different: some 
regions achieved faster growth in some or even most of the manufacturing 
branches, overshadowing other regions.
An interesting question that may be raised is why most of China's 
provincial regions tended to follow a similar development strategy: 
diversification over manufacturing activities. In the context of pre-reform 
China's industrialisation, the reason seems to lie in the motivation towards 
provincial self-sufficiency. As we have mentioned earlier, this motivation was 
associated with defence purposes, i.e., strategic considerations, and also 
promoted by the central government during the pre-reform period. It seems that 
the economic bias towards provincial self-sufficiency should be much weaker 
in the post-reform period, if gains from regional specialisation became large. 
The question may be addressed in another way: what gains were expected by 
those regions that pursued non-specialised development in the post-reform 
environment?
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Table 8-5. Coefficient of variation In 26 major products by 28 provinces
Coeff. of variation Growth rate
1980 1990 1980-90
Clothes 0.973 1.040 3.6
Textile Yarns 0.983 1.062 5.2
Paper 0.683 0.747 10.9
Radio set 1.554 2.224 -5.3
Sewing machine 1.280 1.372 -1.2
Tractor 1.665 1.962 -5.0
Cement 0.672 0.744 11.6
Machine tool 0.933 1.178 4.7
Arithmetic average growth rate 3.1
Woollen clothes 1.695 1.404 11.8
Canned Food 1,152 1.026 13.4
Cigarette 0.952 0.909 8.1
Bicycle 1.911 1.614 9.1
Watch 2.041 1.937 13.2
TV set 1.727 1.342 22.9
Refrigerate 2.821 1.338 56.8
Washing machine 1.792 1.402 28.4
Camera 2.979 2.497 19.1
Steel 1.469 1.193 6.7
Finished steel goods 1.309 1.149 7.2
Vehicle 1.875 1.570 12.8
Glass board 1.315 0.987 12.9
Sulphuric acid 0.945 0.824 4.5
Soda ash 2.702 1.666 7.8
Caustic soda 0.983 0.873 6.0
Chemical fertiliser 0.831 0.778 4.4
Chemical fibre 1.819 1.511 13.9
Arithmetic average growth rate 14.4
S o u r c e  a n d  n o t e :  The coefficient of variation is calculated on physical p r o d uction of 2# provincial 
r e g i o ns{excluding Tibet and Hainan). Growth rates are also calculated in physical quantity. Data of 1980 are 
from the ZGGYJJTJZL 1 9 8 6 , p p . 235-269, and data of 1990 from the TJNJ 1 9 9 1 , p p . 432-439 and p p . 422-427.
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To answer the question, we may first look at the issue of whether 
there is an association between production expansion and regional equalisation 
at product level. A positive close association between the two tendencies 
would suggest that all or most of the individual regions tended to seek 
production expansion by actively participating in those products that 
experienced faster growth overall. We present the comparison in Table 8-5. It 
clearly shows that a positive close association existed between the two 
tendencies.
From Table 8-5, we can note that, out of twenty six major 
manufactured products in Ghina, only eight saw a more unequal geographical 
distribution of production over provincial regions in 1980-1990, as indicated 
by the increased coefficients of variation, but that eighteen saw a more equal 
tendency as indicated by the decreased coefficients of variation(these results 
at product level are similar to those at branch level shown in Table 8-3). 
Among the eighteen are durable and non-durable consumer goods and capital 
goods (including industrial materials and equipment). More importantly, the 
table also shows that most of the products with a narrowing geographical 
variation are the ones with a higher growth rate, and most of the products 
with a rising geographical variation are ones with a lower growth rate. On 
average, in 1980-1990, products in the former category grew as slowly as at 
3.1% annually, and products in the latter category grew as high as 14.4% 
annually. During the period, at one extreme, i.e., tractors, the coefficient 
of variation became larger when production had actually fallen; at the other 
extreme, i.e., refrigerators, the coefficient of variation became smaller when 
production had grown at an astounding rate of over 50% annually over the ten 
years. Of the products that experienced a narrowing of the regional variation, 
there were some whose production did not grow fast or faster, such as chemical 
fertilisers and sulphuric acid. We may however note that during the period,
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China's imports of these goods increased considerably. For example, imports 
of chemical fertilisers increased by 11.6% annually in 1985-1990, far faster 
than the growth of domestic production(4.4%). Overall, we can fairly conclude 
that there was a close association between the growth(or decline) of 
production and a geographical spread(or concentration) of production in 
China's industry during the 1980s^.
A plausible explanation of the close association seems to be a 
process of interaction between market conditions and production conditions. 
For those products that experienced faster growth, demand was growing faster 
or new technology was diffusing faster, or both; the gains from participating 
in the process of production expansion were large when individual regions had 
obtained or increased their access to markets or new technology; with more 
participation from individual regions, the regional concentration declined. 
On the other hand, for those products that experienced slower growth, demand 
was growing slower or technology entered the mature stage; therefore, it was 
relatively easy for only a few regions that had comparative advantages in 
technology or other productive resources to survive, and regions without the 
comparative advantages had their level of production reduced; as a result, a 
more unequal geographical distribution of production appeared.
In this process of interaction, the decisive factors for regional 
industrial growth were access to markets and productive resources including 
technology. To show how China's industrial production has been allocated in
^  The association is seen also to exist in the growth process of a 
single product. For example, as shown below, the number of provincial regions 
producing tractors increased from 1965 to 1980 when its growth rate was rather 
high at 16.7% annually in the period; however, when the production declined 
in, say, 1980-1985, the number of producing regions decreased.
Production of tractors 1965 1980 1985 1990
Number of producing regions 7 21 14 11
Growth rate(%) 16.7 -14.4 -2.6
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line with regional markets and regional productive resources, we take two 
examples: the chemical fertiliser and the cigarette industries. Using the 
chemical fertiliser industry we will show that regional production was closely 
associated with regional markets; and using the cigarette industry we will 
show that regional production was closely associated with raw material supply 
in individual regions. The main common features in the two industries were the 
dominance of state enterprises^ and high profitability in industrial 
production(see below). The issues of relationship between central and regional 
governments may therefore be studied with reference to the two industries.
12A. The Chemical Fertiliser Industry
Chemical fertilisers were always regarded by the Chinese government an 
important capital good for agricultural growth. In the early 1950s, China had 
only two provinces that could produce a meagre quantity of chemical 
fertiliser. With an annual growth rate as high as 34% in 1952-1965, the 
chemical fertiliser industry was among the fastest growing industries in pre­
reform China. Technologically, China endeavoured to make a breakthrough in the 
construction of medium-sized chemical fertiliser factories in the first half
In 1992, state enterprises accounted for over 98% of value added in 
the cigarette industry and 73% in the chemical industry including chemical 
fertilisers. The average ratio was 63% of independent-accounting Chinese 
industrial enterprises.
12 A brief account of the historical background for the chemical 
fertiliser industry here and for the cigarette industry below is mainly drawn 
from some Chinese industrial administrations' own account of the industry 
concerned. Their narratives are recorded in several official and semi-official 
publication series: Dangdai zhongguo de huaxue gongye (Chemical Industry in 
Contemporary China), Dangdai zhongguo de qinggonye (Light Industry in 
Contemporary China)(both were published by Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 
1988, Beijing); Zhongguo gongye nianiian (the Almanac of China's Industry, 
published by Jingji kuanli chubanshe, Beijing, since 1991); and a 
comprehensive survey of China's industrial policy in various branches, 
Zhongguo gongye bumen chanve zhengzhe vaniiu (Studies of China's Industrial 
Policy By Branch, Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingrong chubanshe, 1989).
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of the 1960s. By 1965, virtually every provincial region in China had managed 
to operate its own fertiliser factories. Nevertheless, the central government 
favoured a few selected regions that acted as a supply centre for individual 
regional divisions. For example, in northern China, Shanxi was responsible for 
over two-thirds of division production; in southern China, Guangdong produced 
50%; in south-western China, Sichuan produced over two-thirds, etc. For the 
construction of large chemical fertiliser factories, China was still reliant 
on foreign technology imports, and this constituted a major constraint on the 
development of the industry in China, even in the post-reform period.
The demand for chemical fertilisers in China continued to grow and 
the growth even accelerated in the post-reform period, as China's agricultural 
growth also accelerated during the period. One indication of the fast growing 
demand for chemical fertilisers in the 1980s is that, though the domestic 
production did not grow fast, imports of chemical fertilisers increased 
considerably, as we mentioned above. On the other hand, the relatively 
underdeveloped inter-province transport system handicapped further and 
sufficient expansion in the traditional chemical fertiliser supply bases in 
China. In 1980-1988, when the profit rate was steadily declining in the 
majority of China's industrial branches, the chemical industry, of which 
chemical fertilisers were a major part, saw the profit rate rising.
Gains from establishing local chemical fertiliser factories were thus 
great. The main economic motivation for seeking expansion of localised 
production of chemical fertilisers was therefore to meet the local demand in 
individual regions. Whether this has been the case in China's chemical 
fertiliser industry may be verified by looking at the statistical association 
between regional production and regional markets. To conduct this examination, 
we use regional grain production as a proxy variable for the market for 
chemical fertilisers. The results of the statistical analysis are presented
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Table 8-6. Regional chemical fertiliser production and grain production
Number of
observations
(N)
Spearman's rank 
coefficient
Regression: Ftzj = a + (3(Grn)j + e^
rfi = l-6[EdVN(Nz-l) ] {3 t~value R^ adj D-W statistic
1981 29 
1988 30 
1992 30
0.92
0.90
0.84
1.02 12.51 0.85 2.13 
0.99 12.08 0.83 1.61 
0.94 9.99 0.77 1.45
Source and note: rJjfJ i s m ,  iy«y and l y y i . In regressions, regional perc e n t a g e  snares in n a t i o n a l
production of grain(Grn) and chemical fertilisers(Ftz) are used, 
in Table 8-6.
From Table 8-6, we may first note that there is a high correlation 
between the regional production of chemical fertilisers and regional grain 
production(approximately indicating the regional demand for chemical 
fertilisers), as shown by the Spearman’s rank coefficient(the coefficient 
becomes 1.0 when there is an exact correlation between two variables). 
Moreover, as shown by the regression estimates in Table 8-6, it appears that 
during 1981-1992, if a region’s share in national grain production increased 
by one percentage point, the region's share in national chemical fertiliser 
production would also increase about one percentage point. This implies that 
there seems to exist a near equality between regional production and the size 
of the regional market in the case of the chemical fertiliser industry. In 
other words, the size of a local market seems to be the major decisive factor 
in local production.
The close association between regional production and regional market 
size seems to imply that regional governments were well aware of profitable 
opportunities arising from the growth of regional markets and tended to take
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advantage of the greater access to local markets to develop local Industry. 
Because of the active response to the market by regional governments, the 
negative impact of the relatively underdeveloped inter-province transport 
system on industrial growth were alleviated.
B. The Cigarette Industry
In the early 1950s, cigarette factories in China were mostly located in a few 
regions such as Shanghai, Henan, Shandong, and Tianjin. The four regions 
contributed over 60% of total cigarette production, and Shanghai alone 28%. 
In most years of the pre-reform period, though cigarette products were highly 
priced and therefore highly profitable in China, the production grew rather 
slowly, slower than the speed of overall industrial growth in 1952-1980. The 
slow growth was mainly due to the tight control on the cigarette industry 
exercised by the central government. Several new cigarette industry bases in 
the inland region were however developed during the pre-reform period. They 
include Hunan, Sichuan, and most importantly, Yunnan. By 1980, every 
provincial region in China, except Tibet, had established some cigarette 
factories locally.
The profit rate in the cigarette industry fell sharply in the 1980s 
mainly because of the production expansion. Nevertheless, among all of the 
industrial branches, the cigarette industry maintained the highest profit rate 
throughout the post-reform period. Incentives for every region to develop a 
local cigarette industry were apparently strong. The major constraints on 
local production expansion were the restriction exercised by the central 
government and the availability of productive resources, especially of the raw 
material: tobacco leaf supply. The tight control by the central government 
actually relaxed in line with overall decentralisation in the post-reform
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period. Also, because of the pre-reform geographical proliferation in China's 
cigarette industry, most of the provincial regions had access to the 
cigarette industry technology, though not to the same extent. It was the raw 
material supply, production of tobacco leaf, that quickly became the most 
scarce resource when cigarette production expanded rapidly. The availability 
and control of the raw material supply therefore became the major factor in 
determining regional success.
Table 8-7. Regional cigarette production and tobacco leaf production
Number of
observations
(N)
Spearman's rank 
coefficient
Regression: Cigj = a + 3(Tab)^ + e^
rg = 1 -6 [ Ed /N (N -1) ] 3 t-value adj D-W statistic
1982 29 
1988 30 
1992 30
0.71
0.84
0.85
0.56 9.42 0.76 0.94 
0.53 9.02 0.73 1.41 
0.57 10.38 0.79 1.46
Source and note: TJNJ Iu regressions, regional per c e n t a g e  shares in national
production of cigarette(Cig) and tobacco leaves(Tab) are used.
Statistical examinations of regional cigarette production and tobacco 
leaf production seem to have confirmed this perception. As we may see from 
Table 8-7, the Spearman's rank coefficients between regional cigarette 
production and tobacco leaf production are positive and high, and even have 
a tendency to become higher from 1982 to 1992. The regression results also 
show that when a region's share in national tobacco leaf production increased 
one percentage point, its share in national cigarette production would 
increase more than half a percentage point. An immediate implication seems to 
be that a region tended to be able to achieve success in the cigarette
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industry when it was able to achieve success in its tobacco leaf production.
More generally, the close association between regional industrial 
production and raw material supply, as exemplified by the cigarette industry, 
suggests that regional governments in post-reform China have very positively 
responded to the market by attempting to solve the bottleneck problems in 
production expansion. They made great efforts to increase raw material supply 
when the processing industry was perceived as highly profitable. In the case 
of tobacco leaf, the demand-driven effect on production expansion was indeed 
tremendous. In 1980-1992, the sown area of tobacco leaf in China enlarged by 
470%, not only the fastest increase among all cash crops but also faster than 
the increase of tobacco leaf produced(4.4 times in the same period). Tobacco 
leaf production expansion was mainly due to the increase in the sown area of 
tobacco leaf.
To summarise our discussions of the chemical fertiliser and cigarette 
industries, we may conclude that under the post-reform decentralisation, the 
greater initiatives and incentives given to regional governments have enabled 
them to respond actively to the market by effectively adjusting production to 
accessible markets(in the case of chemical fertilisers) and mobilising scarce 
productive resources(in the case of cigarette and tobacco leaf production). 
The efforts made by regional governments in expanding localised industrial 
production had great positive impacts on the overall industrial growth in 
post-reform China by two means: first, maximally exploiting the market
potentials at each point of time, which to a certain degree has lessened the 
negative effect of the relatively underdeveloped inter-province transport 
system on production expansion; second, the constraints of relatively scarce 
productive resources on production expansion were also alleviated as regional 
governments had a greater influence, compared to the central government, on 
the increase in and allocation of the resources. Increases in the supply of
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a scarce productive resource(such as tobacco leag) could be pursued and
achieved even at the expense of productivity growth (such as the fall in
tobacco leaf produced per unit of sown area in 1980-1992). Overall, the
accelerated industrial growth in post-reform China has been contributed to by
n
the localised industrial production expansion .
From the regional specialisation point of view that we outlined 
earlier, regional growth based on local markets is a contrasting tendency to 
regional specialisation. Because of this, regional growth through localised 
production expansion has had also some negative impact on overall industrial 
growth and productivity change, (i) Commitment to local markets has affected 
the ability of a regional industry to seek expansion in other regions’ 
markets. If scale economies were great in an industry, such industrial markets 
fragmented by the regional administration system would certainly obstruct the 
exploitation of increasing returns to scale^. Also importantly, the reliance 
on local markets has put most of inland regions at a great disadvantage in 
seeking production expansion through export-oriented industrial activities, 
as the coastal region has done, (ii) Controls imposed by regional governments 
on product markets(e.g . , chemical fertilisers) and factor markets(e.g. , raw 
materials such as tobacco leaf) made it difficult for those technologically
In some other studies on similar issues, this has been expressed 
differently. For example, Hussain, et al, have addressed: "The spread of
factories to all parts of the country has the effect of increasing employment 
in some of more backward provinces. Whether encouraging regional autonomy 
rather than specialization and domestic trade is an effective policy for 
increasing employment in the long run is open to question. However, it 
probably prevents a situation where all industrial growth and employment move 
to the coastal regions and slows the growth in regional differences in 
welfare."(Hussain, et al, op.cit., p.56).
^  Not every industry would have significant scale economies. For 
example, it has been noted that, in China’s television industry, economies of 
scale seemed not to be significant and that would help "to explain the 
proliferation of assembly plants all over the country"(Hussain, et a l . 
o p .cit.). Nor should the market size in every Chinese province be regarded as 
small, or not large.
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advanced enterprises to expand in proportion to their competitiveness in the 
market. Under the fragmented product and factor markets, relatively 
inefficient enterprises could survive because of the distorted price and cost 
conditions(for example, an efficient enterprise might be faced with high-cost 
raw material supply, whilst an inefficient enterprise might have receive low- 
cost raw material supply, all depending upon the location of the enterprise 
concerned).
We should however note that to give a full account of the 
implications of localised production expansion on productivity change is an 
issue beyond the scope of the present study. We could hardly conclude by 
saying that localised production expansion would always negatively affect 
productivity growth. This is intrinsically a dynamic issue and much depends 
on how productivity growth would happen under localised production expansion 
in individual regions. In other words, productivity growth is not only 
affected by regional productivity differentials in an initial period, but 
perhaps more importantly, is reliant on the actual speed of productivity 
growth in the process of production expansion in individual regions. The size 
of and methodology involved with this issue warrant a separate study.
Moreover, given the data we have had access to when briefly
considering the issue, it is impossible for us to make conclusions about how
the revealed pattern of localised industrial production could be interpreted
in the context of the economics of location (i.e., an economic justification
of regional specialisation). A well-accepted proposition in the mainstream
study of the economics of location states that the location of an industry
must be determined by its comparative advantages in terms of either profits
15for the producers or gains for the consumers . It seems that the strong 
15 See David M. Smith, Industrial Location: An Economic Geographical 
Analysis. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2nd ed., 1971, p.86
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intervention of local governments alone would not be a sufficient reason for 
the overwhelming localised production, for it could, at least in theory, lead 
to an accelerated move into some form of regional specialisation if the gains 
from such a path were seen to be more advantageous. As a corollary, the 
relatively slowly reformed price system must have played a significant part 
in fossilising the ubiquitous localised production^.
III. Factor Mobility: Comparison of Inter-Regional and Inter-Branch Moves
In Chapter Seven we have shown that overall in post-reform China's industry 
there was a tendency towards convergence in returns to capital mainly because 
of enterprises' stronger profit-oriented behaviour and greater capital 
mobility across industrial branches. Here in this chapter we have however 
found that a large part of the industrial activities in post-reform China, 
especially in the inland region, were still characterised by some form of the 
localised orientation, i.e., relying on either local markets or the local 
supply of raw materials. It appears that we have encountered the question of 
how we should assess in particular the development of factor markets in post­
reform China's industry.
The question arises when we say that there was resource(productive 
factor) movement from areas with lower returns or a lower productivity into 
areas with higher returns or a higher productivity, and that the expansion of 
localised industrial production was reliant on some degree of fragmentation
^  If prices were market-determined, local governments in Xinjiang, where 
raw material resources of cotton and wool are relatively rich, would be less 
enthusiastic in investing in cotton or wool processing factories locally to 
compete with the coastal region that has technological advantages and 
therefore is able to offer higher prices to raw material producers. When the 
prices of the raw materials are fixed at a level below the market ‘rate, local 
governments in cotton- or wool-rich areas would be attracted to this price gap 
by investing in processing factories. This is a topic that needs more 
exploration, but we have to set it aside due to the limit of space.
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Table 8-8. Comparing the variation of profit rate by region and by branch
Region 1988 1992 Branch 1988 1992
Beijing 0.698 0.977 Food 0.320 0.667
Helongjiang 1.212 1.771 Beverage 0.364 0.400
Hebei 1.227 1.215 Textile 0.226 0.800
Liaoning 1.654 0.952 Clothing 0.321 0.445
Shanghai 2.174 1.990 Paper 0.295 0.426
Jiangsu 2.198 1.149 Building material 0.266 0.320
Zhejiang 1.653 1.304 Machinery 0.455 0.515
Shandong 1.140 1.136 Transport equipment 0.483 0.590
Henan 1.599 0.766 Electricity tool 0.256 0.302
Hubei 1.312 1.190 Electronics 0.391 0.714
Hunan 1.569 1.114 Tobacco 0.590 0.568
Guangdong 1.322 1.087 Chemicals 0.507 0.423
Sichuan 1.446 1.435 Ferrous metal 0.425 0.424
fixed capital. In the left panel is the coefficient of variation in a region over 13 manufacturing branches 
and in the right panel is the coefficient of variation in a branch over 26 provincial regions(excluding Qinhai, 
Ningxia, Tibet and Hainan). The 13 provincial regions were the largest in China's industryfthey accounted for 
78$ of GVIO in 1992), and the 13 branches were also the largest(they accounted for 75$ of GVIO in manufacturing 
in 1992). Besides the 13 provincial regions listed in the table, we have also calculated the coefficient of 
variation for the other 13 provincial regions. All of these 13 regions, except one(Inner Mongolia), saw the 
coefficient decrease in 1988-1992.
in factor markets. Could these two tendencies co-exist in post-reform China's 
industry?
As our comparative study will show below, these two tendencies have 
indeed co-existed in post-reform China's industry. Yet their co-existence was 
a feature of the transformation of market structure in China. To show whether 
and how these two tendencies have co-existed, we propose to compare factor
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mobility across regions and factor mobility across industrial branches. A 
hypothesis is that the alleged fragmentation in factor markets should be 
reflected in some degree of factor immobility across regions, and the observed 
overall convergence tendency in returns on capital should be substantiated at 
regional level as well, especially if there is insufficient factor mobility 
across regions. As we have pointed out before, an examination of factor(mainly 
capital) mobility or immobility may be conducted by referring to changes in 
the variation of returns on capital: a decrease in the variation of returns 
on capital may indicate greater capital mobility, whilst an increase in the 
variation of returns on capital may indicate a contrasting tendency.
The results of the comparison of the variation of returns on 
capital(profit rate) between that across regions and that across branches are 
reported in Table 8-8. Because compatible data prior to 1988 are not 
available, we compare 1988 and 1992 only. Also, to keep the illustration 
concise, we focus on China's largest industrial regions and largest 
Industrial(manufacturing) branches only.
The results in Table 8-8 show some contrasting trends in the 
variation of the profit rate across regions(in a branch) and across 
branches(in a region). Out of the thirteen largest industrial provincial 
regions, only two(Beijing and Helongjiang) saw the coefficient of variation 
of the inter-branch profit rate rise in 1988-1992, when all other eleven 
regions saw the coefficient of variation become smaller. This implies that the 
profit rate tended to become more equal among the major manufacturing branches 
for the majority of China's provincial regions in 1988-1992. On the other 
hand, out of the thirteen largest manufacturing branches, only three(tobacco, 
chemicals and the ferrous metal industry) saw the coefficient of variation of 
the inter-region profit rate fall in 1988-1992, when all other nine branches 
saw the coefficient of variation become larger. This implies that the profit
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rate tended to become more unequal among individual provincial regions for the 
majority of China's main manufacturing branches in 1988-1992.
The reasons for the changes in the coefficient of variation of the 
profit rate across either regions or branches may be various. But in any case 
the degree of capital mobility could be believed to have played a large part. 
With greater capital mobility, i.e., capital shifting from an area where the 
profit rate was low to an area where the profit rate high, the profit rate 
would tend to become more equal among these areas over a period of time; on 
the other hand, if capital was immobile or its mobility was small, changes in 
the profit rate in individual areas would be mainly affected by other factors 
such as changes in demand conditions or technology, and it would be likely, 
in this case, for disparities in the profit rate among areas to become wider 
over a period of time. We may fairly conclude, from the results shown in Table 
8-8, that the degree of capital mobility was different for the two 
perspectives: greater capital mobility seemed to have existed within each 
region, where the profit rate tended to become more equal among various major 
manufacturing branches over the 1988-1992 period; and less capital mobility 
seems to have existed within a manufacturing branch where the profit rate 
tended to become more unequal among the various provincial regions over 1988- 
1992.
These two contrasting trends seem to have confirmed the conclusions 
which we have arrived at; during the post-reform period, capital mobility 
across industrial branches has increased either in China's industry as a whole 
or within a provincial region, but because of the fragmented capital markets 
demarcated by the provincial administration, capital mobility across regions 
has not increased in proportion to its overall trend. It is mainly the 
relative difference in capital mobility across regions and across branches 
that has led to the sharp difference in the profit rate convergence, viewed
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both as the inter-branch capital mobility within a region and as the inter­
region capital mobility within a branch.
The convergence trend viewed in the inter-branch move within a region 
means that most of the Chinese provincial regions tended to shift their 
capital resources into industrial branches that were perceived as having a 
higher profit rate. As there were a number of manufacturing branches that had 
a high profit rate virtually everywhere in China’s provincial regions, mainly 
because of the price structure, the responses from individual regions to the 
differential profit rates tended to be quite common: increasing entry(by
regional capital investment) into the high-return areas such as cigarettes and 
some other light industry branches, especially in the first half of the 1980s. 
The vast and common entry into these areas resulted in a quick fall in the
profit rate, and therefore helped to smooth the profit rate differentials at
both national industry level and regional industry level. However, as every 
region had different productive conditions(and might have also faced slightly 
different demand conditions in local markets), the relative success of 
individual regions’ operation in these previously commonly high-return areas 
was nonetheless different or divergent, therefore resulting in a non-
convergent trend in the profit rate across regions.
Fundamentally, the main reason for the factor markets in post-reform 
China’s industry to become more flexible within a region but relatively 
inflexible across regions at the same time seems to lie in the greater 
autonomy gained by regional and local governments under the decentralised 
economic system. Under the decentralised economic system, individual regional 
and local governments not only gained more power to influence industrial 
activities in their own regions, but also had stronger financial motivations 
to initiate regional and local industrial development programmes. As we have 
demonstrated throughout the present study, much of post-reform China's
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industrial development has been in one way or another associated with this 
type of reform: the growth of regional investment activities, the growth of 
non-state industrial enterprises especially township and village enterprises, 
increased intervention from regional governments in the state banking system, 
and fragmentation in product markets and factor markets, etc. We have also 
pointed out that the greater role played by regional and local governments has 
been conducive to the accelerated industrial development all over China in the 
post-reform period, and it also has had some negative implications for 
productivity growth.
Now it is time for us to give a review of the greater role played by 
regional and local governments in post-reform China's industrial growth with 
regard to the historical transformation of the economic planning system. In 
one sense, the greater role played by regional and local governments has not 
fundamentally departed from the traditional state-controlled economic system. 
Under the decentralised economic system, enterprises, be they state-owned, 
collective-owned, or even privately-owned, are all subject to governments’ 
strong intervention at various levels. The independence of enterprises has 
grown rather slowly. On the other hand, however, all regional and local 
governments, besides the central government, now acted in an increasingly 
different economic environment: the market also began to have a greater role. 
It is the market to which individual regional and local governments would 
respond in formulating their industrial programmes and adjusting productive 
allocation in their own regions. By bestowing a greater autonomy on regional 
and local governments, who had a strong appetite for financial gains from 
localised production expansion, the traditional state monopolistic industrial 
structure began to be dismantled along with the proliferation of regional and 
local industry. Also, to actively respond to the market, regional and local 
governments have been greatly motivated to increase their use of productive
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resources especially those that were available locally. Compared to the 
central government, regional and local governments demonstrated their greater 
ability to facilitate the growth of productive resources including industrial 
raw materials. Still, in implementing the open-door policy, regional and local 
governments in the coastal region began to turn to export-oriented industrial 
development and tended to break through the traditional local-market-based 
industrial pattern. Overall, in this respect, the greater role of the market 
and the greater role of regional and local governments seem to have 
collaborated well in the process of post-reform China's industrial growth. In 
other words, the greater autonomy gained by regional and local governments 
under decentralised socialism was a significant step in post-reform China's 
move towards a market-type economy.
Because of this characteristic, however, the evolution of the market- 
type economy in post-reform China has not been well balanced in some aspects. 
Under the great influence of regional and local governments, market 
integration may have emerged at a regional or local scale, but its progress 
at national scale, i.e, at inter-region level, has been relatively slow. For 
this problem, perhaps we may expect that along with greater enterprise 
independence, market integration at national scale will accelerate and 
gradually override the restrictions imposed by regional and local governments.
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Chapter Nine
Conclusion
Much of our attention in the preceding discussion has been directed towards 
contributing factors to post-reform China's industrial growth in quantifiable 
terms such as changes in factor use and productivity. As we have repeatedly 
pointed out, these quantitative changes were associated with institutional 
changes (both economic system reforms and policy shifts) related to the 
pursuit of economic growth. In order to show the implications of the 
institutional changes for post-reform China's industrial growth, our analysis 
has focused on resource mobilisation and efficiency improvement, the twin 
perspectives which have defined the major thrust of our study.
The basic conclusion which we have arrived at from our study is that 
China has made some breakthroughs in the two aspects of its industrial growth 
during the post-reform period. Both the success in resource mobilisation and 
improvement in industrial productivity, which post-reform China has achieved, 
were closely associated with the transformation and integration of a 
traditional centrally planned economic system into a market-type economy. To 
date, the essence of the transformation has been the greater emphasis placed 
on the role of market, even though remains within the framework of a dirigiste 
and interventionist approach to modern industrial growth.
In terms of resource mobilisation, there are a number of areas in
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which significant progress has been achieved. First, in the domestic market, 
restraints on the growth of the household sector were gradually relaxed, and 
this growth was given further impetus by accelerated urbanisation after 1980. 
The structural orientation of industry has accordingly been shifted towards 
the consumer goods industry, and industrial linkages through the market 
thereby received greater encouragement. Second, the greater emphasis placed 
on the role of market was also reflected in the intensified use of overseas 
markets, which was facilitated by measures such as export promotion and 
encouragement of foreign capital inflows. Third, more impressively, post­
reform China has been able to maintain a high investment rate for industry, 
largely thanks to the greater allowance awarded to non-state enterprises and 
government agencies at lower levels as well as the household sector. Though
the state still controls the banking sector --- the paramount funding source
for state industry in the post-reform period --- the overall performance of
the finance sector was undoubtedly quite successful in terms of the voluntary 
mobilisation of social saving resources.
The greater role of market in post-reform China's industrial growth 
had two important effects: the provision of more economically rational
guidance for structural change; and, together with enterprise reforms, the 
injection of stronger incentives for economic agents to reduce costs and 
maximise profit. As a result, the overall efficiency in post-reform China's 
industry improved. Yet, as we pointed out in Part Two, compared with the 
increased use of productive resources and its associated significant 
contribution to China's industrial growth in the post-reform period, the 
improvement in production efficiency and its contribution to industrial growth 
was less impressive. The extent of productivity increase was smaller than 
might have been expected in some industrial sectors, and the trend in 
productivity change has yet to be stabilised across periods of time.
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There were two factors, in particular, which contributed to the 
unbalanced improvement in post-reform China' s industrial productivity. One was 
the dramatic change in market conditions facing China's industry: the
traditional state monopolistic structure gradually gave rise to a competitive 
industrial structure which was a mixture of state and non-state forces 
(especially in some light manufacturing branches). The other was the strong 
interdependence between government agencies and enterprises. Such 
interdependence enabled government agencies, particularly regional and local 
governments, to exert great leverage over enterprise behaviour thereby 
affecting the incentive to and ability of enterprises to improve productivity.
A major question is raised by our analysis of resource mobilisation 
and productivity change in post-reform China's industry: how has resource 
mobilisation been related to productivity change in the process of reform, 
characterised by greater emphasis on the role of market? Part Three has 
attempted to address this issue by analysing the interaction between 
enterprises of various types and the impact of the interaction on market 
structure. The main conclusion we reach suggests that the greater emphasis 
placed on the market has, on the one hand, encouraged enterprises and various 
government agencies (especially regional and local governments) to actively 
respond to the market and make extensive use of the productive resources 
available to them. Entry into traditional monopolistic industries was 
motivated, particularly at lower administration levels. Competition appeared 
and intensified.
On the other hand, because of the strong interdependence between 
enterprises and government agencies especially regional and local governments, 
the domestic market facing China's industry has often been reflected in 
geographical divisions dictated by administration boundaries at various 
levels. Such intervention has also been associated with a greater awareness
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of the role of market, and functioned as a means of achieving the intensified 
use of productive resources. Within this framework of a quasi-market economy, 
productive resources were mobilised effectively, but improvement of efficiency 
in the use of productive resources was obstructed by a number of factors. It 
is apparent that whilst there was a huge increase in the use of productive 
resources (factor inputs) in post-reform China's industry, productivity 
improvement was sometimes frustrated, even if the overall trend was positive.
Post-reform China's industrial growth can thus be seen as having been 
characterised by unbalanced sectoral movements. The existence of uneven trends 
in sectoral production expansion was not new to post-reform China^ but it may 
have taken a different form in the transitional period. Unlike some strategies 
adopted by the Chinese government in the pre-reform period, which favoured 
unbalanced growth, post-reform China's economic policy has displayed an 
overall orientation towards balanced growth(see Chapter Three). However, such 
a policy itself was not sufficient to guarantee that the economy would follow 
a balanced path. When China embarked on its reforms, new shocks emerged from 
market forces which should in theory have propelled the economy towards 
balanced growth. But since the state remained committed to some traditional 
economic objectives and to some aspects of the command system, tension between 
market forces and plans became a new source of unbalanced growth. Some of 
measures by the state sought to counteract unbalanced shifts caused by this 
tension, but were unable to wholly eliminate the effect. This raised the 
danger that the state would assume an excessive, commandist role in the 
economy, as resources under its control contracted sharply relative to those
* It has been pointed out that in China on the eve of reform 
" [ d i s p r o p o r t i o n s  and imbalance - between agriculture, light and heavy 
industry, between production relations and productive forces, between 
accumulation and consumption - were the generic factors underlying the 
emerging critique." (Peter Nolan and Robert Ash, "China's Economy on the Eve 
of Reform", forthcoming in CQ, 1995)
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which were becoming increasingly exposed to the non-state sector or market. 
As a result, inflationary pressures built up from this additional source .
Our overall interpretation of post-reform China's industrial growth 
is, then, that reforms have energised market forces. Under the partially 
reformed framework of the command economy, these forces generated industrial 
growth, more from the intensified use of productive resources than from 
improvements in productivity. In the light of the huge development with which 
China was endowed on the eve of reform , it is perhaps not surprising that 
China should have achieved an impressive industrial growth record when it was 
fraught with economic tensions during the post-reform period. The struggle 
with which post-reform China entangled showed all the signs that China was 
just in the middle of the transition process towards a market-type economy.
The period of our study ends in 1992. In the next two years, the 
situation in China's industry remained basically unchanged^. In aggregate 
terms, industrial production continued to grow at a high speed(over 15% per 
annum), with industrial exports expanding more quickly(over 30% per annum). 
However, problems in some areas were exacerbated. From 1992 to 1993, the 
number of loss-suffering state industrial enterprises increased by over 30%. 
Far worse, the level of losses in state industrial enterprises reached to 245 
billion yuan in 1993, about one third of the VAIO of the year and over
2
In his recent article, Barry Naughton has arrived at a similar 
conclusion based on a more comprehensive macroeconomic analysis of China’s 
investment system: "China in Transition: Planning, Institutional Change, and 
the Macroeconomy", forthcoming in CQ (1995).
In one sense, our discussion of resource mobilisation falls into the 
category of development potential and its change over time. The concept of 
development potential contains factors more than those that can be counted in 
accounting terms such as entrepreneurship. A thorough and succinct analysis 
of the issue can be found in Peter Nolan and Robert Ash, o p .cit.
 ^ Data sources for the following brief description are: TJNJ, 1994, and 
Chen Jinhua, "Report of the Implementation of 1994 National Economy and Social 
Development Plan and 1995 National Economy and Social Development Plan Draft", 
The People’s Daily. 21 March 1995
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sixtimes that of 1992. The evidence seems to suggest that tensions rooted in 
the transitional economic system have intensified, as growth has accelerated.
Such a high level of losses places a huge burden on both government
and industry. It has caused wide concern in China because of its ominous
5
implications to society as a whole. Numerous interpretations have appeared . 
From the conceptual framework that set out in our study, the issue may be 
perceived in a rather different way. In one sense, that an increasingly large 
number of state industrial enterprises should have encountered difficulties 
is precisely the outcome of increased competition, either horizontal 
(geographical) or vertical (sectoral) . As we have pointed out in Chapter Eight, 
during the 1980s when localised industrial expansion became a significant 
trend through regional and local government’s greater intervention, 
fragmentation in China's domestic market generated very similar industrial 
structures in individual regions. As long as these regional or local markets 
are well protected by the relevant government agencies, enterprises operating 
on such bases need not be exposed to any serious challenge. With the regional 
or local markets gradually integrated into the national market, under­
performing enterprises are bound to be challenged and ultimately threatened 
with insolvency. An increase in the number of such enterprises can be 
therefore seen as a positive sign of market integration in China’s industry.
Thus, the real issue in contemporary China's industry is not simply 
that of the level of losses in S0Es(not even its continuing rise), but rather 
how to absorb the associated pressures and restructure the industrial sector 
in line with the greater role of market. The task is pressing and important.
In his recent fieldwork in China, the author came to learn these views 
from various sources including practice and research institutions. Popular 
interpretations of the cause of the problems in state industrial enterprises 
include: unimpressive management in SOEs; implementation of "contract
responsibility system’’ and its effect on- short-termism; historical burden 
suffered by SOEs; undefined property rights; technological backwardness. The 
sources are too many to list here.
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It is important to note that efforts directed merely towards the industrial
sector are not sufficient for fulfilling the task. As we have repeatedly
noted, the key issue for SOEs seeking successfully to implement restructuring
is how to address existing employment or over-employment^. As long as there
are no adequate employment opportunities in urban areas, the problem cannot
be solved effectively. In fact, the number of employees in state manufacturing
7
factories decreased in 1993 , unprecedented perhaps since the early 1960s. 
It seems plausible that the extent to which the state is willing to abdicate 
its protection for employment in state industry and therefore to allow loss- 
making SOEs to go bankrupt is linked with the realistic expectations of 
employment alternatives in urban areas.
Another associated issue, which is also related to the long-term 
perspective of China's industrial growth, is the development of the 
agricultural sector. In 1994 China encountered, once again, an unanticipated 
setback in agricultural production which caused high inflationary pressures, 
and forced the central government back to introduce a degree of retrenchment 
in the first half of 1995. In China today, not only does agricultural growth 
have powerful macroeconomic implications, but it also still impinges directly 
and significantly on industry. Linkages between agriculture and industry 
through conventional means such as market outlets, raw material supply, and 
surplus labour flow, all affect the competitiveness of China's industry, 
domestically and internationally. Moreover, from a long-term point of view,
 ^ The issue has two aspects: at micro level, it is estimated that about 
one fifth of employees in SOEs were surplus(Chen Zhigang, Xu Zhenghui and 
Zhang Ruiling, "Zhengcheng zhigong shiye zhuangkuan diaoza fenxi" (Survey and 
Analysis of Unemployment Situation of Staff and Workers in Townships), 
Zhongguo Gaige (China Reform), No. 2, 1995, p.36; at macro level, industry 
occupied a disproportionately large share in urban employment: over 43%
throughout the 1980s(calculating from TJNJ, various issues; the industry here 
includes SOEs, urban COEs, JOEs, and self-employment in urban areas). Both of 
the two ratios certainly pose a difficulty for industrial restructuring.
7 T J N J , 1994, p.94
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it can hardly be expected that China will continue to maintain its industrial 
growth momentum without a breakthrough in the relatively backward agricultural 
sector. Dangers may ensue, if the outward-oriented industrial growth is 
pursued too far in some parts of the economy(e.g., the south-eastern coastal 
region), whilst the agricultural sector remains stagnant. Market integration 
in the domestic economy will certainly break down in such circumstances. 
Balanced growth between industry and agriculture is the only appropriate 
policy choice.
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